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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Relevance and structure of the analysis 
 
With approximately 650.000 members, the Hungarian-speaking Szekler community is 
one of the largest nationalities of Europe that has not yet obtained any kind of autonomy. 
The many public protests, demonstrations, the numerous drafts, programs and manifestos 
of Hungarian political organizations, scientific institutions or NGOs show a permanent 
discontent of the Hungarian minority regarding their legal status in Romania. Given that 
such discontent was present in different forms ever since the territorial changes after the 
First World War, the question of the Hungarian minorities in the successor states of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire (see Figure 1) is often characterized as one of the major 
unresolved questions of Central and Eastern Europe.1 It is no great surprise, however, that 
this opinion is not widely shared by state officials of countries having extensive 
Hungarian minority communities. As a matter of fact, it is the most common viewpoint 
one would hear that the minority question in Romania is solved in an exemplary manner. 
Any subject which continues to polarize the public opinion so vividly is worthy of 
scientific analysis. Indeed, the issues discussed in this dissertation raise many questions 
worthy of further scientific research. Larger international scientific attention, however, is 
made difficult by the fact that some of the legal materials most relevant for a better 
understanding of the case are only available in either Romanian or Hungarian. Even 
though this dissertation does not provide the full English translation of these legal 
materials, the extensive summaries that it contains will hopefully prove to be a 
contribution to foster more international scientific attention.  
The following chapter provides the methodological underpinnings and the 
theoretical framework of the research, including most importantly the rationale behind 
the case selection. The same chapter also offers the explanation of the primary concepts 
used throughout the dissertation, and the concepts that are in close relation to these. 
Furthermore, a brief historical overview of the subject-matter is provided to increase the 
                                                          
1 See e.g.: Arday (2010), p. 1. 
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contextual understanding of the Szekler case. Chapter two presents the arguments of the 
various Romanian authorities against autonomy. A certain pattern emerges from the 
presented official documents, emphasizing similar observations why autonomy is in 
contradiction with the constitution. The main legal argument - that autonomy would 
eliminate the unity and the indivisibility of the state - is often complemented with 
theoretical arguments on sovereignty, and procedural observations on the feasibility of 
autonomy within the Romanian legal system. All of these considerations come under 
scrutiny, as chapter three explores the possible answers and counter-responses to nation-
state arguments, based mainly on doctrinal analysis of legal material, comparison of the 
experience of other European states and their autonomous regions, as well as relevant 
scientific literature, and the commitments that accrue from international documents 
ratified by Romania. While the former three groups of sources present a large variety of 
arguments about autonomy being an effective and flexible solution for multi-ethnic states 
to accommodate minority aspirations in a democratic manner, while also preserving the 
territorial integrity of the state at the same time, the latter sources are of relevance as they 
outline the extent to which Romania is encouraged or even obliged to seek more effective 
ways of minority protection and power-sharing. These two chapters outline the 
misconceptions, as well as the discrepant perceptions of the majority and the minority 
about state, nation, sovereignty, autonomy, and their relation to one another. The 
conclusions of the study are split into two chapters. While chapter four reviews the 
findings of the research itself, chapter five considers the policy implications of the 
analysed case for the wider public life, hoping to become a useful read to academics and 
decision-makers alike. 
The documents that served as a basis to reconstruct the “nation-state position” 
allude to the presence of a strong tacit consensus within the Romanian political culture, 
capable of shaping public policy decisions. Most certainly, it is due to the impact of this 
tacit agreement that to date no in-depth analysis has been carried out concerning the 
feasibility of incorporating a territorial autonomy into the current Romanian legal system. 
The issue pops up every now and then, depending on the political discourse in the country, 
but extensive scrutiny has so far avoided the topic. In this respect, the novelty of this 
dissertation is twofold. The constitutional aspects of a Szekler autonomy arrangement in 
themselves were largely neglected within academia, leaving behind a gap that is very 
much ripe for scientific review. Furthermore, even if the topic was discussed, it was 
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mostly done within the framework of the “nation-state discourse”, and all the natural 
conceptual restraints thereof. This dissertation attempts to surpass these constraints, along 
with some of the most widespread, albeit false presuppositions and misconceptions 
surrounding the issue at hand. Ultimately, we invite the reader to engage in a mind game 
in order to deconstruct the “constitutional myth” regarding autonomy. Hopefully, by the 
time one reads through this dissertation, he will have been convinced that there are indeed 
no constitutional obstacles to establish a territorial autonomy within Romania. There are 
only political obstacles, which tend to be wrapped and presented as legal ones. 
 
1.2 Theoretical and methodological framework 
 
On 30 March 2004, and 12 October 2005 respectively, the Chamber of Deputies of the 
Parliament of Romania rejected the Draft Law on the Autonomous Status of Szeklerland 
(hereinafter, Draft Law). Opinion No. 102/2004 of the Legislative Council of the 
Parliament argues in favour of the rejection, as the Draft Law is contrary to the 
constitution for various reasons (an opinion that was reinforced in 2005).2 
This theoretical conception arises from the misinterpretation of the connection 
between state and autonomy, and as such can be falsified by the experience of the 
functioning autonomies as well as by international law and the corresponding scientific 
literature. Consequently, my main hypothesis is that the territorial autonomy of 
Szeklerland does not contradict the Constitution of Romania (CR).  
The applied methodology to prove this hypothesis is twofold. One of the main 
assertions of the dissertation is that there are in fact no provisions in the Romanian legal 
system that constitute a material legal obstacle for the establishment of an autonomous 
territorial entity. The only obstacle that exists is a political one, which derives from the 
dissenting interpretation of the same legal material. In this sense, the dissertation is largely 
a doctrinal legal analysis that first explores the misinterpretations of autonomy by 
Romanian authorities, then it identifies a dissenting interpretation and presents evidence 
supporting it. Parallel with this, a comparative legal analysis is conducted, based on the 
                                                          
2 According to Art. 79 (1) of the Constitution, the Legislative Council shall be an advisory expert body of 
the Parliament, which advises draft normative acts for the purpose of a systematic unification and co-
ordination of the whole body of laws. It shall keep the official record of the legislation of Romania. 
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relevant legal material, that is: The Constitution of Romania; Laws of Romania; The 
Opinion of the Legislative Council of the Parliament of Romania on the rejection of the 
Draft Law on the Autonomous Status of Szeklerland; Decision No. 80 of the 
Constitutional Court rejecting the constitutional amendments proposed by the Special 
Committee of the Parliament, issued in February, 2014; relevant decrees of the Prefect’s 
of Romania; the Statutes of European autonomies, as well as the constitutions and laws 
of their host countries; international legal material ratified by Romania. While the scope 
of the analysis remains mostly in the discipline of law, more specifically comparative 
constitutional law, one cannot deny the basic fact that autonomous arrangements are not 
legally airtight constructions, but ones that are highly contingent on political 
developments. The current phase of the Szekler autonomy struggle in particular is a 
highly politicised subject. In this sense, the dissertation is positioned at the cross point of 
law and political science.  
The case selection for the study was done bearing in mind the main features of the 
specific region (Szeklerland) and its host country (Romania) that serve as the basis for 
comparison. In this respect, I will write about territorial autonomies (given the fact that 
Szekler autonomy aspirations pertain to territorial self-government, as opposed to other 
forms of autonomy), in regions where a specific minority represents the majority, and 
which exist in unitary states (as opposed to federal ones). Applying these methodological 
constraints, the core group of selected cases can be identified as follows: South-Tyrol in 
Italy, the Basque Country, and Catalonia in Spain, Scotland in the United Kingdom, the 
Åland Islands in Finland. These main cases, which are relevant in all the questions raised 
by documents outlined in Chapter 3, will be supplemented by examples that are important 
only in some particular aspects. More specifically, state approaches to autonomy that are 
similar to Romania’s will be mentioned, like the case of Corsica in France, and the 
Russian community in Estonia. In particular, French reactions to, and arguments against 
Corsican autonomy have remarkable similarities with Romanian arguments.3 The legal 
entrenchment of the autonomy of the Faroe Islands and Greenland in Denmark will be 
discussed, as well as the experience of the only minority territorial autonomy of Central 
                                                          
3 Due to the fact that Corsica hasn`t still received law-making powers, hence the Corsican Assembly has 
only limited authority to adapt regulations in its areas of administrative competences and can propose 
modifications to specific legislation and regulations, most of the scholars do not consider Corsica to be an 
autonomous entity. See, e.g.: Suksi (2011), pp. 16-17. Nonetheless, this case is relevant from the state-
reaction point of view, and will be discussed exclusively from that perspective. 
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and Eastern Europe, Gagauzia. While federal states in general fall outside the scope of 
the analysis, some brief references to the special legal entrenchment of autonomies in 
federal states will be mentioned only for the purpose of illustrating the manifold ways an 
autonomy arrangement can be embedded in a given constitutional system.  
In practice content analysis of legal texts and relevant scientific literature was 
performed. In order to deepen the understanding of the functioning of regional autonomy, 
and the way the various autonomy arrangements fit into the legal systems of the given 
host countries. Starting from 2011, 3 to 4 months long research visits were conducted in 
South-Tyrol, Scotland, and Finland under the auspices of the European Academy of 
Bolzano/Bozen (EURAC), the University of Glasgow, and Åbo Akademi respectively, 
enabling the implementation of interviews with academics, lawyers, as well as with 
diplomats, and representatives. Shorter visits to Wales, the Basque Country, and 
Catalonia were also made carried out. Conferences, scientific workshops, and research 
seminars attended during the course of the research provided me with the opportunity to 
deepen my understanding of the research topic in a discursive way.  
Regarding the conclusions of this study, my main scientific expectation is to prove 
that territorial autonomy, as an institutional arrangement, in general does not contradict 
the constitutional order of Romania. The misbeliefs surrounding autonomy can be traced 
back to a tacit agreement regarding the aspirations of the Hungarian minority, and the 
national character of the Romanian state. If one puts aside these historically rooted 
reflexes and resentments, and takes into account the international legal documents ratified 
by Romania regarding minorities, and interprets the country’s domestic legislation 
accordingly, then the road is paved for recognizing the legitimate nature of autonomy 
aspirations. This is at stake with this hypothesis: whether or not it is possible to remove a 
seemingly robust obstacle, towering in front of a legitimate minority aspiration. 
Consequently, the dissertation needs also to assess the corresponding action relevant 
actors can engage in to achieve this effect. 
Besides this main concern, there is another dimension of the question that needs 
to be addressed. If we verify the general assumption that territorial autonomy as an 
institutional solution is in conformity with the constitution, does that automatically mean 
that the draft law on the autonomy of Szeklerland is implementable without having to 
amend the constitution first? As I will argue, when it comes to the specific statute draft, 
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some legal obstacles arise, whose solution would require a dialogue between the given 
minority community and the central state. Additionally, even if there was a possibility to 
implement a statute without the amendment of the constitution, it might result in an 
autonomy without adequate legal entrenchment, which could undermine the stability of 
the whole autonomy arrangement. 
 
1.3 Primary Concepts 
 
Reading the scientific literature on autonomy and self-governance, one cannot help but 
notice the diversity of concepts, often describing seemingly identical phenomena. One 
could easily write a whole book, listing only the literature that provides extensive review 
on the terminology used also in this analysis. Given the fact that the dissertation revolves 
mainly around legal issues, I use the definition of concepts existing in the relevant hard 
or soft law (either domestic or international), not neglecting the manifold definitions 
provided by the scientific literature. 
Autonomy: Defining the most relevant concept for this dissertation already poses 
challenges in the sense that the term autonomy has not yet been explicitly defined in any 
international legal material. The concept of autonomy has appeared in many different 
disciplines (sociology, psychology, political science, law), described by a diverse range 
of typology. Generally, autonomy refers to self-government of a group or territory within 
a state, and can be divided, most simplistically, into territorial and personal autonomy. 
The main difference between these two, according to Brunner and Küpper, lies in the 
legal subject. While the former is based on the whole population of a territorial unit, the 
latter one is based on the members of a specific minority.4 Lapidoth adopts a similar 
approach, and completes these basic two categories with that of sovereignty, suggesting 
an eclectic description of autonomy. Cultural (or personal) autonomy might be given to 
groups whose members are dispersed geographically throughout the population. 
Sovereignty refers to state sovereignty as possessing absolute authority within the state's 
boundaries, while territorial political autonomy in this sense is “an arrangement aimed at 
granting to a group that differs from the majority of the population in the state, but that 
constitutes the majority in a specific region, a means by which it can express its distinct 
                                                          
4 Brunner et al (2004), p. 474. 
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identity."5 In an attempt to provide a terminology more suitable to describe the numerous 
forms of autonomy, Tkacik differentiates between five levels. Rejecting the approach of 
Lapidoth that „collapses personal and cultural autonomy”, he distinguishes these two 
adding that unlike cultural autonomy, personal autonomy can mean the guarantee of 
certain basic rights to the individual per se, and not as a member of a specific group. 
Furthermore, Tkacik also tries to avoid the use of territorial autonomy, as a "vague and 
inconsistent" term that "suffers from varied usages", and identifies instead functional, 
administrative, and legislative autonomy, concentrating on the scope of autonomous 
competencies. 6  Heintze differentiates between 4 types of autonomy. 7 Territorial 
autonomy, understood as an arrangement that comprises of self-government organs 
vested with competences that are of particular importance to the minority or group, and 
three subcategories of non-territorial autonomy. These latter three are: cultural autonomy 
(the self-government of cultural affairs by a distinct group or minority), personal 
autonomy (where the subjects of the autonomous competencies are persons, and not a 
group), and functional autonomy (the transfer of specific state functions to private 
organizations administered by a minority group).8 A similar approach is adopted by 
Légaré and Suksi when assessing the spatial and the normative scope of autonomy 
arrangements. Accordingly, they differentiate between territorial autonomy with 
legislative competencies (like the Åland Islands, Catalonia or South Tyrol), territorial 
autonomies with regulatory powers only (like Corsica or Wales, adding that these self-
governing territories may not be characterised as autonomies insofar as we treat 
legislative powers as a prerequisite of the concept of autonomy), non-territorial 
autonomies with legislative powers (difficult to find concrete examples, one would be the 
Millet system of Turkey), and finally non-territorial autonomies with  regulatory powers 
(mainly all cultural autonomies fit in this category, like the ones existing in Estonia, 
Hungary or Slovenia).9 
Provided that autonomous arrangements most often accrue in response to minority 
claims, the term ‘minority territorial autonomy’ is also used.10 Tóth describes this as „an 
                                                          
5 Lapidoth (1997), p. 33. 
6 Tkacik (2008), p. 370. 
7 A typology also used by Weller et al (2010), pp. 2-6. 
8 Heintze (1998), pp. 18-24. 
9 Légaré et al (2008), pp. 146-147. 
10 See e.g.: Henders (2010), p. 12. 
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area of a given state that has relatively exact political and administrative borders and its 
population is being conferred with the power of legislation and law-enforcement at least 
in some fields having relevance to the goal of the autonomy, aiming first of all the 
preservation of the special identity of the minority community in a majority situation of 
the autonomous territory”.11 
Even when narrowing down the scope of analysis to autonomies and their relation 
to constitutional law - the main concern of this dissertation - one finds a large variety of 
typologies. Among these, throughout the dissertation I used the typology of Suksi who 
distinguishes between 6 possible ways of legally entrenching an autonomy arrangement: 
regional entrenchment (possibility of regional reaction to amending the statute of 
autonomy), special entrenchment (special amendment rule of the statute), general 
entrenchment (regulating autonomy in the national constitution), semi-general 
entrenchment (regulating autonomy at the level of organic laws), international 
entrenchment (having two types: a) open: without a formal treaty such as the Åland-
islands, and b) treaty based: where the autonomous competencies are being enshrined in 
a treaty such as the case of South Tyrol), entrenchment under the right to self-
determination (given that the population of the area can be viewed as a people). 12 
Hannikainen lists the constitutional criteria of every autonomy arrangement. These are: 
a) the autonomous status should be inscribed in the constitution of the state or at least in 
legislation, above normal laws in the hierarchy of norms; b) presence of a democratically 
elected legislative body and a local government that is subject to scrutiny of this 
legislature; c) jurisdiction should be either exclusive or shared, with the possibility from 
the side of the autonomous region to insert his preferences; d) the different language, if 
there is one, should have official status in the region; e) the creation of a special bilateral 
organ composed of delegates of the state and autonomous region dedicated to address 
contentious issues; f) opportunity for the autonomous region to effectively take part in 
the decision-making process on the national level;  g) the involvement of local court in 
the autonomous machinery; h) sufficient taxation powers; i) the right to external co-
operation; j) limited powers to the official, representing the State within the autonomous 
region. This typology discusses the democratic prerequisites of autonomy, showing that 
it is an institutional construction that is not easily separated from democratic decision-
                                                          
11 Tóth (2014), pp. 20. 
12 Suksi (1998), p. 170. 
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making. 13  Benedikter describes the various forms of government based on the 
constitutional legal relation between constituent parts of a state. He separates regional 
territorial autonomy from other forms of power-sharing through the following criteria: 
Reservations do not have representation within the national parliament of their host 
country; dependent territories are not part of the motherland or mainland and they mostly 
represent a different order of separation; an associated statehood includes the possibility 
to revoke the association at any times (as was the case with Marshall Islands, Palau, or 
Micronesia for example) while autonomous status does not encompass unilateral 
secession, and it cannot be revoked unilaterally by the autonomous region; federal 
arrangements pertain to the whole territory of a given state, while autonomies are created 
in one or few units only;14 other forms of self-government might contain administrative 
autonomy (regions without legislative competencies such as Corsica) or cultural 
autonomy (or non-territorial ethnic autonomy).15 Hannum et al. assesses the common 
features of autonomies with regard to their internal institutions and the potential 
international legal personality of that entity by measuring the degree of independent 
control over their own affairs. With regard to the first aspect, he finds that the vast 
majority of autonomous entities have executive as well as legislative powers, some degree 
of local judicial authority and possible joint responsibility in areas of common concern. 
Regarding the second aspect there are three primary issues that point out the international 
legal personality of autonomies: police and security arrangements, land ownership and 
natural resources, social services, financial and economic issues as well as cultural, 
religious, and internal minority group concerns. With this analysis Hannum defines the 
place of autonomies relative to internal and international legal circumstances.16 
Lastly, turning to territorial autonomy described in legal materials, as mentioned 
earlier we found that the concept has not yet been explicitly defined in international “hard 
law”. There are some hints, however, in “soft law” instruments, like the Explanatory 
Memorandum of Resolution 361 (2013) of the Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities (CLRA) of the CoE, on Regions and territories with special status in Europe: 
“Special status entails the legal guarantee of more powers (legislative and/or 
                                                          
13 Hannikainen (1998), pp. 91-93. 
14 See the differences between federalism and autonomy in more detail under chapter 1.4. 
15 Benedikter (2007), p. 22. 
16 Hannum et al (1981), p. 861. 
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administrative and/or financial), at least quantitatively in terms of legislation, and 
normally privileged forms of representation and negotiation – often by means of bilateral 
channels with the state – for specific territorial authorities. Such authorities always enjoy 
political and administrative autonomy, while formal legislative autonomy depends on the 
constitutional setting of each country…. As a rule, special status only affects specific 
territories (regions) of a state where there is no wish or need to introduce a fully-fledged 
federal system”.17 
Bearing all the above in mind, for the purposes of this dissertation, territorial 
autonomy connotes a special legal arrangement that grants legislative and executive 
powers to an administrative unit, whose majority possesses an identity other than that of 
the majority of the state, to govern their domestic affairs through their own decision-
making institutions.  
National Minority: I use the generally accepted concept, established by 
Recommendation 1201/1993 of the Council of Europe. Accordingly, the expression 
“national minority” refers to a group of persons in a state who : a) reside on the territory 
of that state and are citizens thereof; b) maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with 
that state; c) display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics; d) 
are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population 
of that state or of a region of that state; e) are motivated by a concern to preserve together 
that which constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their traditions, their 
religion or their language. 
Nation: While this concept is construed by most academics as a set of common values 
and/or features producing a "specific sense of solidarity between the members of one 
group",18 no commonly accepted legal definition exist. This was also the conclusion of 
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights when the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (PACE) called upon them to adopt such a definition. The 
Committee’s report states that while no common conception exists, it is possible to list 
all the various forms this term is being used in law in present-day Europe. Based on this 
                                                          
17  Section II/a paragraphs 9. and 10., available: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2107887&Site=COE#P128_ 6478, accessed: 2015.04.10. 
18 Weber, (1922), p. 673. 
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report “the constitution of Romania enshrines clearly the concept of the civic nation, 
composed of all Romanian citizens”.19 
National state: Nation state or national state refers to a state whose borders coincide with 
the geographical distribution of a given nation. In other words, this concept was 
classically defined “in terms of congruence between a territorial state on the one hand 
and, on the other, a sovereign national community conceived as having a single 
homogenous culture”.20 According to Art. 1 (1) of the Romanian Constitution “Romania 
is a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible National State” (Româniaeste stat 
naţional, suveranşi independent, unitarşiindivizibil).  The official English translation 
makes it clear that the term „national” in the above quoted form was not meant to be a 
mere adjective to the word “state”, but a substantive part of the noun itself. Thus, the 
concept of „national state” is the same as „nation state”. 
 
1.4 Relating concepts 
 
There are some concepts which are used as substitutes for the term autonomy. Most 
notably, autonomy and self-government have generally been treated as synonyms,21 as 
were the terms home rule, or self-rule. Devolution describes the process through which 
a constituent part of a state receives direct competencies of public authority, as opposed 
to merely exercising public power on behalf of another, superior state agency.22 
Federalism and autonomy share many similarities, but they also differ in even more 
aspects.23 Except for some cases (like Switzerland or Bosnia-Herzegovina), federalism is 
seldom based on ethnicity and revolves much more around shared competencies rather 
than the exclusive ones exercised by an autonomous region. In this sense federalised 
administrative units exhibit more symmetry in their powers, while a marked asymmetry 
is more typical of autonomy arrangements. Consequently, autonomy is more flexible than 
                                                          
19 Paragraph 34 of Doc. 10762 of 2005. 
20 Smith (2012), p. xii. 
21 Heintze (1998), pp. 7-8 Hannikainen (1998), p. 79. 
22 Weller et al. (2010), p. 4. For an overview about the difficulties of the concept of devolution, see: Suksi 
(2011), pp. 114-123. 
23 Some scholars do not even closely connect the two concepts. See: Bernhardt (1981), p. 23. 
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federalism.24 Another relevant difference is that while the federated states or regions are 
generally involved in policymaking of the central state, autonomous entities rule 
themselves, and do not necessarily have any special rights regarding the central power.25 
There are also notable differences from a constitutional legal point of view. The 
constitution of a classical federation would have a bicameral legislature on the federal 
level with enumerated powers and residual powers at the sub-state level, while territorial 
autonomies would have enumerated powers inside a state with a normally unicameral 
legislature having residual powers. 26  In federal countries the representation of the 
constituent states in the national legislature is ensured in some generalized way, while 
such arrangement would normally not be present in an autonomous territory whose 
citizens can win representation in the national parliament through the same general 
electoral mechanism as other citizens of the state. 27  While the amendment of the 
constitution of federal states require the consent of several constituent parts, the consent 
of the institutions of an autonomous region to amend the constitution are not required (at 
least in so far as the amendment does not affect autonomous competencies).28 
Lastly, the concept of federacy refers to a specific category of autonomies that 
were established within unitary states.29  According to Stepan et al, a federacy is “a 
political-administrative unit in an independent unitary state with exclusive power in 
certain areas, including some legislative power, constitutionally or quasi-constitutionally 
embedded, that cannot be changed unilaterally and whose inhabitants have full citizenship 
rights in the otherwise unitary state”.30 Bolleyer et al substitutes the concept of federacy, 
with that of regionalized arrangements (as opposed to confederal or federal structures) 
where “the centre has the final say, notwithstanding the presence of lower tiers of 
government with legislative powers (that may or may not be constitutionally 
entrenched)”.31 Subsidiarity is another important concept mentioned frequently as a 
                                                          
24 Ghai (2013), pp. 16-17. 
25 Benedikter (2007), p. 15. 
26 Suksi (2011), pp. 130-131. 
27 Id. at pp. 403-405. 
28 Watts (2008), pp. 157-170. 
29 From a legal point of view, the term might be misleading in the sense that it insinuates the presence of a 
voluntary association between an autonomous entity and the unitary state, which is not the case in practice. 
30 Stepan et al (2011), p. 204. 
31 Bolleyer et al (2014), p. 370. States having such asymmetric regionalized arrangements, are often called 
regionalist- or regionalized states. See e.g.: Benedikter (2007), p. 16. 
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principle whose aim is to “guarantee a degree of independence for a lower authority in 
relation to a higher body or for a local authority in relation to central government”.32 
Self-determination: The right of the peoples to self-determination, as set out by Article 
1 of ICCPR and ICESCR, is probably the most contentious concept that can be linked to 
autonomy. Although this study does not engage in a debate about the many question 
marks surrounding this concept, it cannot fully neglect it either, for at least two reasons. 
On the one hand, this right has been referred to in conflicts between nationalities and their 
host countries, 33  and, on the other, the legal doctrine is constantly evolving and 
expanding, as the basic division between external self-determination (or remedial 
secession) and internal self-determination (understood as self-governance of a group that 
leaves the territorial integrity of a state untouched) is becoming more and more accepted 
as a customary rule of international law.34 As far as academics are concerned, some are 
sceptic as to how generally the concept of internal self-determination has been accepted, 
let alone realized within existing states.35 Others recognize the existence of such a right,36 
and there are also scholars who recognize the internal aspect of self-determination, but 
remind that the term is understood as a right of the whole population of a given state to 
be free from any external coercion, and not necessarily the right of a minority peoples 
within that state for greater self-rule. 37  One can also find international documents 
underpinning the existence of internal self-determination. In the CLRA`s viewpoint: “In 
some case, especially when special status is established in order to accommodate ethno-
cultural minority groups, it is considered to be the most genuine expression of internal 
self-determination of peoples”.38 Lastly, case law is also available in the matter.39 Para 
                                                          
32 European Parliament (2015), p. 2. 
33 A good example would be that of the Ibarretxe plan, named after Lehendakari (President of the Basque 
Country) Juan José Ibarretxe, adopted by the Basque Parliament on 30 December 2004, envisaging a free 
association with the Spanish state based on a plebiscite, and a separate Basque citizenship, all under the 
right of the Basque peoples to self-determination. 
34 Szalayné argues that within this evolution of the right to self-determination, emphasis, on one hand is 
being placed on peoples representing a minority in a state rather than peoples under colonial oppression, 
and, on the other hand on effective democratic self-governance, rather than secession. She also argued that 
such an evolution of this right is plausible because this is the way through which it can remain an effective 
part of international law, and avoid being utterly “drained” as a legal instrument. (2003), p. 34. 
35 Hannikainen (1988), p.357, Tomuschat (1992), p. 39. 
36 Rosas (1993), p. 228. 
37 Cassese (1995), p. 346, Hannum (1996), p. 49. 
38 See Section I/6. Of Explanatory Memorandum on CLRA Resolution 361 (2013). 
39 Source: http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/1643/1/document.do, accessed, 2015.04.22. 
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126 of Opinion [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 of the Supreme Court of Canada on the legality of 
Quebec`s secession from Canada concludes that “the recognized sources of international 
law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through 
internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and 
cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-
determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to 
unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under 
carefully defined circumstances”. 40  The autonomy statute of Gagauzia supports this 
approach as well. Article 1 (4) stipulates that in case of a change of the status of the 
Republic of Moldova as an independent state, the people of Gagauzia shall have the right 
of external self-determination. 41  This also presupposes that Gagauz Yeri otherwise 
exercises the internal right to self-determination through the institutions of the autonomy 
arrangement in force.  
 
1.5 Historical background 
 
In this brief overview I summarize the history of Hungarian minority affairs within 
Romania, with an emphasis on autonomy aspirations and their international context. In 
doing so I have kept in mind the four relevant actors of such a discourse: the given 
minority communities, the host country, the kin-state, and the international community.  
Eastern-Central Europe has always been a buffer zone between the Western parts 
of Europe and the larger foreign civilization surrounding the continent.42 Due to this 
position, this territory has always been a terrain where major powers have clashed, 
constantly intersecting the lives of the indigenous population of the area, as well as the 
political borders they share with each other. Due to the Treaty of Trianon, the Hungarian 
                                                          
40  Declaration 2625 (XXV.) of the General Assembly of the UN on Principles of International Law 
describes these circumstances and their consequences as follows: subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle and is therefore prohibited. Such forcible 
action entitles the given peoples to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter, and at the same time disables the host country to invoke the principle of territorial 
integrity, as they lack a government that would represent the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour. 
41 The „change” in the status of Moldova refers, above all to the country’s possible union with Romania. 
42 Mackinder (1904), p. 435. 
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Kingdom has lost two thirds of its territory, and population (including, at that time, more 
than 3,5 million ethnic Hungarians mostly living directly next to the newly established 
borders) as well as 80 to 100% of its oil, gas, gold, silver, iron ore, salt and wood 
supplies.43 A Treaty that has still been haunting the collective Hungarian psyche ever 
since.  
On the other hand, if we look at some of the most relevant Treaties concluded by 
Romania in the XIX. and XX. century, we recurrently find provisions on religious and 
ethnic equality. This was true of the Treaty of Paris (1856), which granted autonomous 
status to Wallachia and Moldova within the Ottoman Empire, as well as the Treaty of 
Berlin (1878) providing international recognition for Romania, and finally, the Treaty of 
Versailles (1919) that significantly expanded the borders of the country.44 These treaties 
were all contingent on accepting constraints on the country’s authority regarding the 
treatment of minorities. 45  Moreover, after the First World War, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms were established within the League of Nations to safeguard the 
implementation of minority rights. Additionally, there was also the Declaration of Alba 
Iulia/Gyulafehérvár, adopted by the Romanian National Council in 1918 that promised 
“full national freedom for the co-existing peoples” and that “each people will study, 
manage and judge in its own language” and that “equal rights and full autonomous 
religious freedom for all the religions in the State shall be granted”.46 
Contradicting these commitments on minority protection, in practice, Hungarians 
were deprived of their citizenship even years after the annexation of Transylvania 
(through Citizenship Law of 1924), their lands and property were subject to confiscation 
(as of the occupation of Transylvania), the use of the Hungarian language was 
systematically persecuted (as the Constitution of 1923 did not have any provisions on 
minority language protection), persons belonging to the Hungarian minority were 
                                                          
43 For a vivid illustration of the economic and social consequences of the Trianon Peace Treaty see the 73 
maps in Emich et. al. (1920). 
44 This list can be further expanded as Romania made unilateral commitments to implement the documents 
of the Council of Europe when acceding to the organization in 1993 and has similar commitments as 
member state of the EU whose founding Treaties and secondary law contain numerous provisions on 
minority protection. 
45 Krasner (1999), pp. 73-105. 
46 It was this gathering of the Romanian National Council which declared the union of Transylvania with 
Romania on 1 December, a national holiday in Romania today. 
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deported to detention camps under the auspices of collective guilt (from 1944) or parallel 
with this even executed by the paramilitary group, the Maniu Guards.  
The malleable political environment of the late 10s early 20s gave birth to 
numerous plans on the future of Transylvania, coming from Hungarians, Romanians, and 
Germans (Saxons) alike. These plans included the establishment of a confederation of 
nationalities, based mainly on the Swiss model; territorial revision, population exchange 
in order to increase the homogeneity of a given region, the foundation of an independent 
Transylvanian state, or the establishment of various autonomous arrangements.47 
During the interwar-period and throughout the course of World War II, Hungary's 
raison d’état was to regain the territories lost after the First World War. Due to the First 
and Second Vienna Awards concluded in 1938 and 1940 (see Figure 2), territories in 
south-eastern Czechoslovakia, north-western Romania and northern Yugoslavia, 
inhabited mostly by Hungarians, came under Hungarian rule again. These Awards were 
annulled by the Paris Peace Treaties in 1947, re-establishing the pre-1938 borders.  
After WWII both Romania and Hungary were integrated in the “Eastern bloc”. 
Invoking the right of the peoples to self-determination – a principle recognized by the 
Soviet Union early on, since the Lenin-era - the Romanian communist party was 
pressured by its Soviet counterpart - or more specifically Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was 
pressured by Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin - to grant autonomy to the territory populated 
overwhelmingly by the Hungarian speaking Szekler community.48 Articles 19-21 of the 
1952 Constitution were adopted accordingly to establish the Hungarian Autonomous 
Province.49 Parallel with dogmatically respecting the principles of Lenin, the support for 
Hungarian autonomy was also a bargaining chip in realpolitik, providing Russian 
leverage over Romania, with whom Russian diplomatic relations were, euphemistically 
speaking, never cloudless. Being outside the framework of democracy and the rule of law, 
the Hungarian Autonomous Province cannot be characterized as a political territorial 
autonomy, as the central state did not actually confer any legislative or executive power 
                                                          
47 Bárdi (2004), pp. 330-331. 
48 For more background information on the subject see: Bottoni (2008). 
49 77,32% (565.510 persons) of the total population (731.387) of the Province was of Hungarian origin 
according to the data of the Statistical Office, which number rises to 78,71% if we count the Hungarian 
speaking population (containing in that case also other minorities, mostly Jews, whose second identity was 
closer to Hungarian), see: Directia Centrala de Statistica – Directia Regionala de Statistica (1960), pp. 40-
43. 
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to the Province under the auspices of decentralization (it did, however, bring forth a more 
widespread use of the Hungarian language). In fact, it was a tool for furthering 
centralization by generating direct loyalty among members of the Szekler community 
towards Moscow. The borders of the Province were first modified only 8 years later, in 
24 December 1960, by expanding the western borders with Romanian-majority territories 
(Ludas, Sármás and Dicső rajons), and at the same time detaching the overwhelmingly 
Hungarian rajons of Sepsi (85,3% Hungarian), and Kézdi (91,2% Hungarian), decreasing 
the overall proportion of Hungarians from 77,3 to 66,2% (Miklósné Zakar 2010).50 This 
so called Maros-Hungarian Autonomous Province was then entirely abolished by the 
administrative reform of 196851 establishing the currently existing administrative division 
of Romania (for border-changes in communist Romania see Figure 3).52 
The fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of several Eastern-Central 
European states that followed had a great impact on the international community. Never 
since the decolonization process did the question of self-determination attract so much 
attention as in the wake of the Yugoslav Wars. This increased attention came in a sensitive 
period, as post-communist Romania was facing both internal unrest, and at the same time 
was seeking to reorganize her international relations, firstly by acceding to the Council 
of Europe.53 The Hungarian minority played an important role in the events of this period, 
which came into the fore through at least two aspects: Firstly, the whole Romanian 
political transition was ignited by the harassment of Hungarian clergymen Tőkés László, 
and secondly, the Black March. The latter refers to events that occurred in the historical 
capitol of Szeklerland, Marosvásárhely/Târgu-Mureș between 16-21 March. Following a 
series of protests aimed at achieving education in Hungarian language, the far right, 
nationalist organization Vatra Romanesca gathered Romanians from surrounding 
communes and engaged in a fight with protesting Hungarians, resulting in 5 dead (3 
Hungarians and 2 Romanians) and almost three hundred wounded. While the some of the 
                                                          
50 Rajons were administrative sub-division of Counties. 
51 In this sense this short-lived Szekler autonomy joined the ranks of other autonomy arrangements that 
were abolished due to continuous resistance of the central government (e.g.: Chittagong autonomy in 
Bangladesh under the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord 1997, South Sudan under the 1971 Addis Abeba 
Agreement, or the repeal of Eritrea's autonomy under the UN in 1962. Examples mentioned in Ghai (2011), 
p. 96.). 
52 In fact, Law No. 2 of 1968 on the administrative organization of the territory of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania is still in force. 
53 Romania joined the Council of Europe on October 7, 1993; NATO on March 29, 2004; and the EU on 
January 1, 2007. 
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details of this incident are still vague, one of the common explanations is that members 
of the communist secret police agency, the Securitate wanted to secure their positions for 
after the political transition, and fabricated an ethnic strife to underpin the relevance of 
their presence in a newly formed security agency.54 
Romania’s accession to the Council of Europe and the adoption of 
Recommendation 1201 in 1993 by the PACE were all favourable developments, placing 
the question of autonomy in the focal point of the identity building activity of the sole 
representative organization of the Hungarian community, the Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania. The draft Law on Minorities and Autonomous Communities, 
adopted in 1993 on the 3rd annual Congress of the DAHR, foresaw the establishment of 
a three-pillar system: 1) Cultural (or personal) autonomy for members of a minority, 2) 
the establishment of special statuses for municipalities where a given minority forms the 
majority, 3) and regional territorial autonomy accruing from the assembly of 
municipalities with special status.55 Senator of DAHR, Csapó József elaborated the 3rd 
point of this system further by drafting an autonomy statute for Szeklerland. This draft 
became the fundamental document of the Szekler National Council, founded by Csapó as 
a representative body - a proto-Parliament - for the Szekler Communes in 2003, with the 
only purpose to achieve territorial autonomy for Szeklerland. 56  This document is of 
particular relevance as the only draft on which the Parliament of Romania has voted on 
and reacted in an official Opinion (I will discuss this Opinion in detail in the following 
Chapters).  
Meanwhile, Hungary also made attempts to develop an exemplary internal 
minority policy that would serve as a positive example for the countries of Eastern and 
Central Europe.57 For this purpose the country has granted cultural autonomy for all 13 
                                                          
54 See such argument, among others in Kincses (1990). 
55 See: RMDSZ (1993). 
56 It was in the same year (2003) that the ethno-regional party palette started to pluralize, as members of 
DAHR who were unsatisfied with the party’s achievement regarding autonomy and minority rights started 
to establish their separate organizations. Consequently, there are 5 relevant political organizations 
advocating the interest of Hungarians in Romania today: DAHR, the Civic Party, The Transylvanian 
Hungarian People’s Party, the Transylvanian Hungarian National Council, and the Szekler National 
Council. 
57 This approach was not a novelty from the Hungarian political elite. As Krasner reminds, domestic support 
for minority protection in Hungary was present from the end of the First World War, as the country 
perceived these provisions as a means of protecting their co-ethnics in other countries. See Krasner supra 
note, p. 95. 
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recognized minorities of the country, and voiced the relevance of such an approach 
expressis verbis during the elaboration of a new constitution in 2010, which led to the 
current Fundamental Law stipulating that “the nationalities of the country form part of 
the Hungarian political community and are constituent parts of the State” (Preamble, of 
the Fundamental Law of Hungary).58 Additionally, consecutive Hungarian government’s 
implemented various kin-state activities: they established the structure of financial and 
cultural support through various funds, and created the public television Danube TV 
(Duna TV) dedicated to broadcast programs to/and about Hungarians living abroad 
(Antall government: 1990-1994); concluded a series of bilateral Treaties with 
surrounding countries on good neighbourly relations and cooperation addressing the 
importance to have a historical reconciliation between Hungary and its neighbours 
containing also provisions on minority protection (Horn-government: 1994-1998); 59 
provided preferential access to Hungarian public services, and education institutions for 
kinspeople living abroad through the Status Law (1st Orbán government: 1998-2002); 
and recently, granted naturalization on preferential terms, including the right to vote on 
Hungary's parliamentary elections (2nd Orbán government: 2010-2014).60 
Trying to summarize this brief overview one can state that historical developments 
on Hungary’s side ranged from irredentism (1920 - 1945) and total neglect regarding 
kinspeople abroad (1945-1990), to active kin-state politics (from 1990 onwards) as a 
means of preserving Hungarian minority communities living behind the state border, in 
ever decreasing numbers (See Table 1, and Figures 4 and 5in the Annexes for data and 
illustration). Historical developments on Romania’s side show that Romanian authorities 
were never really interested in implementing their international commitments in good 
                                                          
58 According to Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, the recognized 
minorities are: Bulgarians, Greeks, Croatians, Poles, Germans, Armenians, Roma, Romanians, Ruthenians, 
Serbians, Slovaks, Slovenes and Ukrainians. This Law was replaced in 2011 by Law CLXXIX on the Rights 
of Nationalities. In this Law, as well as in the Constitution of Hungary, the term "nationality" is being used 
consistently in order to signal that Hungary recognizes the existence of collective minority rights. 
59 Article 15 contained these provisions, which included: prohibition of discrimination, prohibition of 
measures that would alter the ethnic proportions, the right to establish and operate minority organizations, 
the right to take part effectively in decisions-making, the right to use their mother tongue, and the right to 
preserve their material and architectural memorials and memorial sites constituting their cultural heritage, 
history and traditions.  
60 Hungary’s foreign policy has 3 basic piers which haven’t changed much since the Antall- administration: 
1.) Involvement in the Euro-Atlantic integration, 2) A peaceful and prosperous partnership with adjacent 
countries, 3.) and taking responsibility for Hungarians living abroad. Throughout the years, left- wing 
administrations tended to emphasize the first pier, while right-wing governments stressed the latter one, 
leaving the EU integration as a common point of consent. 
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faith and accepted temporary limitations on their sovereignty only to reach other goals in 
the process: state recognition, territorial gains, or membership in international 
organizations. While this might downplay the significance of the international community 
in the eyes of some, it cannot be neglected that the borders of Eastern-Central Europe 
were in many cases shaped by external powers, and that without international pressure 
and external motivation, Romania's account regarding minority protection would most 
likely have been even more dismal. The Treaty of Paris made Romania (or at that time 
Wallachia, and Moldova) an autonomous entity within the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty 
of Berlin recognized the newly established state within the international community, 
while the Treaty of Versailles expanded its boundaries significantly. Paradoxically, the 
trajectory of Romania’s statehood constitutes an example of autonomy being a precursor 
to secession, and the formation of a new state.   
 
1.6 What and why 
 
1.6.1 Basic features of the Draft Law on the Autonomy of Szeklerland 
Among the eleven some statute drafts that have been crafted by various organizations 
since the political transition in Romania, the most salient one is that of the Szekler 
National Council. So far this is the only draft which the Romanian legislature has had a 
formal vote on, and the only one that has been approved by the local citizens in an 
informal referendum. The first four sections of the General Provisions of the Draft Law 
on the Autonomy of Szeklerland adopted by the Szekler National Council (hereinafter 
DL) resemble the Catalan and Basque statutes in referring to the special identity of the 
legal subjects of the autonomy. Section 1 (1) begins with stipulating that “in order to 
express its historical self-identity, to guarantee equal opportunity to its citizens and to 
safeguard its Hungarian identity, Szeklerland’s population will be transformed into a self-
governing community”. The DL foresees the establishment of an autonomous executive 
power (The Municipal Committee / Önkormányzati Bizottság, hereinafter The 
Committee) 61  responsible to the autonomous legislature (The Municipal Council / 
                                                          
61 DL Section 30-36. 
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Önkormányzati Tanács, hereinafter The Council) 62  whose representatives would be 
elected by direct and universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. The legal basis of the 
autonomy is provided, among others, by Article 117 (3) of the Constitution, allowing for 
the establishment of autonomous administrative authorities. Pursuant to Art. 73 (3) r) of 
the Constitution, the Statute would be enacted as an organic law,63the passing of which 
requires a majority vote of the members of each Chamber of the Romanian Parliament.64 
Inspired by the Romanian constitutional framework, parallel with the head of the 
autonomous government, Szeklerland would also have a President, 65  who is directly 
elected for a term of four years, and who can assume this position for two terms of office 
at most. The President represents the region, appoints the head of The Committee, 
proposes the date of the Council elections, signs and promulgates legislation of The 
Council (whose acts are subject to the scrutiny of the Constitutional Court of Romania), 
and if asked by the head of the autonomous government, presides over the meetings of 
The Committee. With regards to the internal administrative division, the historical 
Szekler Seats (Szék) would be re-established, having the same basic institutions as the 
whole of the region (council, committee, president).66 The Council of Szeklerland would 
have exclusive legislative competencies in the following areas: education and culture, 
mass communication and media, public welfare, roads and transportation, local 
commercial- and industrial activity, agriculture, forestry, mining and energy production, 
determining of own municipal system, ownership and management of public property 
and utilities, levying and collecting own taxes and fees. The autonomous Parliament 
would have its seat in the historical capitol, Marosvásárhely / Târgu-Mureș in the 
building that today serves as the seat of the Council of Maros County.67 Finally, the annex 
of the Statute enumerates all 153 municipalities that would be part of an autonomous 
Szeklerland. 
                                                          
62 Id.at Section 19-29. 
63 This is a similarity with the Spanish constitutional system, where Organic acts are those approving the 
Statutes of Autonomy (as well as those relating to the implementation of fundamental rights and public 
liberties: Spanish Constitution Section 81). 
64 Art. 76 CR. 
65 DL, supra note Section 37-46. 
66 Id.at Section 47-68. 
67 After the adoption of the DL, Maros County, as we know it today, would cease to exist, as only some 
communes of it would form a part of the autonomous Szeklerland. For an enumeration of these communes, 
see Appendix No. 1 of the DL. 
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The drafters of the Statute were largely influenced by provisions of existing 
European autonomy statutes. Similar to South- Tyrol, the education system would have 
linguistically parallel organizational structures. Separate Hungarian and Romanian 
language education institutions would exist from kindergartens to universities. In 
Hungarian schools the teaching language would be Hungarian and Romanian would be a 
compulsory taught subject. Hungarian would become an official language of the region 
together with the Romanian language.68 To ensure the effective use of both languages in 
public administration, a quota would be introduced, similar to the one that exists in South 
Tyrol.69 According to Sections 97 of the DL, the linguistic composition of the employees 
in the public institutions should reflect the proportion between the linguistic groups of the 
region, as established by the last official census. The financing of the autonomous 
competencies would not be totally emancipated from state subsidies, but would 
nonetheless be mostly ensured through local taxes and fees. Similarly to the Basque fiscal 
autonomy, all locally generated revenues would be collected and administered by the 
respective institutions of the autonomous region.70 A Commissioner appointed by the 
Romanian government would be the highest representative of the central state in 
Szeklerland, who also mediates in disputes between the state and the region.71 Lastly, the 
DL provides a regional entrenchment in stipulating that the amendment of the Statute can 
only be initiated by the autonomous legislature, and that every amendment or the 
abolishment of the Statute as a whole has to be approved by the local electorate on a 
referendum.72 
 
1.6.2 Driving forces behind Szekler autonomy aspirations 
Similarly to the case of Tyrol in the Habsburg Monarchy, Szeklerland was a border guard 
region of the Hungarian Kingdom since the early middle ages. As a military class, 
Szeklers obtained a special status within the social order of the kingdom, and developed 
                                                          
68 DL, supra note Section 82-96. 
69  In South Tyrol this system is often referred to as an "ethnic mirror image"/ “ethnische 
Spiegelbildlichkeit“. 
70 DL, supra note Section 103-116. 
71 Id.at Section 119. While this post was based on the institution of the prefects, it is noteworthy to mention 
that a similar way of facilitating connections between state and autonomous entity exists in the Åland 
islands, where a Governor is appointed by the President of Finland (See Section 52 of the Act on Autonomy 
of Åland). 
72 Id.at Section 13 and 125. 
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their special heraldic symbols and own flag that symbolized this status.73 Szeklers were 
all free men, who were exempted from paying taxes to the King in exchange for their 
military services. As of the fifteenth century these various rights and liberties were 
codified in several acts, constituting a separate Szekler law within the legal system of 
Hungary.74 As a consequence of these historical developments, self-governance has been 
a marked characteristic of the Szekler people. A vital part of their self-identity, which 
they feel currently deprived of, and which under modern circumstances could be best re-
established in the form of a territorial autonomy. Contrary to the ambitious set of 
competencies enshrined in the DL, there are numerous deficiencies in the currently 
existing legal protection afforded to the nationalities of Romania.  
 
1.6.2.1 Linguistic and educational issues 
In his report of 19 June 2012, the Committee of Experts (hereinafter, the Committee) of 
the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (hereinafter, the Charter) 
concluded on the Charter’s application in Romania,75 that most of the undertakings were 
not fully implemented.76 Out of a total number of 59 undertakings that were relevant from 
the point of the Hungarian language, only 14 were entirely fulfilled.77 18 undertakings 
were only partly fulfilled, including three instances where the undertaking was considered 
                                                          
73 Szeklers were not the only ones who received such special “autonomous” status. Consecutive Hungarian 
rulers granted similar territorial self-governing rights in exchange for military service to Saxons, 
Romanians, Cumans (Kun), Jassic (Jász) people and Serbs from the 13th century, the majority of which 
remained in existence until the second half of the 19th century. Additionally, Croatia formed a part of 
Hungary from 1102 till 1918 in the framework of a personal union (meaning that the King of Hungary, by 
virtue of his office, also became the King of Croatia), and was led by the Bán, who had widespread 
exclusive competencies, including the right to mint money and to gather an own army without the consent 
of the king. For more information about the autonomy arrangements that existed in the Hungarian Kingdom 
see: Kocsis (2013), p. 119. 
74 From the founding of the Hungarian Kingdom in 1 January 1001 till the adoption of the Stalinist 
constitution in 20 August 1949, Hungary functioned under a common law system, similar to that of the UK. 
75 The Language Charter was ratified by Romania through Law No. 282 of 24 October 2007. Available: 
http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/86674, accessed: 2015.06.23. 
76  See Report ECRML (2012) 3, pp. 74-91. Available: 
https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/Report/EvaluationReports/RomaniaECRML1_en.pdf, 
accessed: 2015.06.22. 
77 Fulfilled undertakings were: Article 8 - Paragraph 1 a i, b i, c i, e i; Article 9 – Paragraph 3; Article 11 - 
Paragraph 1 b i, c i, Paragraph 2 and 3; Article 12 - Paragraph 1 a, b, d, e, f. 
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formally fulfilled, but the Committee had concerns about their practical implementation.78 
One undertaking was not fulfilled,79 while the biggest parts of undertakings are those 
which are not even mentioned in the periodical report provided by the Romanian 
authorities.80  Altogether there were 28 instances where the Committee was not in a 
position to conclude on the fulfilment of an undertaking, as the periodical report did not 
contain any specific information on these. The most problematic article of the Charter 
proved to be Article 10 on the use of language by administrative authorities and public 
services. Here none of the 13 undertakings were entirely fulfilled. Altogether the 
Committee found the following deficiencies: Romanian legislation limits the application 
of several provisions of Article 10 to municipalities where 20% of the population belongs 
to a national minority. It was recommended to lower the general thresholds in the field of 
administrative authorities in order to make them compatible with the Charter. Even in 
localities which meet this very high 20% threshold there were severe problems with the 
implementation of the Charter.81 The use of bilingual signs is not always consistent and 
often depends on local initiatives. At times, the Hungarian inscriptions are erroneous, for 
example if the Hungarian word for “street” is added to a Romanian name without 
translating the latter into Hungarian as well (e.g. “Justiţiei utca” rather than correct 
“Bíróság utca”). Furthermore, the corresponding Romanian legislation does not pertain 
to place-names other than the names of villages/municipalities (for example names of 
streets or geographical features). Romanian legislation does also not allow Counties to 
use or adopt place names in a minority language.  
Regarding cultural and educational issues, the Committee mentions that in some 
localities it is not always possible for children from Hungarian-speaking families to 
                                                          
78 Partly fulfilled undertakings were: Article 8 - Paragraph 1 d i,f i, h; Article 9 - Paragraph 1 a ii, b ii , c ii; 
Article 10 - Paragraph 1 a ii, b, c; Paragraph 2  b, d, g, Paragraph 4  b; Article 11 - Paragraph 1 a ii, d i, g; 
Article 13 - Paragraph 2 e.  
79 This was Article 9 – Paragraph 3  
80 These were: Article 8 - Paragraph 1 fi, g, i, Paragraph 2; Article 9 - Paragraph 1 a iii, b iii, c iii, d, 
Paragraph 2; Article 10 - Paragraph 2 c, e, f, Paragraph 4 c, Paragraph 5; Article 11 - Paragraph 1 ei, fi; 
Article 12 - Paragraph 1 b, c, g, h, Paragraphs 2 and 3; Article 13 - Paragraph 1 a, b, c, Paragraph 2 c, d; 
Article 14 b. 
81 To illustrate the problems in connection with the implementation of the Charter, the Committee mentions 
a shadow report where an NGO sent applications in Hungarian to 76 State authorities, local authorities and 
public service providers located in Mureş/Maros County where 39.3% of the population belongs to the 
Hungarian minority. In its letters, the NGO asked for replies in Hungarian and made reference to relevant 
national laws and Article 10 of the Charter. According to the shadow report, 19 institutions replied 
bilingually on the substance of the request and 13 in Romanian only, 11 replied in Romanian that the request 
should be submitted again in the official language, and 33 did not reply at all. 
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receive Hungarian-medium education from kindergarten to upper secondary school at all 
the places where Hungarian speakers traditionally reside. There is also no television 
channel in Hungarian on the national level.  
In addition to these observations, there was a deterioration in linguistic rights that 
occurred after the last monitoring cycle was completed. The most notable of these being 
the case of the University of Medicine and Pharmacy in Târgu Mureş / Marosvásárhelyi 
Gyógyszerészeti és Orvostudományi Egyetem (MOGYE). Art. 363 of the Education Law 
adopted on 5 January, 2011 (2013 Legea Educatiei Nationale Nr. 1 din 5 Ianuarie 2011) 
enumerates three specific universities that are “multicultural and multilingual”.82 These 
are: 1. Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca – teaching languages are: Romanian, 
Hungarian and German; 2. University of Medicine and Pharmacy in Târgu Mureş– 
teaching in Romanian and Hungarian; 3. Arts University in Târgu Mureş– teaching in 
Romanian and Hungarian. The same article also stipulates that the senates of the 
respective universities must, within six months from the entry into force of the law, adopt 
their new university charters pursuant to these provisions. In the first and the third cases 
the establishment of the minority language department was implemented, in the case of 
MOGYE, however, the Romanian majority of the Universities Senate denied to follow 
suit and adopted a Charter that does not foresee the establishment of a Hungarian 
department.83 Given that this conduct manifestly violated the Education Law, the newly 
elected Prime Minister at the time, Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu, adopted a governmental 
decree on 13 March, 2012 that established the Hungarian department. As a reaction to 
this, the opposition, led by social democratic Victor Ponta, lodged a motion of no-
confidence on 18 April 2012, claiming that the cabinet had violated the universities 
autonomy with its decree, that it had been blackmailed to act against Romanian interest, 
and that a separate Hungarian department would only encourage separatism, and not 
multiculturalism.84 On 27 April, 235 representatives voted in favour of the motion (259 
of a total of 460 MPs were present at the vote), and Ungureanu fell from power, only 78 
days after his inauguration. The Hungarian department of the Pharmaceutical University 
                                                          
82 Source: http://www.cdep.ro/proiecte/2010/500/80/7/leg_pl587_10.pdf, accessed : 2016.04.11. 
83 See the English translation of the Charter here: 
https://www.umftgm.ro/fileadmin/documente_oficiale/regulamente/UMFTGM-REG-01_EN.pdf, 
accessed: 2016.04.11. 
84 The motion also mentioned the clientelism of the administration and that it privatizes public property to 
cronies of the PDL party. See the original text of the motion here: 
http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/137465, accessed: 2016.04.11. 
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has still not been established. In view of this background, it is understandable that all of 
the autonomy statute drafts having been elaborated so far envisage granting official status 
to the Hungarian language in Szeklerland. 
The Experts Committee is not the only body of the Council of Europe that has 
condemned practices experienced in Romania. The reports of the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) present evidence of a general social climate 
pervaded by hostile attitudes towards Hungarians. More specifically, ECRI notes that 
Romanian school textbooks contain stereotypes and prejudice about minority groups. 
Some textbooks, for example, continue to describe the arrival in Romania of “hordes of 
barbarian nomads who came from the East to spread terror”, and the Hungarians are 
sometimes depicted as foreigners who occupied the Transylvania region. The history 
course taught to Romanian pupils is entitled “History of the Romanians” rather than 
“History of Romania”.85 ECRI further noted that certain politicians and media have used 
very harsh discourse targeting Hungarians, which has created tensions between the 
majority population and this community. 
 
1.6.2.2 Religious discrimination 
Another topic that ECRI was particularly keen on was the restitution process of the 
property that had been confiscated during the communist regime from religious 
denominations. The process was characterized by ECRI as extremely slow, having many 
unsolved cases. As an example, they mention that out of the 2522 restitution requests 
submitted by Hungarian-minority religious institutions, 1103 remained pending.86 It was 
found that the reason for this slowness is that “local authorities have in many cases 
obstructed the restitution of property, by: not providing information relating to the 
disputed property; refusing to return certain properties; and challenging before court the 
decisions of the Special Restitution Commission, the section within the National 
Authority for Property Restitution responsible for returning religious and national/ethnic 
                                                          
85  See paragraph 81 of Report No. CRI (2006)3, adopted on 24 June 2005. Available: 
http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/XMLEcri/ENGLISH/Cycle_03/03_CbC_eng/ROM-CbC-III-2006-3-ENG.pdf, 
accessed: 2015.06.24. 
86  See paragraph 19 of Report No. CRI (2014)19, adopted on 19 March 2014. Available: 
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Romania/ROM-CbC-IV-2014-019-
ENG.pdf,accessed: 2015.06.25. 
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communal property”. As regards in particular the return of communal real estate 
belonging to national/ethnic minorities, between 2006 and May 2011, out of a total of 
2000 claims, only 568 were processed. 87  Concerns about the unresolvedness of the 
restitution question were also expressed during the Universal Periodic Review process of 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 2013. In this case the USA, Italy and 
Hungary were particularly keen on encouraging Romania to promptly adopt responsive 
and non-discriminatory legislation for property restitution seekers and to accelerate the 
resolution of pending property cases).88 
Additionally, despite the fact that the constitution does not refer to the orthodox 
church as de jure state-church, the state continues de facto to treat is as such (violating 
the provisions of Law No. 489/2006 on Religious Freedom and the General Regime of 
Denominations), and grants them all sorts of concessions other denominations are 
deprived of (e.g. donation of land property or real-estate). 89 These concessions are 
politically relevant, given that minority Hungarians often point out that the Orthodox 
Church actively contributes to the assimilation policies of the state, among others, by 
building churches in Szekler communes where the overwhelming majority of the 
population belongs to western Christian denominations.90 
 
1.6.2.3 Persecution of symbols 
In its fourth monitoring report, ECRI also discussed one of the most contentious issues: 
the case of the Szekler flag.91 The first regulatory procedure in the case of the Szekler 
flag occurred in relation to Makfalva / Ghindari (north-west Szeklerland), when the 
commune decided to place the Szekler flag on the façade of the local council building in 
December 2009.  This event was followed by a police interrogation in January 2010, an 
investigation of the state prosecution, and another inquiry from the deputy prefect of 
Maros County, aiming to remove the flag. Even though the deputy prefect was unable to 
                                                          
87 Id. at paragraph 20. 
88 See Report No. A/HRC/23/5, available http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/301681, accessed: 2016.01.27. 
89 For more information, see e. g.: Andreescu (2007), pp. 451-480. 
90 See e. g.: http://erdely.ma/publicisztika.php?id=167050&cim=nem_a_rendszerben_van_hiba_maga_a_ 
rendszer_a_hiba_reflexio_borboly_csaba_irasara, accessed: 2017.01.29. 
91  See paragraph 168. of Report No. CRI(2014)19, available: 
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Romania/ROM-CbC-IV-2014-019-
ENG.pdf,accessed: 2016.04.12. 
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mention a law that forbids the use of the Szekler flag, he added that what is not legally 
prohibited, is not necessarily allowed. The rules applying to this issue (first of all Act No. 
75 of 1994)92 stipulate that it is mandatory to place the Romanian flag on public buildings, 
but the flags of other countries can only be displayed together with the Romanian flag 
and only during official state visits, festivities and international meetings. Accordingly, 
this regulation contains no orientation point for the use of the Szekler flag. The Judgment 
that concluded this particular case on 10 August 2010, declared that the Szekler flag is 
the symbol of a historic community, which does not violate any legislation.93 In spite of 
this judgment, the then prefect of Kovászna County, Codrin Munteanu, turned to the court 
in order to remove the Szekler flag from the mayor’s office of the municipality of Uzon, 
and later on called upon all mayors of his county to take off the Szekler flags from all of 
their public offices. As the prefect had put it: “The flag on the mayor’s office of Uzon 
symbolizes a non-existing entity and violates the law in the same way as if someone 
would place the flag of a football team or a car factory on the town hall”.94 Dumitru 
Marinescu, Munteanus’ successor, followed suit with these methods when he ordered the 
Szekler flag to be removed from the Ceremonial Hall in Sepsiszentgyörgy / Sfântu 
Gheorghe where his inauguration took place on 2 February 2013. Similar incidents 
occurred in Hargita (the other Szekler County beside Kovászna) where prefect Jean-
Adrian Andrei called upon the mayors of the county to remove all Szekler flags from their 
public buildings in an official statement on 11 February 2013.  
A new line of argument against the Szekler flag emerged later on, when the police 
of Târgu Mureş / Marosvásárhely fined the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania 
to 30.000 RON for hoisting a Szekler flag on their local headquarters in October 2013. 
                                                          
92 The full name of this Act is: Law regarding the display of the Romanian flag, singing the national anthem 
and the use of insignia containing the Romanian coat of arms by public authority and institutions. LEGE 
nr.75 din 16 iulie 1994 privind arborarea drapelului României, intonarea imnului naţional şi folosirea 
sigiliilor cu stema României de către autorităţile şi instituţiile publice Textul actului publicatîn M.Of. nr. 
237/26 aug. 1994. Available: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=14530, accessed : 
2016.04.11 
93 Besides the Makfalva case, to date there has been only one case where the Judgment came out in favour 
of hoisting the Szekler-flag on public buildings, namely in the case of Erdőszentgyörgy / Sângeorgiu de 
Pădure. In this latter case the Prefect of Maros county fined the mayor of Erdőszentgyörgy for 5000 RON 
(1.112 EUR) on 21 January 2015, for refusing to remove the Szekler and the Hungarian flag from the 
building that serves as local headquarters of the UDMR party. See: http://www.kronika.ro/erdelyi-
hirek/helyukre-kerulnek-a-zaszlok-erdoszentgyorgyon, accessed: 2017.01.25. 
94  See: http://mno.hu/hatarontul/munteanu-figyelmeztetett-ne-tuzzek-ki-a-szekely-zaszlot-1132801, 
accessed: 2015.06.26. 
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The court ruled against the fine, but did not contest the initial argument of the police that 
the Szekler flag was a commercial banner.95 This argument later reappeared in August 
2014 when the police called upon MEP Tőkés László to remove the Szekler flag from his 
Central Office in Nagyvárad / Oradea envisaging a penalty of up to 50.000 RON in case 
he would disobey.96Tőkés challenged the fine but the decision of the Court of Bihar 
County came in favour of the police. 
As a response to these developments, the Romanian legislature codified the use of 
local symbols by way of Law 141/2015 on the display and use of the flags of 
administrative territorial units. Seemingly, this law provides for the opportunity to 
recognize the Szekler flag as the flag of a county for example, in practice, however, 
provisions of the law effectively hinder this process. According to Article 3, in the 
framework of the new procedure, the flag-model adopted by the county council should 
be sent to the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration first, which 
asks for the opinion of the National Committee of Heraldry, Genealogy and Sigillography 
of the Romanian Academy. Based on the consultative opinion of this Committee, the flag 
will be adopted by way of a Government Decree. These new provisions effectively strip 
administrative-territorial units from the right to decide on their own flags, and confers 
this right to the central government which could delay or even deny the approval of the 
county decision. 
The ECRI Report mentions that the processes surrounding the Szekler flag 
cumulated eventually to the point where the hoisting of the flag on official buildings was 
banned and fines were imposed on municipalities that disobeyed.97 The situation was 
serious enough for ECRI to recommend that the authorities appease tensions between the 
majority population and ethnic minorities by applying the principle of equal treatment 
                                                          
95 The same approach was present concerning the flag of another historical region of Hungarian majority, 
the "Partium", Judgement of the Court of Bihar County concluded in case Nr. 284/271/2016 that the flag 
of Partium was a commercial banner, the hoisting of which constitutes a commercial activity, subject to 
prior authorization processes. 
See:http://erdely.ma/autonomia.php?id=205813&cim=jogerosen_reklamzaszlonak_%20minositettek 
_a_partiumi_zaszlot_is, accessed: 2017.02.07. 
96  Source:  http://index.hu/kulfold/2016/02/01/nem_reklamzaszlo_a_szekely_zaszlo/, accessed: 
2016.09.03. 
97 A specific case the ECRI report mentions was that of Csikmadaras, a village where the mayor was fined 
by the court to 9 000 RON (approximately 2 000 €) for not removing the flag. 
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concerning the display and use of national and regional symbols and to remedy any 
violation thereof.  
To illustrate the double standards that take place in the treatment of 
local/Hungarian v. national/Romanian symbols, ECRI mentions a second case which 
concerned the wearing of a headband with the national colours of Romania by several 
pupils in a school in the county of Kovászna on the national day of Hungary (March 15). 
The teacher of the class asked the pupils to remove the headband and this led to an 
escalation of protests in various towns and the burning of the Hungarian flag. Further to 
this incident, a group on Facebook was formed inciting violence against Hungarians. As 
a response, the authorities carried out an investigation into the conduct of the school and 
reprimanded the headmaster and dismissed the teacher who had banned the wearing of 
the symbol. ECRI noted that in this respect there is an inconsistency between the reaction 
of the authorities in the Szekler case and this latter incident. In the first incident the 
authorities banned the display of local symbols, whereas in the second incident they 
safeguarded the right to display Romanian national symbols. ECRI deemed that this 
incongruence should be remedied in order to ensure that there is no discrimination on 
grounds of ethnic origin in this field.  
What could be added to the above is that it appears to be a willingness from the 
Romanian authorities to apply double standards and negative discrimination to the 
detriment of Hungarians on a regional basis, too. On the 4th of June 2016, in the centre 
of Csíkszereda / Miercurea Ciuc local Hungarian civilians and representatives wanted to 
re-hoist a Szekler flag that had already been on display for a long time, but was 
temporarily removed due to renovation works. The local police, however, intervened, 
confiscated the flag, took the organizer into custody and issued a 10.000 RON fine for 
him in June 2016.98 By contrast, only a few months earlier, on 28 November, 2016 in the 
centre of Gura Humorului (a small town in north-eastern Romania, inhabited 
overwhelmingly by ethnic Romanians) the flag of the historical region of Bucovina was 
                                                          
98  See: http://www.szekelyhon.ro/aktualis/csikszek/elkoboztak-a-foteri-szekely-zaszlot-csikszeredaban, 
accessed: 2017.01.25.).This certainly was not the first similar case that the city of Csíkszereda  experienced. 
There were two other incidents, both of which were brought about by an infamous Romanian NGO 
(Asociația Civicăpentru Demnitateîn Europa / Civic Association for Dignity in Europe) whose leader Dan 
Tanasă initiated dozens of  trials to remove Szekler and Hungarian symbols as well as Hungarian written 
signs from the facade and the interior of public buildings (see: http://www.kronika.ro/erdelyi-
hirek/abekemenyitetta-dan-tanasa-a-folytatodik-a-persorozat, accessed: 2017.01.25). 
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hoisted on the Day of Bucovina, accompanied by police tributes, even though no such 
administrative unit exists.99 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that a similarly restrictive approach applies to 
singing the Szekler and Hungarian anthems. One of the most memorable examples 
occurred in December, 2011 when the Romanian ice hockey team - the majority of which 
consits of Szekler-Hungarian players - played a game against Hungary during the Euro 
Ice-hockey Challenge in Csíkszereda, and the players of the Romanian team sang the 
Hungarian anthem as well as the Szekler anthem before the game.100 Romanian news 
reports were outraged by what was described as a scandalous and preposterous incident. 
Some news outlets even went as far to speak of high treason.101Another memorable 
incident happened in December 2014, when the prefect of Kovászna / Covasna County, 
fined the Hungarian Civic Party because the Hungarian anthem was sung at an event 
organized by them. The party turned to the court arguing that it is not prohibited to sing 
the anthem of another country. The court annulled the fine in the end, but not because the 
singing of the anthem of another county was considered legal, but of procedural flaws 
committed by the prefect during the procedure.102 
 
1.6.2.4 Public administration practices 
Completing the already mentioned organizations with a third body of the CoE, the 
Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCPNM) concluded that certain media outlets report in a manner that 
strengthens existing negative stereotypes associated with certain minorities (in particular 
the Hungarians),103 and that the number of persons belonging to national minorities who 
work as public officials is proportionally low (notably Hungarians and Roma). The 
                                                          
99  See a video of the festivity here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tqa9Oi2k_hQ, accessed: 
2016.06.07. 
100 See video footage of the case here: 
http://erdely.ma/autonomia.php?id=106649&cim=himnuszbotrany_miert_enekeltek_a_magyarok_a_mag
yar_nemzeti_imat_video, accessed: 2017.01.26. 
101 See references in: http://www.origo.hu/sport/jegkorong/20111218-magyarroman-himnuszbotrany-egy-
csikszeredai-hokimeccsen.html, 217.01.26. 
102 See case nr. 5901/305/2014. 
103  First opinion on Romania adopted on 6 April 2001 - ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)001, p. 9. Available: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_1st_OP_Romania_en.pdf, accessed: 
2015.06.24.  
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Advisory Committee recommended that the Romanian authorities adopt the necessary 
measures to promote a fair representation of the minorities in the civil service.104 There 
has only been limited dialogue between the authorities and the representatives of 
minorities that have expressed an interest in the measures taken by the State to protect 
national minorities, 105  and therefore in the protection afforded by the Framework 
Convention (the Committee specifically mentions the Csángó Hungarians). 106  The 
Committee specifically mentions the two counties with Szekler majority (Hargita and 
Kovászna) where inter-ethnic and inter-cultural dialogue remains problematic.107 Finally, 
The Advisory Committee notes with regret that the Draft Law on the Status of National 
Minorities,108 which has been under consideration in various forms since 1995, has still 
not been adopted and continues to be discussed in Parliament.109 As a matter of fact, this 
Draft Law (renumbered as Draft Law 502/2005 in 2005) has become the longest-debated 
draft law in the history of post-communist Romania. A legislative process that seems to 
have no end in sight, as the Draft has already been debated in seven Parliamentary 
Committees (which is also unprecedented, as most legal documents in the country are 
debated in two or three committees tops), only to slowly melt off the agenda of the 
Legislature. According to the official homepage of the parliament, Draft Law 502/2005 
                                                          
104 Id at p.21. 
105  Paragraph 25. of the Second Opinion on Romania adopted on 24 November 2005 - 
ACFC/OP/II(2005)007. Available: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_2nd_OP_Romania_en.pdf, accessed: 
2015.06.24. 
106 The Csángó people are an ethnic group of Roman Catholic faith living in the Romanian region of 
Moldavia (adjacent to Transylvania on the eastern side of the Carpathians), especially in the counties of 
Bacău and Neamț. According to a report of the Council of Europe, the estimated number of the Csángó 
population ranges from 260,000 to a couple of thousands (depending on the definition, and based on the 
fact that in the 2002 census only 4.317 persons declared themselves as Csángós, who were concentrated 
mostly in the municipalities of Klézse/Cleja, Pusztina/Pustiana, and Lészped/Lespezi) out of which only 
about 60,000 – 70,000 speak the Csángó dialect. The Csángós speak an archaic form of Hungarian and 
have ancient traditions and lifestyle as well as a great diversity of indigenous folk art and culture. The 
official Romanian viewpoint is, however, that the Csángós are in fact "magyarised" Romanians from 
Transylvania. Consequently, the Romanian authorities do not ensure the teaching of the Hungarian 
language for Csángós. See: Recommendation 1521 (2001) on Csángó minority culture in Romania, and the 
explanatory memorandum by Mrs TyttiIsohookana-Asunmaa: Doc. 9078, Report of the Committee on 
Culture, Science and Education from 4 May 2001: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-
ViewHTML.asp?FileID=9301&lang=en, accessed: 2015.07.27. 
107 Paragraph 92 of the Second Opinion on Romania - ACFC/OP/II(2005)007. 
108 The lack of such a legislation means that the rights of minorities are currently scattered in the Romanian 
legal system in several different sources of law. 
109 Paragraph 38 of the Third opinion on Romania adopted on 21 March 2012 - ACFC/OP/III(2012)001. 
Available: https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId= 
090000168008c6a3, accessed: 2017.01.29. 
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has not been on the parliamentary agenda since 2012 when it was sent back to the 
Committee for Human Rights, Cults and National Minorities for further analysis.110 
The third report of the Advisory Committee also makes references to the 
administrative reform, another process that continues to grow longer and longer. In this 
issue the Advisory Committee noted that “the proportion of persons identifying 
themselves with national minorities is likely to diminish in some of the proposed larger 
units, which may affect the exercise of a number of rights which are conditional on 
reaching a certain threshold of persons identifying themselves with a national minority 
and residing within the territorial unit in question. Such a development, in the opinion of 
the Advisory Committee, might lead to the weakening of the possibilities for persons 
belonging to the minorities to influence and participate in local affairs.”111 To remedy the 
problem, The Advisory Committee urged the authorities to ensure that “the rights of 
persons belonging to national minorities are duly taken into account when planning and 
implementing the reform of territorial administration in Romania and that there is no 
negative impact on the right of persons belonging to national minorities to participate 
effectively in public affairs at local level”,112 in accordance with the principles enshrined 
in Article 6 of the Framework Convention. 
The issue is also mentioned in the 4th ECRI Monitoring Report, which notes that 
two issues are at the heart of the growing tensions which have characterized the relations 
between the majority population and the Hungarian minority. “The first concerns the 
planned constitutional and administrative reform which aims to reorganize the counties 
in eight administrative regions. ECRI has been informed that the Hungarian minority 
fears that this will dilute their representation in the new regions and that these will not 
coincide with the cultural “borders”. The second issue refers to the growing demand from 
the Covasna and Hargita counties for greater regional autonomy, which has at times been 
interpreted by the national authorities as a wish to secede from Romania”.113 
It follows from the above-quoted observation of ECRI that interpreting demands 
for greater self-rule and decentralization as a secessionist threat can only result in 
immediate vigour from public institutions to any manifestation that points in the direction 
                                                          
110 See: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck.proiect?idp=6778, accessed: 2017.01.26. 
111 Paragraph 193. of the Third opinion on Romania- ACFC/OP/III(2012)001. 
112 Id. Paragraph 194. 
113 Report No. CRI (2014)19, paragraph 167. 
  
44 
 
of regional autonomy. This approach came to the fore particularly well when the Szekler 
National Council called upon the 153 municipalities of Szeklerland to adopt pro-
autonomy municipal resolutions.114 More specifically, these resolutions stipulated that 
the Szekler cities and villages wish to be part of a unified Szekler administrative unit in 
the future, which unit should be called Szeklerland and should be vested with autonomous 
competencies as set out in an organic law, and that this autonomy should include the 
official status of the Hungarian language, along with the Romanian language.115 Such 
resolutions were adopted by 62 municipalities, representing 376.271 inhabitants, 
amounting to 47,08 % of the population of Szeklerland.116 Even though these resolutions 
pertained to a future preference, and did not contain any tasks to be fulfilled by local 
authorities, the Prefects of Maros, Hargita, and Kovászna counties challenged all 
resolutions before the Administrative Courts, which annulled all resolutions through 
Judgments that contained familiar arguments: a) the only administrative units that the 
constitution recognizes are communes, towns and counties; b)  Romanian language can 
be the only official language of the state. 
Lastly, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (CLRA) has also 
condemned some of the institutional practices of Romania. In their Information Report 
from 2002, CLRA noted that the de jure suspension of the decisions of local authorities 
challenged by the Prefect before the administrative courts can have the same effect as 
annulment and can thus, have an adverse effect on the decision-making autonomy of local 
bodies. Consequently, the provision at issue is contrary to Article 8.3 of the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government which establishes that the intervention by the 
controlling authority should be kept in proportion to the importance of the interests which 
it is intended to protect.117 Recommendation 300 (2011) of the Congress notes with 
concern the lack of transparency in the allocation of financial resources between the 
                                                          
114  See the text of the call here: http://sznt.sic.hu/hu-
sic/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=724%3 Amasfel-szaz-szekely-oenkormanyzat-
nyilvanitsa-ki-akaratat&catid=13%3Akoezlemenyek&Itemid=18&lang= fa, accessed: 2017.02.01. 
115 About the results of this campaign, SzNC informed: The Parliament and the Government of Romania, 
the Secretary-general of the CoE, the PACE, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, the 
Committee of Regions, the European Parliament, and the Human Rights Council of the UN. 
116  See the full list of these municipalities here:http://www.sznt.sic.hu/hu-
sic/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=752%3Aszekely-oenkormanyzatok-az-autonom-
szekelyfoeldert&catid=12%3Afolyamodvanyok-valaszlevelek&Itemid=16&lang=fa, accessed: 
2017.01.31. 
117 Paragraph 76/a a) of Information Report No. CG/INST (8) 55 rev / 2002.  
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central and local levels of government which does not allow either to address the real 
needs of local authorities or the insufficient consultation with the local authorities in the 
decision-making process on all questions directly concerning them.118 
 
1.6.2.5 Criminalization of autonomy aspirations 
The criminalization of the Szekler-Hungarian community and their autonomy aspirations 
has a robust history in the country, the roots of which go way back to the totalitarian 
regimes of the XX. century. This is illustrated by a Memorandum from 1982, which was 
the only samizdat publication of communist Romania called Ellenpontok (Counterpoints). 
The redaction consisted of Hungarian intellectuals and the memorandum was addressed 
to the second Madrid follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe to review compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The Memorandum 
points out that: “state powers treat us [the Hungarian community –ed.], especially 
intellectuals and workers, as if we were the enemies within.  Terror on the part of the 
security forces is the order of the day. If we speak out in defence of our heritage, it is we 
who are called chauvinistic. We live as second-class citizens in Romania, whose 
possibilities for career advancement are also limited by the fact that we are Hungarians. 
We lack any means of self-protection....Thus, our situation is characterized by the denial 
of not only our individual rights, but our collective rights as well, two sets of rights which 
are inseparable in our case”.119 
The validity and the continuity of these observations are confirmed by the findings 
of the annual activity reports of the Romanian Secret Service. Autonomy issues are 
usually mentioned under the sub-chapter dealing with the protection of the Constitution 
(Apărarea Constituţiei). Here, the “autonomy-discourse” is depicted as “ethnic 
radicalism” that strives to “internationalize the anti-Hungarian politics of Bucharest”, and 
                                                          
118  Paragraph 5/b, c. Available: 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2
550142&SecMode=1&DocId=2147904&Usage=2, accessed: 2015.06.24.  
119  Source: Beszélő online (1982), I. évfolyam, 5. szám: available: 
http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/memorandumok-es-programjavaslatok. For the English text of the 
Memorandum see: http://www.hungarianhistory.com/lib/bors/bors15.htm, accessed: 2016.02.21. 
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at the same time aims to “aggressively emphasize Szekler ethno-cultural 
characteristics”.120 
 The most obvious method to criminalize a democratic autonomy movement is to 
apply double standards to those struggling for it, and label their cause as illegitimate and 
extremist. In Szeklerland the culmination of this approach can be witnessed with regards 
to the “Day of the Szekler Freedom” protests (hereinafter DSF).121 This event is organized 
in the historical capital of Szeklerland, Marosvásárhely / Târgu Mureș annually on 10 
March 122  by the Szekler National Council and with the participation of domestic 
Hungarian political parties as well as foreign politicians and public figures, attracting tens 
of thousands of people each year. The main goal of the DSF is to demand territorial 
autonomy for Szeklerland and to protest against the already mentioned administrative 
reform plans of the government, which in its present format attempts to assimilate the 
counties with substantial Szekler population into a larger administrative region in which 
the proportion of Szeklers would drop below 30% of the population.123 Given these 
contentious goals, various tools have been deployed to hinder the organization of  the 
DSF: 
On 10 March, 2014 the Gendarmerie of Maros County issued a fine amounting to 
12.000 RON / 2700 EUR for the organizers of the DSF, based on Article 26 a) of Act 
60/1991 on the organization of public meetings. This article aims to penalize those who 
are “organizing and conducting undeclared, unregistered or prohibited public meetings”. 
This has proved to be the main argument against the event and its organizers and has been 
continuously invoked by the authorities’ year after year. The Gendarmerie argued that 
one would need prior approval from the police to hold any demonstration. On the 
contrary, the organizers argued that according to the law one only needs to inform the 
authorities about a demonstration (which they had done), and not ask for their permission, 
                                                          
120 Raportul de activitate al ServiciuluiRomân de Informaţiiînanul 2014, p. 7. Available: 
https://www.sri.ro/fisiere/rapoarte/Raport_SRI_2014.pdf, accessed: 2017.01.31. 
121 The case of the DSF proved to be salient enough to reached the sensitivity threshold of US Diplomacy. 
See the State Secretary’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 in Romania: 
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252891#wrapper, 
accessed: 2017.01.26. 
122 Marosvásárhely / Târgu Mureș is the multi-ethnic centre of Maros County, where the deliberative and 
executive branches of the County are seated. According to the last census, 49,17% of the city’s population 
is Romanian, 42,84% is Hungarian, and 7,99% other. 
123 According to the last census conducted in 2011: 82.9% of Hargita-, 73.79% of Kovászna-, and 38.09% 
of Maros county was composed of Hungarian/Szeklers. 
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given that the right to assembly and to free speech are fundamental human rights that are 
not contingent on the goodwill of the police. Consequently, the organizers filed a lawsuit 
against the Gendarmerie before the Court of Marosvásárhely / Târgu Mureș, which 
transferred the case to the Administrative Court. The case is still pending. 
 In 2015, the Mayor of Marosvásárhely / Târgu Mureș, Dorin Florea decided to 
simply ban the annual DSF in 2015, claiming that it creates “ethnic unrest” and turns the 
city into a “conflict zone”.124 The organizers contested this decision before the court 
which ruled in favor of the Mayor due to legal technicalities which happens quite often 
in Romania.125  The court’s decision did not take into account the actual topic of the 
contestation, but instead dismissed the case due to procedural reasons, stating that before 
turning to the court the plaintiffs should have made a prior complaint to the Mayor’s 
Office.  
In an attempt to prevent such malicious practices of the authorities, the organizers 
filed a prior notification, according to the provisions of the law, with the Mayor’s Office 
already on 2 March 2015, announcing that they will hold the DSF in the same usual place 
both in 2016 and 2017. Even so, the Mayor’s Office decided not to acknowledge this 
notification, and argued instead that the announcement came too early, and should rather 
be made at a later stage, closer to the date of the actual event. Furthermore, the Mayor’s 
Office argued that organizing the DSF in 2016 will be problematic, given that it falls into 
election year (!), and that road construction works were being planned for the trail of the 
event, due to which public security across the city would be constantly changing (even 
though they were not able to clarify what kind of construction works they were referring 
to). The organizers turned again to the court, which ruled in favor of them,126 concluding 
that the above-mentioned arguments of the Mayor’s Office lacked any kind of legal basis 
whatsoever to deny the registration of the event, and that the organizers fulfilled all prior 
notification requirements. Additionally, the judge admonished the Mayor for refusing to 
acknowledge the announcement of the organizers because with this conduct he 
deliberately “refused to settle the request of the applicant”.127 
                                                          
124  See e.g.: http://www.evz.ro/marsul-secuilor-naste-tensiuni-inainte-de-organizare.html, accessed, 
2016.08.18. 
125 See cases mentioned under Chapter 1.6.2.3. 
126 See Judgement No. 16/2016 from 8 January, 2016. 
127See p. 6, last paragraph of Judgment 16/2016. 
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A week after the DSF of 2016 had been held, the Gendarmerie of Maros County 
started to issue fines amounting to 61.000 RON / 13.700 EUR in 50 cases pursuant to Act 
60/1991 for participating in an undeclared, unregistered or prohibited public meeting and 
9.800 RON / 2.200 EUR in 34 cases pursuant to Act 61/1991 for noise disturbance (!). 
This year the Gendarmerie started fining not just the organizers, but also the participants. 
In some cases, the fined individuals were not even present in Tîrgu 
Mureș/Marosvásárhely on the day of the demonstration. Given that the event took place 
without any public disturbance, the organizers believed that the only explanation for 
penalizing the peaceful exercise of the fundamental right to assembly and free speech was 
to deter people from participating in the DSF in the future. As a response to these unlawful 
fines, the organizers lodged a claim for misconduct against the Gendarmerie. The case 
was transferred to the Office of the Military Prosecutor where it is still pending. 
Simultaneously, the Szekler National Council encouraged people to turn to the Court of 
Tîrgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely asking it to annul all fines issued to participants of the DSF.  
Not only do the Romanian authorities apply punitive measures against citizens 
peacefully exercising their fundamental rights to assembly and free speech, they do so 
based on ethnic and political guidelines. The double standard of the authorities in this 
regard came to the fore particularly well during the fall of 2015. After the Colectiv 
nightclub in Bucharest had burned down on 30 October, 2015 leaving 64 dead and more 
than 180 injured, large masses of people in the Romanian capital spontaneously 
participated in a series of unregistered demonstrations against corruption. Even though 
there was no one organizing these demonstrations, no individual was fined or prosecuted 
as a result of his/her participation in the protests. Similar inequalities can be found in the 
treatment of various political messages. The far right, neo-Nazi Noua Dreapta (New 
Right) repeatedly organizes marches in cities inhabited by Hungarians, chanting slogans 
inciting hatred against Hungarians (for example: "Harghita and Covasna is Romanian 
land", "Get Hungarians out of the country!", "Romanian language is the only ruler" or 
that "Romania is for Romanians").128 On 13 February, 2013 Noua Dreapta organized a 
                                                          
128 Sources: Protest in Sepsiszentgyörgy / Sfântu Gheorghe on 1 December, 2014 (the national holiday, 
commemorating the Romanian National Councils declaration from 1918 claiming that Transylvania is part 
of Romania: http://www.maszol.ro/index.php/belfold/39447-magyarellenes-roman-unnep-
sepsiszentgyorgyon, accessed: 2016.08.22. Noua Dreapta also marched several times in Arad on 6 October 
against Hungarian „irredentism” (on this day Hungarians commemorate the downfall of the 1848-1849 
revolution and the execution of 13 of their generals in Arad by the Habsburg authorities): 
http://www.nyugatijelen.com/jelenido/a_magyar_irredentizmus_ellen_tuntetnek_aradon.php, accessed: 
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protest in Kolozsvár/Cluj at the Hungarian Consulate General, and parallel with that a 
protest in Bucharest at the Hungarian Embassy against the use of the Szekler flag on 
public buildings. Regardless of the fact that the latter protest was a spontaneous, non-
registered event, the police did not intervene or impose any fines afterwards.129 Even if 
the DSF is staged without violence, public disturbance, or incendiary messages, the 
Romanian authorities initiate numerous proceedings against organizers and since 2016 
also against participants. Whereas, on the other hand, marches of the Romanian far-right 
never encountered any bans, fines or other administrative proceedings, no matter how 
inflammatory, biased and disrespectful their messages towards Hungarians might have 
been. Juxtaposing these examples shows that the authorities in Romania apply the right 
to assembly in a discriminative and selective way to the detriment of persons belonging 
to the Hungarian community.  
The above explained phenomenon indicates that there is a tacit agreement among 
Romanian authorities that they de facto possess the capacity to effectively ban or allow 
public protests to be held, especially in the case of politically sensitive events organized 
by Szeklers/Hungarians. This interpretative framework is diametrically opposed to that 
of the Council of Europe, which was reflected in several cases of the European Court of 
Human Rights (hereinafter, the Court), most notably in the case of Bukta and Others v. 
Hungary.130 In this Judgment, adopted on 17 July 2007, the Court reiterated that „the 
subjection of public assemblies to a prior-authorization procedure does not normally 
encroach upon the essence of the right (see Rassemblement Jurassien and Unité 
Jurassienne v. Switzerland, no. 8191/78, Commission decision of 10 October 1979, 
Decisions and Reports 17)....”. 131  Furthermore, the Court noted that “where 
demonstrators do not engage in acts of violence, it is important for the public authorities 
to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings if the freedom of 
                                                          
2016.08.22. Noua Dreapta also prefers to march in Marosvásárhely, as they did on 27 March, 2015 
demanding the unification of Romania with the Republic of Moldova (Bessarabia): 
http://www.kozpont.ro/hirek/belfold/marosvasarhelyen-tuentetett-az-uj-jobboldal/, accessed: 2016.08.22. 
129 Source: http://mno.hu/hatarontul/a-szekelyek-nem-magyarok-tuntettek-a-szelsonacionalistak-1138066, 
accessed: 2016.08.22. See video on the event at: http://ziuadecj.realitatea.net/eveniment/noua-dreapta-a-
pichetat-consulatul-maghiar-din-cluj-fotovideo--106254.html, accessed: 2016.08.22. 
130 Available: www.legislationline.org/documents/id/17932, accessed: 2017.01.29.  
131 Id. paragraph 35.  
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assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention is not to be deprived of all 
substance” (see Oya Ataman v. Turkey, no. 74552/01, §§ 41-42, ECHR 2006-XIV).132 
When further browsing the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, one 
can find remarkable similarities between reactions of the Romanian authorities to 
Szeklers and their political events, and Turkish reactions to Kurdish political claims, or 
Bulgarian reactions to activities of Macedonian organizations. One notable example was 
the Sener v. Turkey case.133 On 5 September, 1993 the Istanbul State Security Court 
charged the owner and editor of a weekly review (Haberde Yorumda Gerçek / The Truth 
of News and Comments)with having disseminated separatist propaganda against the 
indivisibility of the State, and ordered the seizure of the 23rd edition of review on that 
grounds. The article at hand spoke of the extermination of a nation, of genocide, used the 
term "Kurdistan" and mentioned the right to self-determination of the nations.  The Court 
ruled that Articles 10, 6 (1), and 18 of the ECHR had been violated and reiterated that 
freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society, as a consequence of which all exceptions and restrictions to this right should be 
construed strictly and established convincingly. However, the Court reminded that under 
the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) there is little scope 
for "restrictions on political speech or on debate on questions of public interest", and that 
the "limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the government". In this 
particular case the Istanbul State Security Court presented the argument that referring to 
a specific region of Turkey as "Kurdistan" in itself constituted "dissemination of 
propaganda". In this connection the Court noted that Turkish authorities had failed to 
respect the public's right to be informed of a different perspective on the Kurdish-issue, 
"irrespective of how unpalatable that perspective may be for them". In this respect, the 
views of the Romanian authorities with regard to Szeklerland are similar to that of Turkish 
authorities in connection with Kurdistan.134 
Analogous pro- and counter arguments have emerged with regard to the freedom 
of assembly and association in the Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey case,135 where the 
Court reminded that an organization cannot be excluded from the protection of the ECHR 
                                                          
132 Id. paragraph 37. 
133 Source: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58753, accessed: 2017.01.20. 
134 For more detail see Chapter 2.4. 
135 Source: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58172, accessed: 2017.01.20. 
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irrespective of their political agenda. In this case "exclusion" took the form of dissolution 
of the Socialist Party by the Constitutional Court on 10 July 1992, for allegedly 
undermining the territorial integrity of the state through Pro-Kurdish public statements. 
These statements were in favor of a federalized Turkey where Turks and Kurds would be 
on an equal footing to the extent that Kurds as a "nation" would have "full and 
unconditional right to self-determination", including the right to create a separate state 
should they wish to do so. The Court ruled that Article 11 of the ECHR had been violated 
and irrespective of Turkish sentiments towards these ideas, one cannot dissolve an 
association simply because its activities are regarded by the national authorities as ones 
undermining the constitutional structures of the State. 
Similar findings have been made by the Court in the case of Stankov and the 
United Macedonian Organisation (UMO) Ilinden v. Bulgaria in 2001.136UMO Ilinden's 
main political goal was not secession or autonomy, but the recognition of the Macedonian 
minority in Bulgaria and the main activity towards this end was the organization of 
celebrations to commemorate historical events of importance for Macedonians in 
Bulgaria. Even so, UMO Ilinden had been refused registration under Bulgarian Lawin 
1990, 1998-99 and 2002-04, on the grounds that its statute and programme were directed 
against the unity of the Bulgarian nation. Even so, the Court concluded that “an automatic 
reliance on the fact that an organization had been considered anti-constitutional - and 
refused registration - could not suffice to justify under Article 11(2) of the Convention a 
practice of systematic bans on the holding of peaceful assemblies. More importantly, from 
the Szekler point of view, the Court replied to concerns raised by the Bulgarian 
government that certain leaders of UMO Ilinden harbored separatist views and had a 
political agenda that included autonomy for the region of Pirin Macedonia or even 
secession from Bulgaria. Paragraph 97 of the Judgment stated that "the fact that a group 
of persons calls for autonomy or even requests secession of part of the country's 
territory...cannot automatically justify a prohibition of its assemblies. Demanding 
political changes in speeches and demonstrations does not automatically amount to a 
threat to the country's territorial integrity and national security". 
As final remarks to this chapter, it is important to mention two unique attempts to 
criminalize and discredit Szekler autonomy aspirations. The first example was a draft of 
                                                          
136 Source: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59689, accessed: 2017.01.20. 
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the National Strategy for Order and Public Safety 2015-2020 elaborated by the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs of Romania.137 Among the possible threats to public safety, this draft 
highlights “manifestations of racism, xenophobia, extremism and other forms of 
intolerance aimed at achieving autonomy for specific areas / regions based on ethnic 
criteria.” Not only does this paper consider regional autonomy to be a general security 
threat (such as the deterioration of living standards or the degradation of the education 
system), it goes further as to characterising autonomy as an extreme manifestation of 
intolerance, racism and xenophobia. Even though the quoted part was terminated from 
the text and is not present in the document that was adopted by the Parliament, it 
demonstrates the general approach of the political elite towards autonomy aspirations.   
The second case appeared on December, 2015 when the Romanian Directorate for 
the Investigation of Organized Crime and Terrorism (Direcția de Investigare a 
Infracțiunilor de Criminalitate Organizatăși Terorism - DIICOT) arrested two Szeklers 
(Beke István Attila and Szőcs Zoltán, both members of a right wing NGO called HVIM – 
Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom / Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, 
originally established in Hungary) on the charges that they were planning to explode a 
home-made bomb on the Romanian national holiday (1 December) in Kézdivásárhely, 
Szeklerland.138 
Up to this point no one knows if the charges are valid or not. In any case, if one 
looks at the indictment, it becomes clear that the DIICOT attempts to expand the 
accusations to individuals, organizations, even whole communities who have nothing to 
do with violence, terrorism or extremism, and which never had any personal or 
institutional connections with the suspects. In order to blur the lines and depict Szekler 
autonomy aspirations as a terrorist threat, DIICOT uses pictures made at the Day of 
Szekler Freedom in 2014 to illustrate how extremist are trying to generate anti-Romanian 
sentiments. Page six of the indictment states the following: 
“As you will see, followers of the ‘policy of small steps’, at events organized by these 
extremist organizations in Romania, wanted to demonstrate strength, power and 
discipline while they invited prominent members of far-right movements in Catalonia, 
                                                          
137  Source: http://www.mai.gov.ro/documente/transparenta/SNOSP%202015-2020%20.pdf, p. 6.p, 
accessed: 2015.03.26 
138 See the indictment here:https://issuu.com/lazarlehel/docs/rechizitoriu_structura_centrala 
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Northern Ireland, and the Basque Country to attend and to speak, that is from regions 
with marked extremist / terrorist problems. The aim in organizing such events is to 
cultivate, maintain and develop among the Hungarian community of Transylvania ultra-
nationalist and anti-Romanian sentiments, aimed to put strain on relations among 
members of the two ethnic communities, and consequently damage the climate of peaceful 
coexistence, and to intimidate and create fear among ethnic Romanians coming from 
areas where they are a minority relative to ethnic Hungarians.” 
Irrespective of how the judicial procedure will play out, the quoted parts of the 
indictment speak volumes about the direction in which the DIICOT aims to push the 
public discourse and the social climate. Both of these cases represent a proactive attempt 
of the Romanian deep state to influence public perception and shape public policy 
decisions to create a hostile environment to autonomy aspirations.139 
The essence of state attempts to criminalize Szekler autonomy claims was 
summarized by the President of the Szekler National Council, Izsák Balázs at a 
Conference in the European Parliament on 19 April 2016 in the following way: Various 
regulatory institutions of Romania function as political police that implement retribution 
targeted against those Hungarians who protest against the violation of their rights and 
who speak out in favour of more autonomy for their community. The practices of the 
Ceausescu regime`s secret service, the Securitate, are present to date and can be carried 
out by any of the regulatory bodies of the central state in pursuit of intimidating 
Hungarians who try to enforce their rights.140 
  
                                                          
139 The term deep state refers to a second order of government behind the publicly elected or constitutional 
state. An informal network of democratically non-accountable actors who aspire to influence policies of a 
given national government. While the most obvious example is the military in Turkey or non-accountable 
agencies, like the NSA in the USA, in conjunction with Romania, the most salient organizations of the deep 
state are the SRI, the DIICOT, and the DNA (Direcţia Naţională Anticorupţie / National Anticorruption 
Directorate). See among others: Dale (2015). 
140 Source: http://tokeslaszlo.eu/cikk/a_brusszeli_autonomiakonferenciarol, accessed: 2016.04.21. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Autonomy and the Constitution of a Nation state 
 
2.1 Romanian Constitutional traditions 
 
For a better understanding of the contemporary constitutional thinking, it is helpful to 
take a historical overview on Romanian constitutional traditions. The three periods that 
can be distinguished are the liberal constitutionalism of the XIX century and the early XX 
century, followed by the communist period, and the current post-communist period.  
 
2.1.1 Liberal Constitutionalism 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, most Romanians lived in two separate 
autonomous entities: Wallachia and Moldavia, both having been under Ottoman 
suzerainty for centuries. While the Ottoman Empire recognized the political, 
administrative fiscal and judicial autonomy of these two Principalities, as of the beginning 
of the Phanariot rule (1711-1821) the Porte started to directly appoint the Princes to both 
thrones. As a consequence of the Russo-Turkish War (1828–29), the Treaty of Adrianople 
was concluded on 14 September 1829 giving Russia most of the western shores of the 
Black Sea along with the estuary of the Danube. Moldavia and Wallachia came under 
Russian protectorate until the Crimean War, which facilitated freedom of trade for Russia 
in these territories. To govern the local administration, the Russians adopted a series of 
Organic Regulations (Regulamentele Organice), which entered into force in 1831-32 and 
lasted until 1858. They were a mixture of constitutional and administrative regulations 
inspired by the monarchy enshrined in the French Constitutional Charter of 1814. The 
holder of sovereignty by divine right was the Prince (Hospodar) who was elected for life 
from the aristocracy. The parliament (Adunarea Electiva) was composed of members of 
the nobility and had legislative competencies only to the extent to which the Prince was 
ready to cede the exercise of power. The regulations did not contain provisions on an 
independent judiciary and ignored the idea of fundamental rights of citizens, moving the 
Principalities toward neo-absolutism. The regime of the Organic Regulations ended with 
the Treaty of Paris from 1856, which settled the Crimean War. As a result, Moldavia and 
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Wallachia remained under nominal Ottoman rule but were granted independent 
constitutions and national assemblies, which were to be monitored by the victorious 
European powers. These Ad Hoc Assemblies (Ad hoc Divans) were established in 1857 
on the basis of popular vote in order to express the wishes of Romanians. The main topic 
of these Assemblies was the unification of the two principalities in line with the 
nationalist- ethnocentric type of constitutionalism, which gradually developed since the 
revolutions of 1848. Even so, the Ad Hoc Assemblies specifically voiced their desire to 
have a foreign Prince as the ruler. This preference was the result of experiences, as the 
fourteenth to nineteenth centuries were dominated by intense power struggles between 
competing local ruling houses and short reigning periods for rulers interrupted by 
protracted fights among the potential successors. This was a result of historical lack of 
established rules of succession: while the male-preference principle was clearly present, 
the rule of primogeniture was absent. Thus, all legitimate and illegitimate sons of 
deceased rulers fought to accede to the throne. A return to such affairs was seen as a threat 
to the national unitary state project, therefore the idea of a foreign Prince within hereditary 
monarchy was considered the best solution. The Paris Convention of 1858 largely 
neglected these preferences and instead established a constitutional order that was more 
favourable for the European Great Powers. This entailed the imposition of two separate 
states led by separate princes with only a limited degree of integration on the level of 
some secondary institutions. Furthermore, it meant the establishment of French-inspired 
authoritarian regime led by an elected Romanian prince who disposed over excessive 
powers and had the jurisdiction of absolute veto right over decisions of the parliament. 
This constitutional design was also to the detriment of the principles of liberal 
constitutionalism, such as separation of powers or individual rights and freedoms. The 
two states attempted to bypass the decision of the Great Powers by electing the same 
candidate, Alexandru Ioan Cuza in 1859 as Domnitor (ruler) for both countries. On 5 
February 1862, the parliaments of the Principality of Moldavia and the Principality of 
Wallachia formally united to create the Romanian United Principalities. As an admirer of 
Napoleon III, Cuza started to develop an authoritarian appetite for more power. On 2 May 
1864, he initiated the adoption of Developing Statues of the Paris Convention (Statutul 
Dezvoltător al Convenției de la Paris), which directly transplanted the French 
constitutional model of the Second Empire. New laws on suffrage were enacted which 
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extended the right to vote to the bourgeoisie and to peasants. 141  Nevertheless, Cuza 
launched through his governments systematic electoral manipulation. One could thus 
conclude that the “Romanian unitary state was not founded on parliamentarianism, but 
against it”.142 Since the Greater Powers did only recognize the association of Moldova 
and Wallachia for the duration of Cuza`s reign, the challenge arose in 1866 (after he had 
been forced to abdicate the throne) how to maintain the status quo afterwards. This 
reignited the request to elect a foreign Prince, which in the end came from the Swabian 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen House. Carol I of that family was the ruler of Romania from 
1866 to 1914. It was in the same year in 1866 when the first Romanian Constituent 
Assembly aimed to elaborate the first modern Constitution of Romania, based on massive 
amounts of direct transplant of provisions from the 1831 Constitution of Belgium. 
Consequently, the Constitution of 1866 established the Senate as the second chamber of 
the Parliament, stipulated the irresponsibility of the Monarch. This constitution also took 
steps to consolidate an “ethnocentric constitutionalism, with strong religious accents”,143 
that was concerned with the national unity of ethnic Romanians. These views were 
reflected in Article 7 that refused to grant citizenship to non-Christians. This regulation 
in fact made it nearly impossible for Jews to obtain citizenship, while, on the other hand, 
the Romanian Orthodox Church was elevated to a superior status as the embodiment of 
the dominant religion of the Romanian state. The institutions, procedural mechanism and 
principles that were transplanted from the Belgian constitution fell on less fertile soil, 
given that the great majority of the population at the time (about 80 per cent) was still 
composed of illiterate peasants.144 The small number of intellectuals, on the other hand, 
studied to a large extent in France, which is one of the main reasons why government 
meetings were held in French from the eighteen twenties up to the beginning of WW 1, 
despite the Monarch himself being German. 145  It was also during this period that 
Romanians started using the Latin alphabet, as opposed to Cyrillic that was in use until 
the language reform of 1860. This language reform was the first step in a series of planned 
language reforms aimed to bring the grammar and the vocabulary of the Romanian 
                                                          
141 Before this new regulation, active and passive suffrage established a census of sex and relatively high 
wealth, which led to the domination of parliament by great landowners. 
142 Selejan-Gutan (2016), p.10. 
143 Id. at p.11. 
144 Id. at p. 12. 
145 Id. at p. 31. 
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language closer to Romance languages, not the least in pursuit of supporting the 
politically motivated myth about the origin of the Romanian peoples. 146  Following 
successful military campaigns of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, fighting on the 
Russian side, Romania gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1877 and 
turned into a kingdom four years later in 1881. 
 The next important step after independence was to expand the territory of the state 
with neighbouring regions with Romanian population (Transylvania, Banat, Bukovina, 
and Bessarabia), which happened because of the Versailles Peace Conference after World 
War I. This also meant the incorporation of extensive minority communities, Hungarians, 
Saxons, Russians and Jews. Consequently, in the framework of the Declaration of Alba 
Iulia, the Romanian National Council, which professed to represent the Romanian 
community of Hungary, promised to respect the administrative autonomy as well as the 
cultural and linguistic identity of these communities. These aspects were marginalized in 
comparison with the aim to consolidate a unitary national state, and the fresh political 
movements in the newly absorbed part could not bring about a shift in customs of the pre-
World War I era. Consequently, the newly adopted constitution of 1923 contained no 
provisions regarding administrative autonomy or linguistic identity of minorities. In 1938 
The “New Royal Constitution” replaced the short- lived Constitution of 1923 and created 
what is now referred to as the “royal dictatorship” of King Carol II only to be suspended 
two years later when Marshall Ion Antonescu seized power. As “Leader of the State”, 
Antonescu assumed all legislative and executive power in the framework of the National 
Legionary State (Statul Național Legionar) from September 6, 1940 to January 23, 1941. 
It was a right wing, one-party dictatorship based on the German Führer model of the time, 
dominated by the overtly fascist Iron Guard in conjunction with Prime Minister Ion 
Antonescu. This jurisdiction did not extend to Northern-Transylvania after that territory 
came under the rule of Hungary again as a result of the second Vienna Arbitration signed 
on 30 August 1940. 
 
                                                          
146  According to the theory of Daco-Roman continuity, Romanians descend from the Romanized 
inhabitants of an eastern province of the Roman Empire (Dacia Traiana), where the native Dacian people 
mixed with Roman colonists. 
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2.1.2 Communist period 
After World War II it was Petru Groza who presided over the consolidation of communist 
dictatorship as of 6 March 1945.  The Senate was dissolved in 1946 and King Michael I 
was forced to abdicate in 1947 as the country officially became the "People's Republic of 
Romania". The 1923 Constitution was abrogated and a new interim law was adopted until 
the adoption of a new Constitution. This law established a Soviet-like collective organ as 
the bearer of executive power (the Presidium of the Republic). A new unicameral 
parliament called the Great National Assembly (Marea Adunare Nationala) was elected 
and entrusted with the task to prepare a new constitution for the new order. This 
Constitution was adopted in 1952, according to which power lied with working class who 
exercised it through the Great National Assembly. While a set of freedoms and liberties 
was enshrined in the text of this constitution, in practice, of course this was the period 
characterized by confiscation of private property, installation of a single party political 
system with heavily manipulated elections and pervasive terror of the political police 
which persecuted, incarcerated and exterminated the “enemies of the state” who were 
accused of acting against the socialist order. As mentioned before, it was this constitution 
which established the Hungarian Autonomous Province due to Soviet pressure. Under the 
auspices of a totalitarian regime this autonomy, however, was largely in lack of true 
substance regarding decentralization. It also contradicted the ethnocentric mentality of 
the political elite, which mind-set kept on thriving even during the communist decades. 
Proletarian internationalism was nowhere to be found in Romanian communism. Thus, 
the boarders of this autonomous region were changed in 1960 to make it ethnically more 
Romanian and then 8 years later it was abolished altogether. 
 The last communist constitution was enacted in 1965. The state organization was 
similar to that of 1952: “the supreme organ of state power and sole legislator” was the 
Great National Assembly, and “the supreme organ of the state with permanent activity” 
was the Council of State. These were complemented in 1974 by the “President of the 
Republic” which was a formality, given that in practice state power rested with the 
General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, a position that was filled by 
Nicolae Ceaușescu from 1965 to 1989 after his predecessor Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej 
died. The reign of Ceaușescu can accurately be characterized as one of the most 
oppressive totalitarian regimes of the XX century. In the framework of an extreme cult of 
personality, Ceaușescu gave himself titles such as "The Genius of the Carpathians" 
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("Geniul din Carpați"). He asserted political persecution through arbitrary arrest, 
fabricated trials and introduced an atmosphere of fear, paranoia, distrust and terror 
through the political police, the infamous Securitatea.  
 
2.1.3 Post-communist period 
As mentioned earlier, the Romanian political transition was ignited by the harassment of 
Hungarian clergymen Tőkés László in the winter of 1989. New electoral legislation was 
adopted by Decree-Law No. 92/1990, according to which the first democratic and free 
elections were held in May 1990. Between 22 December 1989 (the adoption of the 
revolutionary declaration of the National Salvation Front - NSF)147 and 8 December 1991, 
Romania did not have a constitution. There were no roundtable discussions on the matter; 
instead, the newly elected legislature established a Drafting Committee having delegates 
from all parties but being dominated by NSF. The most controversial issues of the drafting 
procedure were: the form of government, the structure of the parliament, the powers of 
the President and other institutions of checks and balances. Among the most controversial 
issues was the request of representatives of the Hungarian community to include 
autonomy rights within the text. The proposal was rejected as it was seen by the majority 
of the parties as something that was contrary to the national and unitary character of the 
state. The Draft Articles were finally sent to the legislature in November 1990 where it 
was adopted on 21 November with an overwhelming majority of 81%. The constitution 
was revised in 2003 adding, among others, an important third paragraph to Article 1 that 
states that: “Romania  is  a  democratic  and  social  state,  governed  by  the  rule  of  law,  
in  which human dignity, the citizens’ rights and freedoms, the free development of 
human personality, justice and political pluralism represent supreme values, in the spirit 
of  the  democratic  traditions  of  the  Romanian  people  and  the  ideals  of  the Revolution 
of December 1989, and shall be guaranteed”. This means that the complete legal system 
of the country as of that point should be interpreted in the spirit of democracy, rule of law 
and fundamental civic liberties. 
                                                          
147 Frontului Salvării Naționale was the name of the ad hoc political umbrella organization that was the 
governing body of Romania in the first weeks after the Romanian Revolution in 1989, and which 
subsequently became a political party and won the 1990 election under the leadership of then-President Ion 
Iliescu. An awkward result from this aspect is that Iliescu himself was a communist who became member 
of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party in 1965 but fell from grace gradually as 
Ceaușescu saw an adversary in him. 
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 Overall, we can say that the constitutional history of Romania was characterized 
by failure to successfully transplant provisions of western European constitutions into the 
Romanian legal system due to enormous gaps in the social structure, and political culture 
(e.g. high levels of illiteracy, manipulated elections…). Strong personalization of power, 
and constant dominance of the executive branch were present as opposed to more 
parliamentarianism, which was perceived as a threat to the national unitary state and its 
political stability. Human rights, including minority rights, were only formally 
consecrated and they “never succeeded to become a true state of mind in the Romanian 
society”. 148  Constitutional ethnocentrism was an overarching feature, providing a 
perpetual guideline for various political systems. The lack of democratic constitutional 
traditions and a track-record of having manipulated and fabricated elections was also a 
pervasive feature. As Selejan-Gutan summarized the Romanian constitutional history: 
“interest in limiting political power and in the separation of powers decreased in favour 
of the idea of building a strong nation state; the interest in rights and freedoms diminished 
in favour of the idea of national unity; the idea of a political community was replaced by 
the idea of a community united by blood, language, history and (especially) religion”.149 
 
2.1.4 Constitution in force 
Romania is a Republic, with a bicameral legislature that is elected for 4 years by universal, 
equal, direct, secret and free suffrage.150 Bicameralism is symmetrical which means that 
both the House of Deputies and the Senate have equal powers to discuss and enact laws 
within their respective sphere of competence,151 while none of the Chambers have the 
jurisdiction to override vetoes or amendments adopted by the other house. The two 
Chambers are congruent in the sense that they are directly elected, at the same time, use 
a similar electoral system resulting in similarity of their partisan composition. 
 The dual executive branch consists of the President directly elected for a term of 
5 years, and a Prime Minister with equally long term elected by the House of Deputies. 
                                                          
148 Guțan (2013a), p. 251. 
149 Id. at p. 26 
150 Article 62 (1) CR 
151 Enumerated under Article 75 CR 
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Differences in election often produce political cohabitation, 152  a phenomenon well 
known in similar semi-Presidential political systems, most notably in France. In order to 
deviate from past abuses experienced by an indirectly elected President during 
Communism, the democratic constitution followed the framework of the 1958 French 
Constitution in having a directly elected President but with narrower powers than its 
French counterpart did. 
The constitution is on top of the hierarchy of norms followed by three types of 
state legislation. Parliament can pass constitutional, organic and ordinary laws.153 While 
constitutional laws pertain to the revision of the Constitution, organic laws regulate some 
of the most relevant institutions of the constitutional fabric such as the functioning of 
parties, the organization of referendums, state of emergency, rules of local autonomy, or 
the status of national minorities.154 Due to the more salient nature of the fields covered 
by organic laws, the passing of such legislation requires the majority vote of all the 
members of each Chamber.155 In contrast, the third type of legislation is ordinary laws 
that are passed by the majority vote of the members present in each Chamber.156 Even 
with this distinction, there are no clear procedural requirements for introducing organic 
laws to the legislature. Other sources of law contain government ordinances and 
resolutions of local governments.  
The CR adopts the monist approach in incorporating international treaties, which 
means that Treaties ratified by Parliament shall become part of national law. Article 20 
(1) states that Constitutional provisions concerning the citizens' rights and liberties shall 
be interpreted and enforced in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, with the covenants and other treaties Romania is a party to. Furthermore, where 
any inconsistencies exist between the covenants and treaties on the fundamental human 
rights Romania is a party to and the national laws, the international regulations shall take 
precedence unless the Constitution or national laws comprise provisions that are more 
                                                          
152 Cohabitation occurs when the President and the majority of the members of parliament come from 
opposing parties. The most memorable example of cohabitation in Romania happened in 2012 between 
Romania's Prime Minister Victor Ponta and President Traian Basescu over the issue of who should 
represent the country at the European Council. After weeks of clashes, eventually Ponta prevailed. 
153 Article 73 (1) CR 
154 Id. Article 73 (3) 
155 Id. Article 76 (1) 
156 Id. Article 76 (2) 
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favourable.157 Consequently, irrespective of the initial intentions of the drafters of the 
Constitution in 1991, 158  the Romanian authorities are not free in interpreting the 
regulations pertaining to fundamental rights and freedoms, as the above provisions put a 
restraint upon them to align their interpretation with the corresponding international 
covenants. Article 4 (2) CR makes it even clearer how the constitutional concepts should 
be interpreted, stating that Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all its 
citizens, without any discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, 
language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social origin. 
Finally, an important aspect of the constitution is the fact that it refers to several 
forms of autonomy. Article 29 (5) pertains to personal autonomy in the form of freedom 
of conscience by stipulating that religious cults shall be autonomous from the State and 
shall enjoy support from it. Article 32 (6) guarantees the functional autonomy of 
Universities, while Article 120 sets out the principles of local autonomy for territorial-
administrative units. Article 117 (3), which we discuss in later chapters, provides a special 
form of administrative autonomy. 
 
2.2 Opinion No. 102/2004 - The essential summary of all arguments 
 
2.2.1 General objections 
 
I. The Draft Law aims to create a separate state entity, parallel with the unitary, 
national Romanian State.159 
 
II. As the Draft Law refers to several international legal documents, Opinion Nr. 102 
reminds the territorial organization of a state is not subject to community law and 
falls exclusively under the scope of the authorities of the member states of the 
Union. It also adds that European organizations do not promote the creation of, 
                                                          
157 Id. Article 20 (2). This follows the Spanish model, where Section 10 (2) contains similar provisions. 
158 At the constitutional drafting process fears concerning threats to the unity and integrity of the state came 
to the fore, which triggered the desire to add an "identity mark" to the text of the constitution and emphasize 
the national character of the state and to carve it in stone for future generations through limitations on 
constitutional amendment. See Selejan-Gutan (2016), p 41. 
159 Paragraph 1 of Opinion No. 102/2004. 
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“asymmetrical, non-uniform or simply just separate, exclusively ethnicity-based 
intrastate entities, such as autonomous regions”,160 and that persons belonging to 
minorities do not have collective rights under international law.161 
 
III. Territorial autonomy would result in the positive discrimination of an ethnic 
minority to the detriment of persons belonging to the majority.162 More specifically 
Art. 94 of the Draft Law (on the use of mother tongue in cultural life) would violate 
Art. 16 of the Constitution on the principle of equality of rights among citizens.163 
These provisions also contradict Art. 6 of the Constitution (the right to identity) as 
well as the provisions of international law. The Opinion specifically quotes Art. 16 
and 17 of Resolution 1334/2003 of the Council of Europe, stipulating that “the 
granting of autonomy must never give a community the impression that local 
government is a matter for that community alone. Successful autonomy depends on 
balanced relationships within a state between majorities and minorities, but also 
between minorities themselves. Autonomous status must always respect the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination and be based on the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of states.” Accordingly, to grant special rights to 
administrative entities that are not recognized by the constitution and are organized 
exclusively along ethnic lines would violate the principle of equality between 
citizens of the State.  
 
IV. The Draft Law manifestly contradicts the constitutional order as it foresees the 
creation of an administrative-territorial institution different from the administrative-
territorial units enshrined in the constitution in terms of both its organization and 
its special powers. The Opinion cites Art 1 (1), and Art. 2 of the Constitution. The 
former stipulates that Romania is “a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible 
National State”, while the latter one states that “national sovereignty shall reside 
with the Romanian people” …and that “no group or person may exercise 
sovereignty in one’s own name”. The Opinion argues that the Draft Law violates 
                                                          
160 Id. Paragraph 2. 
161 Id. Paragraph 3. 
162 Id. Paragraphs 3, and 6. 
163 Id. Paragraph 12. 
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these provisions and infringes on the sovereignty as well as the unity and 
indivisibility of the State in the following manner:  
a) Unity is understood by the Legislative Council as a single state formation that 
“assumes a legal order based on a single constitution and a single system of 
organization, through which the three basic powers are being exercised, and 
whose population has one single citizenship. This and only this formation is a 
subject of international law.164 
b) Indivisibility is described in the sense that Romania “cannot be segmented, nor 
can it be subject to total or partial division into different legal regimes”.165 
c) Sovereignty is violated through the delegation of special – and sometimes 
exclusive - competencies to the autonomous region whose exercise would 
eliminate the primacy of state sovereignty within Szeklerland. With the adoption 
of the Draft Law the population of Romania would no longer belong under one 
political and legal organizational structure, nor would it have a single state 
apparatus or a unified state structure, and this territorial division would prejudice 
the fullness of the sovereignty of the state.166 Furthermore, the formation of the 
autonomous region would make it impossible to implement laws and other legal 
acts adopted by the Government all over the country.167 
Altogether territorial autonomy would mean giving powers to an 
autonomous region that is detached from state sovereignty as that is the nature 
of territorial autonomy.168 
 
V. Art 11 (3) of the Draft Law guarantees the free use of Hungarian national 
symbols,169 which contradicts Art. 12 of the Constitution on the national symbols 
of Romania.170 
 
VI. Art 10 of the Draft Law stipulates that the Hungarian language would become equal 
to the state language within Szeklerland. This provision violates Art. 13 of the 
                                                          
164 Id. Paragraphs 4, and 7. 
165 Id. Paragraph 4 
166 Id. Paragraph 7. 
167 Id. Paragraph 8. 
168 Id. Paragraph 5. 
169 For more detail on the topic, see Chapter 1.6.2.3. 
170 Id. Paragraph 9. 
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Constitution on the official language of Romania. The rights of persons belonging 
to minorities to use their mother tongue is not the same as granting equal status to 
a minority language with the official language of the state.171 
 
2.2.2 Procedural objections 
 
I. According to Art. 3 (3) of the Constitution, the country’s territory is organized 
administratively into communes, towns and counties. Only these levels have 
administrative and financial competencies, which raises two issues. On the one 
hand, no such unit as a “region” or a “seat” exists within the current constitutional 
framework of the country (while both of these being present in the Draft Law). 
Consequently, no such unit could receive any kind of administrative or fiscal 
competencies, whatsoever. On the other hand, Szeklerland would have three 
administrative levels (local, regional, and that of the Seats), whereas the rest of the 
country would be organized into two of these levels only (local, and county level). 
This would generate impediments and dysfunctionality with regard to both internal 
and external cooperation.172 
 
II. According to Art. 12 (3) of the Draft Law, the legal basis of the establishment of 
the autonomous region is Art. 117 (3) of the Constitution which stipulates that 
autonomous administrative authorities may be established by organic law. In the 
interpretation of the Legislative Council, however, this Article refers to the central 
public administration as opposed to the local public administration regulated under 
Art. 121, which article provides an exhaustive list of local authorities that cannot 
be further expanded. 
 
III. The Draft Law violates the provisions of Law No. 215 of 2001 on Local Public 
Administration, according to which “the territorial delimitation of the communes, 
towns and counties shall be established by law. Any change in their territorial limits 
may be made only by law and only after prior consultation of the citizens in the 
respective territorial-administrative units by referendum, to be organised according 
                                                          
171 Id. Paragraph 10. 
172Id. Paragraphs 6, and 15. 
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to law”.173 The Opinion notes that no such referendum was organised prior to the 
submission of the Draft to the Parliament. 
 
2.3 Decision No. 80/2014 of the Constitutional Court of Romania rejecting 
the constitutional amendments proposed by the Special Committee of 
the Parliament - The Constitutional Court and the recognition of the 
national ideal 
 
During the second Ponta administration, the government pushed forward with a 
constitutional reform package, which included plans on reforming the administrative 
division of the country by granting administrative competencies to the NUTS II regions. 
Such an administrative reorganisation would be detrimental for Szeklers, as Szeklerland 
would be incorporated into a region where the Hungarian speaking community 
represented less than 30% of the population.174 Trying to react to these developments, the 
dominant Hungarian party (DAHR), aimed to turn the situation to their advantage by 
elaborating a draft on amendments to the constitution. These included an additional 
paragraph (para 3.) to Art. 3 of the constitution. Bearing in mind the example of the South 
Tyrolean province which blends into a greater region (Trentino - Alto-Adige), this 
proposed amendment foresaw that “organic laws may recognize traditional areas as 
administrative subdivisions of regions“.175 The same draft also proposed an amendment 
to Art. 6 of the constitution (on the right to identity) stipulating that “legal representatives 
of national minorities may establish their own decision-making and executive bodies 
according to the Statute on National Minorities adopted through legislation,176 that are 
vested with the powers to preserve, develop and express their identity.”177 Furthermore, 
this draft foresaw that “decisions of central and local authorities on the preservation, 
development and expression of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity are taken 
after consultation with the organizations of national minorities”.178 Besides the territorial 
                                                          
173 See articles 20, and 22 of law 215/2001. 
174 Within the current administrative division 
175 CCR Decision 80 (2014), p. 18. 
176 This phrasing refers to the need to codify a single statute summarizing all the minority rights, as these 
are currently dispersed in various laws of the legal system. 
177 Supra note, p. 19. 
178 Id. at, p. 19. 
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division and the competencies exercised by them, a third relevant issue was expressed in 
the government proposal, namely that of the symbols. In pursuit to amend Art. 12 of the 
constitution (on national symbols), the proposal stated that “national minorities can freely 
use in public and in private, their own symbols that represent their ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious identity”.179 
Against these proposals, the Constitutional Court of Romania (CCR) raised 
familiar objections. On national symbols, the CCR concluded that such amendment could 
not be placed under Art. 12 of the Constitution as that would entail accepting the idea that 
the symbols of national minorities are "national symbols", indicating that national 
minorities have the right to opt for the use of their own symbols as opposed to symbols 
of the Romanian national state. If such paragraph did have any place in the constitution 
in the first place, then it would come under Art. 6 on identity, and only on the condition 
that minority symbols can be used together with symbols of the Romanian national state. 
On the proposals regarding the right to identity, the CCR announced that the amendment 
would create collective political autonomy based on ethnic criteria and would thus 
contradict the principle of equality among citizens and infringe upon the unitary nature 
of the state, given that „the essence of the unitary state is the existence of an exclusive set 
of institutions with political and legal powers (one legislative body, one executive 
authority, one judicial authority)”. 180  Finally, when it came to the question of the 
administrative subdivisions, the CCR pronounced something that so far has only been 
insinuated by the authorities. It is namely that granting administrative competencies to 
“traditional areas” would not only violate the unitary nature of the state, but they would 
also “call into question the national character of the Romanian state”.181 As such, they 
would also infringe upon Art. 152 (1) of the constitution, stipulating that the “national, 
independent, unitary and indivisible character of the Romanian State, the republican form 
of government, territorial integrity, independence of justice, political pluralism and 
official language shall not be subject to revision”. This interpretation of the Constitution 
clearly depicts Romania as a national state for ethnic Romanians. 
 
                                                          
179 Id. at, p. 20. 
180 Id. at, p. 19. 
181 Id. at, p. 18. 
  
68 
 
2.4 Political Assertions 
 
The lodging of the Draft Law on Szeklerland in March 2004 and the referendum 
campaign that commenced after its rejection ending in February 2008 spanned through 
two parliamentary terms and three governments, igniting heated reaction from Romanian 
MPs. In his interpellation from 19 December 2005, right wing (Democratic Party, 
Partidul Democrat - PD) politician Bogdan Cantaragiu asked the Minister of Public 
Administration (Vasile Blaga) if his Ministry was prepared to cope with possible 
separatist activities and actions aimed to undermine the authority of the state, which could 
take place in the “so called Szeklerland” due to the fact that the Szekler National Council 
had repeatedly requested to adopt a Statute of Autonomy for this area. In his response, 
Blaga agrees that the activities of the SzNC affect the climate of public order in the areas 
inhabited by Szeklers, and that the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs will 
have an eye on such activities and make the necessary legal steps if required.182 In 14 
February 2007, Gabriel Sandu, MP of the centre-right National Liberal Party (Partidul 
Naţional Liberal - PNL) demanded answers from the Prime Minister about the measures 
his administration intends to take against the self-proclaimed referendum on the 
autonomy of Szeklerland, given that such an illegal referendum can be a real threat to the 
territorial integrity of the State and can trigger a series of grave problems.183  In his 
response, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu noted that the municipal resolutions aiming to 
organize local autonomy-referendums were either annulled by the courts or are in the 
process of being nullified. The PM also mentioned that several complaints were recorded 
by the Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism (Direcția de 
Investigare a Infracțiunilor de Criminalitate Organizatăși Terrorism - DIICOT) coming 
from parliamentarians invoking Art. 166 of the Criminal Code184 as well Art 19 of Law 
                                                          
182  See: Interpelareanr. 952B/20-12-2005. All Questions and Interpellations cited in this Chapter are 
available at the homepage of the Chamber of Deputies of Romania: 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/interpelari.home, accessed: 2015.05.09. 
183 See: Interpelareanr. 2386B/14-02-2007. 
184 The mentioned article of the Criminal Code in force at that time stipulated that any illegal or violent 
action that aimed to change the constitutional order or the national, sovereign, independent, unitary and 
indivisible character of the Romanian state shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of between 5 and 
15 years. This provision has been removed from the Law during its revision in 2009. For this version of the 
Penal Code, no longer in force, see: 
http://anp.gov.ro/documents/10180/57727/Codul+Penal+al+Rom%C3%A2niei.pdf/7fd6b4fc-a94e-4bab-
bf79-14215deecf08, accessed: 2015.05.09. 
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no. 51 of 1991 on the National Security of Romania.185 While the PM reminded that the 
initiators of the referendum established no illegal intelligence structures, nor did they 
engage in any violent actions, he also expresses his disapproval of the idea of autonomy 
on ethnic grounds as he did many times before. Socialist MP Ion Stan initiated a similar 
inquiry on 3 March 2008 addressed among others to the Director of the Romanian 
Intelligence Service (Serviciul Român de Informaţii- SRI).186 In his interpellation, Stan 
asked about the consequences of the “so-called referendum” that was initiated by the “so-
called Szekler National Council”, which the MP considered an incitement to 
discrimination and territorial separatism under Art. 30 (7) of the Constitution. 
Additionally, the Interpellator also demanded a scrutiny of the legality of the financial 
sources used for “autonomist-separatist activities”. In his written response, George-
Cristian Maoir, Director of SRI made it clear that the Intelligence Service monitors and 
investigates every activity that affects the rule of law, the constitutional order and the 
social stability including those relating to the illegal promotion of autonomist-separatist 
projects based on ethnic criteria. In the cases, Maoir added, in which the obtained 
information revealed the existence of threats and risks to national security and whose 
realization would be likely to endanger sovereignty, unity and indivisibility of the 
Romanian national state, the corresponding authorities were notified so that they could 
take the necessary measures to prevent or counteract such developments. Regarding the 
legality of financial resources, the SRI Chief notes that in many cases the representatives 
of foreign NGOs performing propaganda in favour of autonomist-separatist goals in 
Romania are acting as individuals and are consequently not subject to Romanian laws on 
financial control. 
Leading politicians made an abundance of like-minded assertions outside the 
Parliament as well. On 12 August, the then Head of the State Traian Băsescu said during 
a Summer University in Izvoru Mureșului / Marosfő that he guarantees: “…one will never 
make an administrative reorganization of the country along ethnic lines. Those who think 
they can do that confuse us with the Stalinists. Only Stalin organized a Hungarian 
                                                          
185 The initiation, organization, establishment or support of intelligence structures that might affect national 
security is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 2 to 7 years. For this version of the Act, no longer in 
force, see: http://legislatie.resurse-pentru-democratie.org/legea/51-1991.php, accessed: 2015.05.09. 
186 See: Interpelare nr. 3600B/03-03-2008. 
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Autonomous Region”.187 Next year, on 13 April, 2014 Realitatea TV made an exclusive 
interview with Băsescu where the President made clear that: “Romania defines herself as 
a unitary state and anyone who wants autonomy will confront the Romanian constitution 
and logically also the Romanian state”.188 On 25 May, 2013 at a Conference on the 
administrative reform of the country, Crin Antonescu, President of the centre-right PNL 
Party mentioned that regionalization in Romania will not mean the establishment of 
"enclaves based on ethnic criteria".  
These views of right-wing politicians are unequivocally shared by their left wing 
counterparts. Regarding the regionalization process, social-democratic Prime Minister 
Victor Ponta mentioned that a region composed of  Covasna, Harghita, and Mures was 
never on the table, “because that would mean a region along ethnic lines, which does not 
happen in the EU”.189 Foreign affairs minister of the Ponta cabinet Bogdan Aurescu 
reminded after a meeting with his Hungarian counterpart in Budapest that “territorial 
autonomy based on ethnic criteria is incompatible with the Romanian Constitution, its 
support is not a part of European norms and is therefore unacceptable”.190 At a conference 
that took place on 31 April, 2015 at Babeş–Bolyai University, in Cluj Napoca / Kolozsvár 
Aurescu also highlighted that: “Romania has developed her own minority protection 
model, based on the inclusion of minorities into political decision-making, which is not 
perfect…but is still better than other models”. Aurescu also noted that “only the dialogue 
of the cultures can lead to social development”, adding that “cultures which isolate 
themselves are not able to develop, henceforth territorial autonomy based on ethnic 
criteria cannot be a good solution within minority protection”. 191  A week later he 
reasserted these views in an interview with the Romanian news agency, Agerpres, 
claiming that: “Minority protection in Romanian is guided by interculturality, which is 
the philosophy of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of 
                                                          
187  Source: http://www.mediafax.ro/social/basescu-doar-stalin-a-facut-regiunea-autonoma-maghiara-in-
romania-nu-se-va-mai-intampla-11247073, accessed: 2016.08.12. 
188  Source: http://www.3szek.ro/load/cikk/69492/b%C3%84%C2%83sescu:_az_autonomia_alkotmany 
ellenes, accessed: 2016.01.28. 
189  Source: http://www.reporterntv.ro/stire/ponta-despre-regionalizare-singura-formula-posibila-e-cu-8-
regiuni-altfel-deschizi-cutia-pandorei, accessed: 2016.08.12.  
190 Source: http://www.szekelyhon.ro/vilag/ujabb-nem-az-autonomiara, accessed: 2016.02.03 
191  Source: http://www.3szek.ro/load/cikk/80249/konferencia_ellentmondasok_kereszttuzeben_ 
kisebbsegvedelem_kisebbsegek_nelkul, accessed: 2016.01.28. 
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the Council of Europe. Therefore, we support the merging of cultures and reject 
separation including autonomy based on ethnic criteria”.192 
Characterizing the maintenance of a minority culture as an undesirable enclave 
and linking this form of “separation” with undesirable economic developments came 
again into the fore during the T-529/13, Izsák & Dabis v. European Commission case. 
The initial request of the plaintiffs in this case revolved around a European Citizens’ 
Initiative aimed at the reform of the cohesion policy of the EU, which - according to the 
initiators - should pay special attention to regions that differentiate themselves from the 
surrounding regions through national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic 
characteristics (a.k.a. national regions). 193  The government of Romania joined this 
lawsuit and argued that the plaintiffs’ proposals on the reform of the cohesion policy 
would have the result that the national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic 
characteristics of the given national region remain unchanged. As the government pointed 
out, the proposal would cause the “enclavisation” of these regions leading to detrimental 
economic developments.  
The above-quoted declarations illustrate some of the long-standing characteristics 
of the Romanian politics. Suspicions towards and full rejection of autonomy in general is 
present regardless of ideological affiliation or the structure of government coalitions. In 
practice, the presence or absence of a Hungarian party within the government does not 
alter this basic characteristic. Romanian politicians tend to challenge the existence of 
Szeklerland by referring to it only as the “so-called Szeklerland” (aşa-zisului Ţinutul 
Secuiesc) and/or by putting it between quotation marks (“Ţinutul Secuiesc”). Autonomy 
aspirations are being perceived as an imminent threat to public order, national security 
and state sovereignty, which is why state authorities need to monitor the organizations 
engaged in such subversive activities. In addition, territorial autonomy equals self-
isolation, the maintenance of ethnic enclaves and would further exacerbate the social and 
economic backlog witnessed in regions inhabited by minorities. The solution to these 
non-desirable effects in the “Romanian-model” is interculturality and the merging of 
cultures, understood as the process of minority assimilation, which in turn contributes to 
                                                          
192  Source: http://www.kronika.ro/belfold/aurescu-veszelyeztetett-a-magyarorszagi-romanok-kulturalis-
identitasa, accessed: 2016.01.28. 
193  For more information on this European Citizens’ Initiative visit: http://www.nationalregions.eu/, 
accessed: 216.02.03. 
  
72 
 
economic development, provides social mobilization channels and eliminates the root 
causes of the problem: cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity. 
 
2.5 Similar approaches 
 
Conceiving autonomy as a potential threat to the unity of the state is a thought that is 
shared by many states across Europe. While the study concentrates on the Romanian case, 
it is noteworthy to mention some of the similar approaches to deepen the understanding 
of this phenomenon, in particular the cases of France and Estonia. While there are some 
countries where governments tend to treat whole minority communities as potential 
threats due to historical resentment (this is the case with Macedonians and Turks in 
Greece, and Bulgaria; the Russian minority communities in the Baltic states; Kurds in 
Turkey, or Hungarians in Slovakia), the two examples presented below are salient by 
reason of the fact that they represent cases where institutions of central states provided 
legal arguments against autonomy per se. 
As far as France is concerned, an interestingly different approach is present 
regarding the Overseas Departments and Territories (départements et territoiresd'outre-
mer, colloquially referred to as the DOM-TOM) and Metropolitan France (including not 
just the mainland but also the surrounding Mediterranean Islands). Within the DOM-
TOM regions, a large variety of institutional arrangements exists,194 out of which the ones 
possessed by New Caledonia are the widest in scale.195 As a result of the 1998 Nouméa 
Accord, the archipelago gained a special status in 1999 which also included the launch of 
a public consultation on the independence of New Caledonia from France between 2014 
and 2018. A New Caledonian citizenship was established and a gradual transfer of 
exclusive legislative and executive powers from the French state to New Caledonian 
institutions commenced.196 The constitution of France clarifies that this unique status is 
                                                          
194 See Art. 72 - 75-1 of the French Constitution. 
195 See Title XII. of the French Constitution. 
196 Under section 99 of Organic Law No. 99-2009 enacted pursuant to Articles 76 and 77 of the French 
Constitution, the jurisdiction of New Caledonia pertains to: rules on base and methods of local tax 
collection, own identity symbols, fundamental principles of labour law, trade union law, social security 
law, ownership, civil and commercial obligations, rules on access to employment, environmental issues, 
the electoral system, and the internal municipal system. 
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based on the principle of the self-determination of peoples and are due to the former 
colonial status of these territories.197 Due to this post-colonial context the comparative 
value of these examples are largely confined. Nonetheless, they are interesting if one 
compares this cordial approach to the more vigorously restrictive one exhibited in relation 
to Metropolitan areas, first and foremost in the case of Corsica.  The issue of Corsica has 
been on the agenda of consecutive governments for decades, the modern phase of which 
can be traced back to the mid-1960s and which was also characterized by violent actions 
of the National Liberation Front (FLNC). There were several attempts in various 
modalities to address the issue. Right-wing administrations (1986-1988; 1993-1995; 
1995; 1997) generally applied tactics of repression and ‘double diplomacy’ negotiating 
with Corsican political actors while also dealing with separatists and playing one against 
the other. Left-wing governments (1981-1986; 1988-1993; 1997-2002) sought to propose 
institutional solutions instead.198 There are two relevant rulings of the Constitutional 
Court of France on Corsica: Decision 91-290 DC of 9 May 1991 and decision 2001-454 
of 17 January 2002. The first one is mostly referred to because it declared unconstitutional 
Section 1 of the Joxe Statute, which stipulated that “the French Republic guarantees to 
the Corsican people, a living historical and cultural community and part of the French 
people, the rights to the preservation of its cultural identity and the defence of its 
economic and social specific interest”. The Court declared this provision unconstitutional 
on several grounds. It infringes upon the unity of the French people (as set out by the 
Preamble), the indivisibility of the republic (Article 1), and, finally, it violates Article 3 
that designates the people as the sole possessor of national sovereignty. The Court argues 
that the French people regardless of their origin constitute a whole unit incapable of any 
                                                          
197  As the preamble of the French Constitution puts it, by virtue of the principles enshrined in the 
Declaration of 1789 - confirmed and complemented by the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946, and the 
rights and duties as defined in the Charter for the Environment of 2004 - and that of the self-determination 
of peoples, the Republic offers to the overseas territories which have expressed the will to adhere to them 
new institutions founded on the common ideal of liberty, equality and fraternity and conceived for the 
purpose of their democratic development. 
198 These included: 1.) Law no 82-214 of 2 March 1982, ‘Statut de la collectivité territoriale de Corse’ that 
established the Corsican Assembly which was vested with the special power to communicate directly with 
the government and to be consulted by it on all matters concerning Corsica, even though their opinion was 
of a non-binding nature. 2.) Law of 13 May 1991 (a.k.a. the ‘Joxe Statute’) that established a special 
constitutional status for Corsica (like the overseas territories of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, or Mayotte). 3.) 
the Matignon Process of 1999–2000 that resulted in a third autonomy statute in January 2001 (granting for 
the first time the opportunity to teach Corsican language in kindergartens and elementary schools) and 
constitutional reforms in 2003 that redefined the unitary republican model of the state.  See more in Daftary 
(2004), pp. 24-27, and Henders (2010), 89-123.  
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subdivision by statute. The concept of the French peoples perceived in this manner is 
invoked by the 1789 Declaration of Rights, the Constitution of 1946 as well as the 
Constitution of 1958 and is therefore a legal concept of constitutional status. The only 
exemption is the overseas people, which is exactly why the Court has also ruled 
unconstitutional Section 2 (1) of the Joxe Statute, which stipulated that Corsica 
constitutes a territorial unit of the Republic within the meaning of Art. 72 of the 
Constitution on the Territorial communities. The court reminded that Art. 72 and 74 are 
reserved for overseas territories as opposed to metropolitan France, but noted that 
devolution of responsibilities that are normally regulated by statue (that is by the central 
legislature) is not foreseen by Corsica and so cannot be declared unconstitutional. This 
part argues in favour of the legitimate nature of granting administrative competencies to 
Corsica as opposed to legislative ones and sets further boundaries to this type of 
autonomy. The right of the Corsican Assembly to be consulted on bills containing 
provisions specific to Corsica are not unconstitutional, as they do not restrict the power 
of the Government to take legislative initiatives. This is not the case with the power to 
make proposal for legal acts in Corsican matters in a way that obliges the Prime Minister 
to respond to these proposals, nor is the establishment of a special financial arrangement 
(regarding, among others, transfer of tax revenues and the allocation of budget resources). 
Lastly, the Court argued that inserting the Corsican language into school curricula is only 
constitutional provided that it does not become a compulsory subject. This way of 
thinking also insinuates that if Corsican was to become a mandatory subject in schools, it 
would violate the constitutional status of the French language as the only official language 
of the state. 
The second decision came eleven years later in response to the third autonomy 
statute adopted in January 2001 (for simplicity hereinafter, the ‘Matignon’ statute). 
Decision 2001-454 covers mainly the same issues that were brought before the Court in 
1991. It reaffirms the reservations regarding the right of Corsica to propose the 
amendment or adaptation of legal acts and the compulsory education of the Corsican 
language.  Apart from these, the ‘Matignon’ statute wished to expand the autonomous 
competencies of Corsica in a very delicate manner. According to the proposed provision: 
“Where the Corsican Assembly considers that legislative provisions in force or in the 
process of elaboration as regards the powers of the territorial unit raise difficulties of 
application related to the specific circumstances of the island, it may ask the Government 
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to have the legislature to give it possibility of conducting experiments possibly involving 
exceptions from the rules in force, for the subsequent adoption by the Parliament of 
appropriate legislative provisions.” Even to this humble proposition did the Court react 
restrictively, stating that “by giving the legislature, even for a derogatory experiment with 
limited duration, the possibility of empowering the territorial unit of Corsica to take 
measures on matters that fall to be regulated by statute, the Act referred has intervened in 
a matter that is for the Constitution” and which Act would delegate the powers of the 
legislature in a manner not provided for by the Constitution. 
All in all, the French thinking differentiates between overseas people who have 
the right to self-determination as separate entities from the French people of the mainland. 
Due to this basic difference, the former can be granted an increased share of public 
powers, even exclusive legislative and executive ones, while the latter, who is composed 
of every citoyen regardless of their language or culture, exercises its sovereignty as an 
indissoluble whole. In theory, this approach would ensure de jure equality among the 
citizens whether they are members of the majority or a minority. In practice, however, 
the interpretation of the Constitutional court shows that the majority and its culture enjoy 
de facto dominance. For the minorities of metropolitan France (including not just 
Corsicans but Bretons, Basques, Alsatians…etc.) this means that they are only entitled to 
a narrower sense of self-government which is subject to the better judgment of the 
majority (as seen with the arguments on the power to propose legislation) and which thus 
excludes legislative and executive competencies (and includes administrative ones only), 
limiting also their opportunities of consultation with the centre (allowed only to the extent 
to which does not bind the actions of the central government in any way) and 
marginalizing their mother language relative to French (through non-compulsory 
teaching of the minority language).  
 
In reaction to certain historic events,199 as well to Russian policies in the middle of the 
nineties,200 Estonia did not automatically grant citizenship to migrants who originated 
                                                          
199  Throughout the course of the Soviet occupation (1940-1991), the demographics of Estonia was 
dramatically altered as a result of sovietisation policies. Several tens of thousands of Estonians were either 
killed or deported, while at the same time a large number of Soviet immigrants was sent to Estonia as a 
result of forced migration policies. 
200 Russia declared that persons of a “post-Soviet” kind who resided outside Russia may apply for Russian 
dual citizenship. 
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from the former USSR and required naturalization instead under The Nationality Law, 
effective as of 1 April 1995.201 Because of this policy, even by the end of the decade there 
were around 150.000 to 200.000 stateless persons present in the country,202 as not all 
residents were able or willing to apply for a citizenship or opt to leave the country instead. 
Even today there are still about 85.000 people (6,5% of the population) with undetermined 
citizenship who are mostly of Russian origin.203 Alluding to the discriminative nature of 
these laws, the overwhelmingly Russian populated Narva City Council adopted a 
resolution on the 28 June 1993 to organize a local referendum posing the following 
question: “Do you want Narva to have the status of a national-territorial autonomy within 
the Republic of Estonia?”204 The City Council of Sillamäe followed suit and adopted a 
similar resolution on 6 July. The Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court 
of Estonia declared the unconstitutionality of these resolutions through decision No. III-
4/A-2 of 11 August 1993, and III-4/A-3 of 6 September 1993 respectively. In a brief 
conclusion, the Court raised the substantive legal objection that the constitution does not 
refer to national-territorial autonomy but only to cultural autonomy as stipulated by Art. 
50 of the Constitution. Consequently, the national-territorial form of autonomy is in 
conflict with the spirit of the constitution. Furthermore, the Court Decision also mentions 
that the absence of an Act concerning the division of territory of Estonia into 
administrative units does not constitute a ground for a local government council to 
determine its own status or to change the Constitutional order of the Republic of Estonia. 
The Court also alluded to two procedural problems: Due to the fact that the Constitution 
makes no reference to local referendums, such referenda can only be interpreted as a 
means to decide on issues that fall within the competence of a local government. In 
relation to this argument, the Court mentioned that the formation of a national-territorial 
autonomy falls outside the scope of the local authority’s jurisdiction (stipulated under § 
                                                          
201 For more information on the issue see e.g.: Thompson (1998), or Suksi (1999). 
202Suksi (1999), p. 44 
203 In order to address the problem, the Estonian government adopted it in 1996 when  the Estonian 
Government began to issue special identity documents (known as "alien's passport" or välismaalase pass) 
to persons of undetermined citizenship who had previously held Soviet passports, thus granting those 
persons the opportunity to have an official identification within Estonia with which they are also allowed 
to travel abroad. 
204 According to the last census conducted in 2011, the total population of Estonia was slightly above 1.3 
million, 25% of which had Russian origins (about 325.000 persons) with other ethnic nationalities adding 
up to 64 000 (consisting mostly of Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Finns). For census data visit the homepage 
of the Statistical Office of Estonia: http://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/Dialog/statfile1.asp, accessed: 
2015.04.27. 
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154 (1) of the Constitution), as it represents a national issue to be resolved pursuant to the 
procedure for deciding national issues. Even given these circumstances, one has to note 
that Estonia does not rigidly reject every form of autonomy. The Law on Cultural 
Autonomy for National Minorities adopted on 26 October 1993 ensures non-territorial 
self-government over cultural affairs as well as education in the minority’s mother tongue.  
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Chapter 3 
3 Deconstructing the constitutional barrier 
 
3.1 Reactions to Opinion No. 102 
 
3.1.1 Reactions to General objections 
 
I. The territorial autonomy envisaged by the Draft Law would not result in the 
creation of either a separate or a parallel state entity with the Romanian state. 
According to Art. 2 of the Draft Law, Szeklerland is an autonomous region having 
legal personality within Romania. The DL further adds that “the autonomy of the 
region does not infringe on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Romanian 
state”,205 and that the exercise of autonomous rights have to be "in harmony with 
the laws of the State".206 
Parallel competencies are to be found mostly in federal states where one can 
witness, for example, law enforcement or judicial proceedings on both federal and 
member state level. Such “duplications” would not accrue from the entry into force 
of the Draft Law. Although exclusive jurisdiction to adopt legislation on devolved 
issues is the very essence of autonomy, as defined under the “Concepts” section 
earlier, the entry into force of the particular set of shared and exclusive 
competencies present in the DL would not infringe upon the jurisdiction of the 
central state to exercise the exclusive jurisdiction it would still retain over foreign 
policy, monetary policy, social security or judicial powers. Decisions of the central 
state in these issues would continue to be compulsory even for an autonomous 
Szeklerland. 
 
II. While the territorial, administrative organization of a state is an exclusive 
competence of the respective national authorities, the regulations of these 
authorities cannot violate the international commitments of Romania regarding 
                                                          
205 Art. 3DL 
206 Id. at Art. 23. 
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minority protection. While the Draft Law is in line with the principle of subsidiarity 
(a fundamental principle of both European Union law and Romanian law), the plans 
of the Romanian government regarding the administrative reform of the country 
disregard this principle by envisaging an administrative distribution in which 
Szeklerland would be incorporated into a region where the Hungarian speaking 
community would represent less than 30% of the population. Such an 
administrative reform would manifestly violate both the internal laws and the 
international commitments of Romania as set out by: Art. 6 of the Romanian 
Constitution; Art. 3 of Law 2/1968 on the administrative organization of the 
territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania;207 Art. 15 (9) of the Treaty between 
the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and Good 
Neighbourly Relations, Art. 2 of the Treaty on the European Union, Art. 21 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 14 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
Art. 16 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 
On the other hand, however, there are numerous recommendations adopted by 
European organizations promoting autonomy. These include for example: 
Recommendation 1201/1993, 1334/2003, 1985/2014 of the PACE; Resolution 361 
(2013) of the CLRA; Para 35 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (5-29 June 1990). 
 
III. According to Kardos, perceiving minority rights as an existential threat or arguing 
that regional autonomy would infringe upon the rights of the majority citizens or 
disadvantage them in any way is a form of nationalistic thinking, which proves that 
the political identity of the majority is based on culture rather than civic equality.208 
One could add that such arguments would not even exist in the first place if a 
country truly was a common home to all its citizens regardless of their cultural, 
ethnic or national origin.  
                                                          
207 Art. 3 of this law states that the county is made up of towns and villages – the basic units of the 
administrative-territorial organization of the country - depending on the geographical, economic, socio-
political, ethnic, cultural and traditional ties of the population. 
208 Kardos (2015), pp. 38- 39. 
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In pursuit of specifying the principles outlined in Art. 17 of Resolution 
1334/2003, rapporteur Andreas Gross lists 9 recommendations to respect when 
granting an autonomous status. The first two and the last of these recommendations 
are of particular relevance as they state that autonomous status constitutes a 
dynamic process that must be based on an agreement negotiated between the parties 
concerned, and that the devolution of powers to autonomous entities must 
imperatively protect the rights of minorities living in them. The Draft Law does 
actually foresee the establishment of such an inherent minority protection scheme. 
Accordingly, the language of persons belonging to a national- ethnic- linguistic 
community, whose numbers exceed one hundred in villages, one thousand in towns, 
ﬁve thousand in municipalities and ten thousand in the territory of the Seats will 
have the same status as the official language of the state.209 
 
IV. “Nation state” is not a term of constitutional law, which is why it does not possess 
a constitutional legal content either. No wonder that it does not appear in 
constitutions very often. As a matter of fact, Doc. 10762 of the Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights on the concept of “nation” shows that while the term 
‘nation’ appears in most of the constitutions, Romania is the only European country 
whose constitution enshrines the concept of  the “nation state”.210  The same report 
concludes that “the constitution of Romania enshrines clearly the concept of the 
civic nation, composed of all Romanian citizens”, without any discrimination on 
account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political 
adherence, property, or social origin as set out by Art. 4 (2) CR. Bearing in mind 
that the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination is a peremptory 
norm (jus cogens) of international law, from which no derogation is permitted, the 
                                                          
209 Art. 10 (3) DL. 
210  In 2003, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) debated the question of 
preferential treatment of national minorities by their kin-states in the light of the Hungarian law of 19 June 
2001 concerning Hungarians living in neighbouring countries. Among other provisions, this law has 
defined the concept of "nation" in its preamble. It was not until this debate that the Assembly had realized 
that to date there had been "no common European legal definition of the concept of 'nation'" (quote from 
Resolution 1335/2003 adopted after the mentioned debate). Consequently, the Assembly called on the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to analyse the various forms in which the concept of 'nation' 
is being interpreted in the constitutions of CoE member states in order to clarify this so often used 
terminology. The results are shown in Doc. 10762, and the Recommendation adopted by the Assembly 
accordingly (Recommendation 1735 (2006) The concept of “nation”). 
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national character of the Romanian state cannot mean that Romania is the national 
state of ethnic Romanians. It cannot mean that citizens of the titular nation enjoy 
more rights than citizens possessing different national identities. 
a) Unity remains intact. No separate constitutional order would come into being. 
The autonomous region would be entrenched in the Romanian legal system 
based on Art. 117 (3) CR, and the Constitution of the country would remain the 
highest legal norm for an autonomous Szeklerland. It is exactly for this reason 
that the DL stipulates that in case the legal acts of the autonomous authorities 
contradict the constitution, the Constitutional Court shall annul 
them. 211 Additionally, single citizenship is not a prerequisite of unitary 
statehood. Several EU states grant dual citizenships and Romania in particular 
has an extensive legal regime in this regard preferring Romanian kinspeople 
living behind the state border, mostly in Moldova. Not only does autonomy not 
threaten the unity, it is on the contrary, an instrument to strengthen the integrity 
of the state. As Paragraph I/5 of the Explanatory Memorandum of CLRA on 
Resolution 361 (2013) states: “Special status arrangements for sub-national 
units not only are consistent with the overarching public international law 
principle of territorial integrity of states: they also help preserve such integrity 
by addressing specific claims without challenging the unity of the state”.212  
Similarly, the General Assembly of the United Nations holds that „the 
promotion and protection of the rights of minorities contribute to the political 
and social stability of the States in which minorities live and contribute to the 
strengthening of friendship and cooperation among peoples and States”.213 
There is also an overarching academic consensus that autonomy 
strengthens the unity of a state instead of weakening it. Wolff considers 
territorial self-governance arrangements as a tool of statecraft and a mechanism 
of conflict management in divided societies - specifically when compact ethnic 
groups make demands for self-determination - that provide "institutional 
solutions that allow the different segments of diverse societies to realize their 
                                                          
211 Art. 120 DL.  
212  Available: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2107887&Site=COE#P128_6478, accessed: 
2015.07.16. 
213 Paragraph II/3 of the Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the UN Declaration on the 
rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, available: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/Minority2012/G0513385_en.pdf, accessed: 2015.07.16. 
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aspirations for self-determination while simultaneously preserving the overall 
social and territorial integrity of existing states".214 Åkermark notes, that in 
essence autonomy is a security arrangement, in the sense that it „helps to fit the 
idea of a unitary state in the multiplicity of the nation and vice versa to fit the 
factual and inevitable multiplicity of the nation into the idea of a unitary state”. 
Parallel with this, autonomy consolidates not only territorial integrity but also 
the democratic political system of states due to the „participatory paradigm” 
thereof.215 Comparing secessionist movements in Canada, Spain, and the UK, 
Montserrat concludes that if devolution is founded upon mutual trust, 
recognition and a sound financial arrangement, then it stands as an antidote 
against secession for the following reasons: 1) The creation of devolved 
institutions contributes to the dynamism of civil society by reallocating 
resources of decision-making and by promoting regional businesses as well as 
the preservation of regional cultural heritage. 2) Devolution tends to foster a 
sense of common regional identity where it did not previously exist and 
strengthen it where a pre-existing sense of identity was already in place (while 
not excluding the possibility of an overall national identity). 3) A substantial 
degree of devolution when accompanied by sufficient – or even moderately 
generous – resources automatically raise the profile of regional political elites, 
which elites in turn will be reluctant to make a "radical move of unpredictable 
consequences towards independence". 4) Devolution tends to strengthen 
democracy through introducing more subsidiarity in public policy decision-
making.216 
In fact, even in cases where an autonomous region has seceded from its host 
country,217 it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to argue that the autonomous 
arrangement was to blame for that result. In practical terms, it is also important that 
secession is an option for border regions, while Szeklerland lies in the heart of 
                                                          
214 Wolff (2013), p. 7. 
215 Åkermark (2013), p. 24. 
216 Montserrat (2006), pp.70-73. 
217 See the Caucasian examples in Cornell (2002) where the geographic proximity to Russia and Russian 
aspirations in the region are more likely to be behind the results seen among others in Abkhazia or South 
Osetia. One could add the Crimean-peninsula to this list. 
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Romania and does not have any secessionist parties such as the ones in Flanders, 
Scotland or Catalonia.  
b) According to paragraph 12 of Resolution 1334 (2003) of the Council of Europe: 
„Indivisibility must not be confused with the concept of the unitary state, and the 
indivisibility of the state is thus compatible with autonomy, regionalism and 
federalism.” The term itself is primarily a signpost for external forces, mediating 
the message that the territory of the country should remain intact, and that 
borders should be respected. Devolving more competencies from the centre to 
the local authorities cannot be understood as segmenting the country into a 
patchwork of different legal regimes. The same conclusion was reached by 
rapporteurs of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (Jean-Claude 
Frecon and Lambert van Nistelrooij), when the question of the administrative 
reform first reached their agenda in 2002. This report noted that there is no 
constitutional provision in Romania whatsoever that prohibits considerable 
devolution of state powers to the counties.218 
c) Sovereignty would not cease to exist, it would simply be exercised through a 
democratically elected body other than the Parliament in Bucharest. According 
to Art 2 (1) of the Constitution, sovereignty lies not in the state but in the citizens 
of the state, who shall exercise this sovereignty by means of their representative 
bodies as well as by referendum. In democratic polities, sovereignty is not a zero 
sum game, as it can be shared, devolved or delegated. Furthermore, as Krasner 
noted, sovereignty in issues regarding minorities have never been an exclusive 
jurisdiction of the states.219 In this point the diametrically opposing views of the 
majority and the minority come to the fore. While the Szekler Draft Law presents 
a bottom-up process, presupposing the voluntary consent of the local citizens in 
establishing the autonomy arrangement, the majoritarian scenario is of a 
hierarchical top-down nature, in which popular sovereignty is being confusingly 
supplemented with state sovereignty. 
 
                                                          
218 See paragraph 83 of Information Report No. CG/INST (8) 55 rev / 2002 on Local and Regional 
Democracy in Romania. Available: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=888817&Site=Congress, 
accessed: 201506.23. 
219 Krasner supra note, pp. 220-239. 
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V. Given the poorly phrased or absent legislation on the use of symbols, the antagony 
between minority and majority views on the use of symbols continues to reopen the 
political discourse to interpretations on what can be considered lawful conduct. 
While there is a scholarly debate whether or not the possibility of an open legal 
system and the absence of law (non liquet) can be ruled out,220 as opposed to 
conceptualizing a universal, and, by extension, closed legal order where the 
negative law is an inherent part of the legal system,221 the concept of "residual 
principles" is used and commonly referred to in legal practice and legal theory as 
well. Stone even notes that most legal orders lay down some kind of residual 
principle, "the effect of which is to occupy the space which would otherwise be 
devoid of law".222 One of the most well-known of these is the “residual negative 
principle”, which refers to the idea that everything that is not legally prohibited is 
legally permitted. This idea stems from the understanding that certain areas of life 
that are not positively regulated by law are not devoid of law but rather regulated 
in a residual or negative manner by precluding legal effects in those specific areas. 
Consequently, in the absence of a norm limiting specific behaviours, the legal 
system is neutral as to the legal consequences, which grants citizens the freedom to 
exercise activities of their choice within that framework. The opportunity to think 
and act with this principle in mind is available for Romanian authorities at all times. 
The application of the residual negative principle would result in an analogous 
effect concerning particular cases (like the case of the Szekler flag) that the 
arguments of this dissertation intends to achieve regarding the general case of 
Szekler autonomy: A “simple” change in the mind-set can remove an unnecessary 
and unjustified obstacle to a legitimate minority claim without having to resort to 
any amendments in the legal system. 
 
VI. Similarly, to views on the exclusivity of sovereignty, a zero sum mentality was 
traceable in the case of linguistic issues. Even though the DL only suggested 
recognizing Hungarian as a regional-official language in addition to the Romanian 
language, the Legislative Council thought that in a unified state there could only be 
                                                          
220 Lauterpacht (1958), pp. 196–221. 
221Radbruch (1956), p. 298 
222 Stone (1964), pp. 188-192 
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one official language. If regionalized power sharing is the “autonomist” answer to 
exclusive central state sovereignty, then multilingualism and linguistic equality is 
the reply to cultural monochromaticity. The official status of Hungarian would not 
violate any legislations in force; on the contrary, one could find numerous examples 
where multilingualism contributed to social peace and mutual understanding among 
different cultures. Such positive examples include, above all, the linguistic quotas 
of South Tyrol or the official status of the Swedish language in Finland. The latter 
examples show particularly well the influence of political culture on law and the 
interpretation of legislation. Finland is an equally “young” state (even younger than 
Romania) which - due to its geographic position- had its fair share of foreign 
occupations (just as Romania). The Swedish community is equally large relative to 
Finns just like Hungarians relative to Romanians (about 6-7% of the total 
population) and their distribution within the country is similar (having in both cases 
significant areas where they represent the majority). The constitutional design has 
or had similarities, as both countries are unitary states, led by a semi-presidential 
form of government (though Finland has shifted towards a parliamentary system by 
adopting the new unified constitution in 2000). Yet, Finland takes a diametrically 
opposite approach in linguistic issues. Language Act no. 423/2003 stipulates that 
Swedish is the second national language in Finland. This means that as far as state 
communication with citizens is concerned, the officially used language of the new-
born citizen will be the one that was requested by the parents upon birth. It is a 
declaration that can be changed by the individual later on if so desired. As far as 
local administration is concerned, a municipality is either unilingual or bilingual - 
a status which is determined every ten years based on official statistics. A 
municipality is designated bilingual if the population includes both Finnish and 
Swedish speakers and the minority comprises at least eight percent of the 
population or at least 3,000 persons. A bilingual municipality is designated 
unilingual if the minority comprises less than 3,000 persons and its proportion has 
decreased below six percent.223 While there are some considerable challenges in the 
implementation of this model of bilingualism, surveys show an overall satisfaction 
                                                          
223  Section 5 (2) of Law 423/2003. Available: 
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2003/en20030423.pdf, accessed: 2017.02.21. 
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of Swedish-speaking citizens with regard to state services in Swedish language,224 
while most apparently, bilingualism did not tear apart the political and social fabric 
of Finland but rather contributed to the preservation thereof. 
 
3.1.2 Reactions to Procedural objections 
 
I. The fact that an administrative unit is not listed in the constitution of the country 
does not mean that it automatically becomes unconstitutional. NUTS regions, for 
example, are not mentioned in the constitution they still function, and are vested 
with widespread financial authority.  
The autonomous region can fit in the present administrative system as an 
autonomous county, whose internal administrative division could be regulated by 
the Statute of Autonomy. Unique internal divisions of autonomous administrations 
which revitalize historic administrative units can be found in Catalonia’s Comarca 
system or in the Basque Country where the historical regions (Bizkaia, Álava, and 
Gipuzkoa), which only exist there, are pivotal elements in the exercise of the fiscal 
autonomy of the region. The reestablishment of the historical administrative units 
of the Seats would be in line with Law 2/1968, as it would take into account socio-
political, ethnic, cultural and traditional ties of the population. 
 
II. The fact that the DL makes reference to Art. 117 (3) CR might seem somewhat 
misplaced at first, given that this article appears in the section on "specialized 
central public administration", whereas local public administrations are being dealt 
with under the following section (Articles 120-123). The scope of the activities of 
specialized central public administrative authorities is national, which would 
certainly not be true to the institutions of an autonomous Szeklerland. Even so, 
invoking this article is relevant in so far as it would be central public authorities 
conferring competencies to the autonomous region authorizing it to make decisions 
for Szeklerland in matters which otherwise would fall under the jurisdiction of the 
                                                          
224 The quality of state services in Swedish language received an average of 7.6 points (out of a total of 10 
points) from the Swedish speaking citizens, based on the availability of services in Swedish. Source: 
Government of Finland (2009), p. 25. 
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central public administration. From the point of view of the state, this would mean 
that as of the entry into force of the organic law on the status of Szeklerland, the 
legislative and executive competencies would no longer be carried out by the central 
administrative authorities but by decision-making bodies of the autonomous region, 
to the extent that the statute of autonomy allows for it. In other words, in relation to 
Szeklerland, a set of nationwide competencies of central administration bodies 
would be taken over fully or partially by the autonomous authorities of Szeklerland. 
As Stanomir notes, the very essence of autonomous administrative authorities is 
that they are not subordinated to the government but they share relations with the 
Parliament in varying forms. Autonomy clearly alludes to the lack of central-
governmental coercion and the capability to act freely within the boundaries set out 
by law.225 The shear fact that the constitution refers to various forms of autonomy 
as instruments that can be established through legislation is in itself a valid 
argument that autonomy per se does not contradict the constitution, given the 
assumption that provisions of the constitution do not contradict one another. This 
interpretation is also in line with the basic principles laid down in Article 120 (1) 
CR, according to which public administration in territorial-administrative units 
shall be based on the principles of decentralization, local autonomy and 
deconcentration of public services.   
The legislature of the constitutional model country, France, also inserted a 
similar provision in to the constitution as they saw such provision to help to 
accommodate increasing regional demands for bigger self-rule within a unitary 
state structure. Since the constitutional amendment of 28 March 2003, Article 1 of 
the constitution now stipulates that France shall be organised on a decentralised 
basis. The same amendment introduced more specific regulations on how to transfer 
powers from the central government to the territorial communities (Articles 72-1. – 
72-4.).226 Lastly, the analogy of devolution in the UK is worth mentioning, given 
that the predecessors of the devolved parliaments, the Scottish and Welsh Offices, 
were ordinary Whitehall departments in the beginning, 227  whose competencies 
                                                          
225 Stanomir (2010), p.50. 
226 For a more detailed description on local governance in France see: Boyron (2013), pp. 206-235. 
227 Whitehall department is short for British government departments. 
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were gradually assumed by the respective regional legislative assemblies when 
these were re-established in the late nineties. 
 
III. Pursuant to the Legislative Councils conclusions on the necessity to hold a 
referendum, Szekler Communes started to adopt municipal resolutions to organize 
local referendums. Eleven municipalities adopted such resolutions228 posing the 
question whether or not the citizens agree that by modifying the current county 
borders, Szeklerland should become an autonomous territorial administrative unit, 
which the given municipality should form a part of. In line with Opinion 102, these 
resolutions based their legality on Law No. 215/2001 on Local Public 
Administration, and also on Law 3/2000 on the Organization of the Referendum, 
Art. 13 (1) of which stipulates that “issues of particular interest for an 
administrative-territorial unit may be subject, under this law, to the approval of the 
population by local referendum.” Moreover, paragraph 3 of the same article states 
that “legislative proposals on amending the territorial delineation of municipalities, 
cities and counties, shall be submitted to the Parliament only after consultation with 
the citizens of these administrative-territorial units by referendum. In this case the 
referendum is binding.”  The constitutionality of these resolutions was contested by 
the Prefects of Kovászna and Hargita Counties before the Administrative Courts on 
the following grounds: Art 12 (1) b) of Law 3/2000 stipulates that the adoption of 
a special policy decision on the organization of local public administration, 
territory, as well as general rules on local autonomy is a question of national 
interest, and subject, therefore, to nationwide referendums. In this sense, the 
territorial distribution of a country surpasses local interest and constitutes a national 
level of interest. The courts also reaffirmed the most common counter-argument 
that the referendum would result in the establishment of an administrative unit not 
foreseen by Art 3 (3) of the Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional. 
Consequently, the court declared all eleven resolutions null and void. The phrasing 
of Act 3/2000 is vague enough to give birth to dissenting interpretations (especially 
                                                          
228 These eleven municipalities were: Farkaslaka, Gyergyóalfalu, Gyergyószentmiklós, Illyefalva, 
Kápolnás, Kézdivásárhely, Mikóújfalu, Nagyborosnyó, Sepsibükszád, Szentegyháza, and Vargyas. Plaints 
of the Prefects against these resolutions can be found under: http://sznt.sic.hu/hu-
sic/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=20&Itemid=26&lang=hu, accessed: 2015.05.08. 
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when comparing Articles 12 and 13). Still, it is fair enough to say that the adoption 
of special policy decisions on local administration that is binding for the whole 
country and is thus subject to referendums on the national level (Art. 12) should not 
be confused with referendums on issues of particular interest for an administrative-
territorial unit and with referendums on the delimitation of the borders of the 
administrative units (Art. 13), in which local citizens have to be invited to the polls 
even if the final decision might be taken on a higher level by the national 
Parliament. It should be noted that after these proceedings the Szekler National 
Council decided to organize an informal referendum, meaning that they established 
their own mobile ballot boxes and ballots and directly visited the local electorate 
from December 2006 till February 2008. They reached about 395.000 voters out of 
which 210.000 cast their votes. 99,31% was in favour of creating an autonomous 
Szeklerland. 229  The case of the local referendums shows that in practice the 
approval or disapproval of the legality of a referendum on the borders and status of 
Szeklerland is contingent on discrepant interpretations of different state institutions 
on the same legal texts.  
 
3.2 Reactions to Decision Nr. 80/2014 
 
In his Dissenting Opinion Judge Puskás Bálint Zoltán claimed that the CCR refused to 
consider both the existing national and international legal framework and the elements of 
comparative law. By ignoring those grounds, the Court pronounced a wrong solution, 
based on an artificial argumentation.230 Puskás notes that the state is yet to deliver on 
pledges enshrined in the Declaration of Alba Iulia/Gyulafehérvár. In spite of not being 
explicitly referred to in the constitution, this declaration has a constitutional legal value. 
It represents such a direct and genuine manifestation of popular will that it must be 
respected, recognized and developed at all times, because it lays down the foundations of 
the Romanian state, as a result of which these values and principles remain immune to 
the passing of years.231 Given that national minorities are members of the national state 
                                                          
229 See Appendix No. 2 in: Szekler National Council (2009), p. 102. 
230 CCR, supra note., p. 74. 
231 Id. at, p. 77. 
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as equal citizens of the country, the acknowledgment of an administrative-territorial 
organization which recognizes the historical realities does not in any way affect the legal 
relationship between a state and its citizen. Moreover, the initial proposals did not intend 
to alter or limit the unitary and indivisible character of the state, on the contrary, they 
organically blend into the said provisions of the Constitution. Declaring the analysed legal 
solution unconstitutional calls into question the good faith of the CCR`s interpretation.232 
Underpinning this argument, Puskás refers to the wording of Art. 3 of Law 2/1968, the 
constitutional setting of unitary states, like Spain, Italy or Serbia, whose unity was not 
affected by granting autonomy to their minorities as well as to the relevant literature of 
Romanian constitutionalists. Lastly, the dissenting opinion notes the contradiction 
embedded in the CCR`s viewpoint regarding the establishment of decision-making bodies 
under Art. 6 of the Constitution. If the right of persons belonging to national minorities 
to their identity is truly recognized and guaranteed but they are not allowed to establish 
their own bodies to implement this right, that would mean that the majority is entitled to 
impose on the minority the appropriate way they can maintain, express and develop their 
identity.233  A similar critique is expressed regarding the use of minority symbols. If a 
national minority cannot use its symbols, not even in areas where it represents the 
overwhelming majority that is equivalent to denying the right of national minorities to 
identity.234 
The thoughts of Puskás on identity do not stand alone. A few years earlier similar 
views were echoed in the Stanomir-report.235 As the report concludes, one of the basic 
principles that has to govern every constitutional amendment process is the protection of 
the identity of national minorities.236 The report characterises the Romanian Constitution 
as one of the most rigid ones due to Art. 152 (1) which lists a number of provisions not 
subject for revision at all. 237  This approach stems from fears that coined the 1991 
                                                          
232 Id. at, p. 78. 
233 Id. at, p. 77. 
234 Id. at, p. 78. 
235 In 2008, the President of Romania initiated the establishment of a Commission made up of constitutional 
law experts chaired by Ioan Stanomir Professor at the University of Bucharest in order to investigate the 
possibilities of revising the constitutional structure of the country. For the full report see: 
http://www.jakabffy.ro/magyarkisebbseg/pdf/02stanomir.pdf, accessed: 2015.04.19. 
236 Stanomir et al (2010), p. 89. 
237  These are: the national, independent, unitary and indivisible character of the Romanian state; the 
republican form of government; territorial integrity; independence of justice; political pluralism; and the 
official language. 
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constitutional process (like separatism and isolation based on ethnic criteria), and which 
should be surpassed in a new constitutionalization process, as these inhibit the 
possibilities of legal development by generating artificial conflicts.238 
Assertions of the CC show that judges can contribute to interpreting public law 
provisions in a manner that is hostile to autonomy. It also shows how overarching the 
tacit agreement on the ethnocentric nation ideal is. 
 
3.3 The Eye of the Duck - Legal entrenchment239 
 
Now that we have presented the pros and cons and outlined the different views of the 
majority and the minority on autonomy, we can address the core of the issue at hand. 
When it comes to legal arguments about the constitutionality of an autonomy 
arrangement, this core is the legal entrenchment, i.e. the practical way to anchor an 
autonomous legal regime within the constitutional system of a given state. When 
elaborating this Chapter, I took into consideration the type of entrenchment that the Draft 
Law on the Autonomy of Szeklerland envisages, not excluding, however, some examples 
that might be of relevance, bearing in mind that the Draft Law is not carved in stone but 
is open for changes as part of a dialogue between the state authorities and representatives 
of the Szekler community. 
Much favourable for national communities who are in pursuit of more self-
governance and for states willing to address such aspirations, a broad selection of 
examples is available to draw inspiration from. The autonomous republic of Tatarstan, 
for example, fits into the constitutional system of the Russian Federation through a special 
bilateral treaty (signed on 15 February, 1994), as opposed to other sub-state units of the 
federation which signed the multilateral Russian Federal Treaty. Another unique example 
would be that of Puerto Rico. Ceded to the United States by Spain as the consequence of 
the Spanish-American War in 1898, the autonomy of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
originated in its status as an “unincorporated territory” of the US, which meant that its 
                                                          
238 Supra note, pp. 31-32. 
239 The “eye of the duck” is a metaphor invented by American director David Lynch, which refers to a scene 
in his movies that captures the fundamental essence of the whole film, and which helps the viewer to 
reconstruct the thinking of the director. 
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residents did not enjoy certain constitutional rights but were also exempted from certain 
obligations (most importantly tax-related ones).  
The entrenchment of devolution in the UK is peculiar in the sense that it takes 
place within a common law system, which lacks a written constitution. Even so, the UK 
example is valuable given that before the reestablishment of the Scottish Parliament and 
the Welsh Assembly in the late nineties, the country used to be as centralized as 
contemporary Romania. This slowly evolving devolution processes gained new impetus 
with the BREXIT referendum240 after which both the federalisation  of the country and 
the breakaway of Scotland and/or the unification of Ireland and Northern- Ireland are 
plausible scenarios. Even if Scotland seceded from the UK in the future, the type of 
devolution it had enjoyed from the adoption of the Scotland Act until the construction of 
a separate state is worth studying. With respect to Scotland there are no de jure special 
rights regarding the amendment of the Scotland Act that enumerates the competencies of 
the autonomous legislature.241 The Parliament of Scotland may make laws within its area 
of competence known as the Acts of the Scottish Parliament notwithstanding, however, 
the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland, as set out 
by Section 28 (7) of the Scotland Act. Deducting its logic from the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty,242 this section provides a clear residual power for Westminster 
to legislate for Scotland in devolved areas without the consent of Scotland. This provision, 
however, has never yet been invoked due to the Sewel Convention. 243  Later on, a 
Memorandum of Understanding from 2002 between Westminster and the devolved 
administrations expressed the same position with regard to all of the devolved 
legislatures, as the Memorandum stipulates that “the United Kingdom Parliament retains 
authority to legislate on any issue, whether devolved or not. It is ultimately for Parliament 
to decide what use to make of that power. However, the UK Government will proceed in 
                                                          
240 BREXIT is a portmanteau word that combines the words "British" and "Exit" to refer to the United 
Kingdom European Union membership referendum held on 23 June, 2016. 
241 While some scientists refer to the Scotland Act as the "Constitution" of Scotland (see e.g.: Himsworth 
(2013), p. 359.), from a legal point of view this Act can be seen as a functional equivalent to the autonomy 
statutes discussed in this dissertation. 
242 According to the "Diceyan Orthodoxy", the parliament is vested with the power to make or unmake any 
law and no person or body has the right to set aside or override an Act of Parliament. 
243 The Sewel convention is named after Lord John Sewel, who was the Minister of State in the Scottish 
Office responsible for the conduct of the Scotland Bill in 1998. He was the MP who first stated during the 
Lords Committee stage of the Scotland Bill on 21 July 1998 that the Government expected a convention to 
be established that Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland 
without the consent of the Scottish Parliament. 
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accordance with the convention that the UK Parliament would not normally legislate with 
regard to devolved matters except with the agreement of the devolved legislature”.244In 
practice, the convention requires a Legislative Consent Motion (LCM) to be put forward 
by the UK Government, according to which Holyrood has to agree that the provisions of 
the given Bill should be considered by the UK Parliament,245 insofar as the matters fall 
within the competence of the Scottish Parliament. Since the first session of the Scottish 
Parliament in 1999 to date, there has been a total of 155 LCMs. Even though the option 
of withholding consent exists, Holyrood is yet to test the Sewel Convention in that manner 
as so far all of the LCMs were passed by the autonomous legislature.246  An LCM 
procedure was also required when the UK government wanted to enact amendments to 
the Scotland Act. Due to some concerns of the Scottish government, this procedure 
spanned through 2 legislative cycles between its initiation by the Labour government in 
2010 and its adoption by the following Conservative-Liberal Coalition in 2012. In spite, 
this protracted procedure; there was no effort from the British government to override 
Scottish opposition by passing the Bill without an LCM. In other words, as long as the 
Sewel convention remains in place, the Scottish autonomy will have a protection under 
the political conventions of the UK from unilateral amendment of its competencies. 
The Faroe Islands enjoy a remarkably wide scope of competencies including also 
the jurisdiction to conclude international treaties despite the fact that this autonomy lacks 
a general constitutional entrenchment and was enacted through an ordinary law instead 
which can be unilaterally amended by the Danish Parliament through a majority vote 
whenever they wanted to.247 However, not once has it happened since the enactment of 
                                                          
244 Paragraph 13 of the Memorandum of Understanding, as laid before the Scottish Parliament by the 
Scottish Ministers, January 2002: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/1999/10/MofU, accessed: 
2015.07.13. 
245 Holyrood is an Anglicisation of the Gaelic word halyruid (holy cross), which functions as a metonym 
for the Scottish legislature located near Holyrood Palace that has served as the residence of Scottish 
Monarchs since the 16th century. 
246 For Legislative Consent Memorandums and Motions by Session see: 
http://www.gov.scot/About/Government/Sewel, accessed: 2015.07.13. 
247 There are opposing opinions as to the status of Greenland relative to the Faroe Islands. One argument 
would say that ever since the Greenland Home Rule Act (577/1978) was replaced by the Act on Greenland 
Self-Government (473/2009), Denmark has agreed to recognize that “the people of Greenland is a people 
pursuant to international law with the right of self-determination” (Preamble of Act 473/2009). This right 
includes the right to secession under Chapter 8 of the Act. The unilateral amendment of this statute would 
violate the principles of self-determination as set out by international law which thus grants a higher 
protection for the Greenlandic autonomy compared to the Faroese one (even though the Greenland Self-
Government Act is still an ordinary law as far as the hierarchy of norms of the Danish legal system is 
concerned). On the other hand, however, this argument can be contested by the fact that in the Reports of 
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Law No. 137 of March 23rd 1948 on Home Rule of the Faroe Islands that the Danish 
Parliament has amended this statute or repealed parts of it without the consent of the 
Faroese Parliament. This mentality is still present decades later and is reflected expressis 
verbis in Danish Act no. 578 of 24 June 2005 Relating to the Takeover of Affairs and 
Fields of Affairs by the Faeroe Islands Public Authorities (shortly, Assumptions Act). 
The preamble of the Assumptions Act stipulates that “this Act is based on an agreement 
between the Faeroe Islands Home Rule Government and the Danish Government as 
equivalent parties.” One could thus argue that this favourable mind-set of the Danish 
political culture represents a type of political entrenchment, in so far as the central state 
power compels itself to seek agreement as opposed to adopt unilateral measures, “in 
acknowledgement of the special position held by the Faroe Islands within the Kingdom 
in national, historical and geographical respects”.248 The cases of the Faroe-islands and 
Scotland prove that conventions can constitute an effective political entrenchment even 
in the absence of a constitutional one.249 
Similarly to the Faroese model, the 1994 organic law on the special legal status of 
Gagauzia provides exclusive legislative and executive competencies in various matters 
from culture and education to economy and environment, but given that the law was 
enacted after the new constitution of Moldova had already been adopted, the Gagauz 
autonomy had functioned without a general constitutional footing for almost ten years. It 
was only through the amendment of the constitution in 2003 that Articles 110 and 111 
                                                          
Denmark on the implementation of the ICCPR, both the Faroe Islands and Greenland are considered as 
peoples under Article 1 of the Covenant. Additionally, a circular note of the Danish government from 7 
November 2005 - to all heads of diplomatic missions accredited to Denmark - makes it clear that though 
Denmark has granted powers to both Faroe and Greenland to conclude agreements under international law, 
such agreements can solely pertain to matters for which internal powers have been transferred to the 
respective autonomous entities. Prior to the exercise of this power, the Danish Foreign Ministry must be 
consulted in both cases. These sources allude to the fact that there is no substantial difference between the 
legal statuses of the two autonomous regions and that it is indeed the internal from of self –determination 
that is the available option for both communities. Finally, Article 21 (3) of the Act on Greenland Self-
Government stipulates that independence is contingent on the consent of the Danish legislature as part of 
an agreement between Greenland and Denmark. Unilateral form of external self-determination is therefore 
precluded from the Act, and secession is only possible in the framework of a negotiated process. But then 
again, a negotiated secession is possible in the case of Faroe as well (or in the case of any other region 
elsewhere for that matter) irrespective of the fact that the Faroese statute does not explicitly mention a 
Faroese right to secession. 
248 Preamble of the Home Rule Act of the Faroe Islands. 
249 For more information on the similarities between the Danish "theory of delegation" and the British 
doctrine on "sovereignty of Parliament”, see: Larsen & á Rógvi (2012), pp. 348-350. 
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were inserted providing a general constitutional entrenchment for the autonomy of 
Gagauzia.250 
Another special example was that of the Åland Island prior to 1994. Between the 
entry into force of the initial autonomy act (Law No. 124/1920 adopted on 6 May 1920), 
and the amendment of the constitution in 1994, Åland enjoyed a quite unique form of 
entrenchment as an act of exception.251 The legal structure of Finland comprised and still 
does of the constitution (whose amendment requires a two-thirds majority in two 
consecutive legislative cycles),252 ordinary laws (whose adoption requires the majority 
votes of the MPs) and decrees adopted by the central or local-municipal governments. 
The lack of organic laws in this system disabled a semi-general constitutional 
entrenchment, while a general entrenchment was hindered by the fact that the 1920 
Autonomy Act was adopted after Finland had already enacted its constitution as a newly 
independent state in 17 July 1919. Consequently, the autonomy of Åland functioned for 
almost seven and a half decades without a general or semi-general constitutional 
entrenchment.253 Unlike Faroe, Greenland or Gagauzia before 2003, however, this sui 
generis position did not mean that the Finnish governments would have been able to 
unilaterally amend the statute of autonomy. The ålandic autonomy was firmly entrenched 
as an act of exception,254 which means that Law No. 124/1920 was adopted by the 
parliament under the same procedure that was otherwise exclusively reserved for the 
amendment of the constitution but without making the Autonomy Act a part of the formal 
constitution of Finland or without declaring the Act constitutional. 255  As far as the 
doctrine of the acts of exception is concerned, when a political community encounters an 
exceptional political situation that produces compelling reasons, the parliament may 
                                                          
250 See Weller et al (2010), p. 242. 
251 Suksi (2011), p. 145 
252 An important difference between the current constitution and the one that was in force during the 
adoption of the Åland Autonomy Act is that after Finland gained independence, the country functioned 
under a multi-documentary constitutional system consisting of 4 Constitutional Acts: the 1772 Form of 
Government Act, the 1789 Union and Security Act, the 1906 Parliament Act, and the 1906 Act on Freedom 
of Speech, Assembly and Association. The new constitution that merged these documents into on unified 
constitutional text was adopted on 1 March 2000. For more information on the evolution of the Finnish 
constitution, see Chapter 5 of Dawn (ed.) (2011), pp. 87-115. 
253  For the text of the first constitution see: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/fi01000_.html, accessed: 
2015.06.30. 
254 The Autonomy Act was completed by a special Act on the Acquisition of Land on the Åland Islands, 
which had the same sui generis legal entrenchment and amendment procedure as the Autonomy Act. 
255 The lack of such a declaration is relevant because of the multi-documentary nature of the constitutional 
structure of Finland at that time. 
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adopt an ordinary act of law using the procedure prescribed for constitutional legislation 
whose provisions from a material point of view are in breach of the constitution. The 
“exceptional political situation” in the case of Åland came in the face of a secessionist 
movement. Under the leadership of Julius Sundblom, the Swedes established their own 
parliament and brought forth a petition addressed to the Swedish government fostering 
the merger of Åland and Sweden, invoking the principle of self-determination of the 
peoples.256The petition campaign was completed on 29 June 1919 and was signed by 9735 
people who supported the Union with Sweden, while 461 persons refused to sign the 
petition (the total population of the islands was approximately 21.000 at that time). The 
situation also had its international resonances, as there were attempts already in 1919 to 
refer the case of Åland to the Versailles Peace Conference, which ultimately failed, given 
that Sweden was not a belligerent party and remained neutral throughout the course of 
the First World War. Some authors also claim that the granting of autonomy was much 
more influenced by external rather than internal factors. According to this theory, after 
the Ålandic issue was referred to the Council of the League of Nations, the Finnish 
government anticipated that the decision might not be in favour of Finland and they 
adopted Law 124/1920 only to improve their chances before the Council.257 Nonetheless, 
the times were exceptional for Finland which gave enough incentive to legislate in an 
extraordinary manner. Normally, one would have needed a two-thirds majority in the 
Finnish legislature, the Eduskunta, for a constitutional amendment to take place, 
precluding those instances where the legislature votes for an amendment to be adopted 
under expedited order. In that case the Eduskunta would first have to vote for an expedited 
order with 5/6 of its members and have a following vote on the amendment itself requiring 
this time a 2/3 majority. This was exactly the case with Åland Autonomy Act, where the 
Eduskunta first approved the expedited order with a 5/6 majority (158 yeas and 21 nays), 
and then voted for the Act itself with 152 yeas, 27 nays and 1 abstention on 6 May 1920. 
Such extraordinary legislation happened quite a lot of times during the turmoilish first 
years of the Finnish state. What was so special with Åland, however, was that the Islands 
received the additional insurance that the Autonomy Act could only be amended in the 
same manner as the Constitution and with the consent of the Legislative Assembly of 
Åland, while other acts of exception could have been repealed by the Finnish legislature 
                                                          
256 See more in: Suksi (1993), p. 220. 
257 See: Hannikainen (1997), p. 58. 
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with a simple majority through an ordinary act. The Constitutional self-limitation that 
Finland imposed on itself was quite robust here in spite of the lack of a general 
constitutional entrenchment. The Ålandic case provides a vivid example that in the 
presence of political will a specific minority issue can be resolved, even if the resolution 
requires the central state to resort to extraordinary constitutional-legal means.258 
Similar to the case of Åland, the Paris Agreement (also known as the Gruber-de 
Gasperi Agreement named after Italian Prime minister Alcide de Gasperi and Austrian 
Foreign Minister Karl Gruber who signed the treaty on 5 September 1946) sought to 
“safeguard the ethnic character and the cultural and economic development of the German 
language group” of South Tyrol (Article 1, Paris Agreement). This Agreement was 
annexed to the Peace Treaty of Paris, published in the Gazette of the Italian Republic on 
24 September 1947, becoming a part of Italian legislation. Unlike the Agreement between 
Sweden and Finland on Åland, the Paris Agreement took the form of a treaty and ensured 
leverage for Austria as a party to the treaty that could appeal against non-implementation. 
The obligation of Italy to grant special status to South Tyrol was thus already part of the 
domestic legal system when the Italian Constituent Assembly adopted the new 
constitution on 31 January 1948. Consequently, this constitution referred to the special 
status of South Tyrol. This general constitutional entrenchment has remained in place 
since then. The satisfying implementation of the Paris Agreement, however, commenced 
after several decades and a wave of bomb attacks aimed at the secession or South Tyrol 
from Italy orchestrated by the South Tyrolean Liberation Committee 
(Befreiungsausschuss Südtirol).259 
Art. 116 of the Constitution of Italy (CI) enumerate the five special regions of the 
country that exist beside the 15 ordinary regions (the special regions are: Sicily, Sardinia, 
the Aosta –valley, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, and Trentino-Alto Adige/ Südtirol). Since the 
                                                          
258 A detailed summary of the procedure pursuant to which the Statute of Åland was adopted can be found 
in: Finlands Riksdag (1920), pp. 86-87. 
259 The discord of the South Tyroleans was due to the fact that the first autonomy statute adopted in 1948 
gave autonomous competencies to the Italian majority region of Trentino- Alto-Adige instead of the 
overwhelmingly German-speaking Südtirol Province, and the neighbouring bilingual townships as foreseen 
by the Paris Agreement. Invoking the non-implementation of the Gruber-de Gasperi Agreement, Austria 
raised the South Tyrolean question before the UN General Assembly that adopted two resolutions on the 
issue in 1960 and 1961. Pursuant to these resolutions, Italy then set up a commission of inquiry with the 
mandate to find solutions to the South Tyrolean question. This organisation called Commission of Nineteen 
was the one that adopted the “Package” consisting of 137 measures to alter the existing legal regulations 
on the autonomy of Tyrol, which resulted in the revised autonomy statute that entered into force in 1972. 
  
98 
 
amendment of the Constitution in 2001, Article 117 has listed the exclusive competencies 
of the state that includes national questions such as foreign policy, defence, judicial 
powers, social security, citizenship, currency and so on. Other competences that fall 
outside this exclusive enumeration were passed to the regions (with the difference that 
ordinary regions have to follow state guidelines in concurrent competencies), the 
resolutions of which can only be contested by the government through the Constitutional 
Court (whereas before the 2001 amendment the government was able to refer regional 
laws back to the regional government). 260  On the other hand, special regions have 
exclusive or shared powers in the fields of economics (including the retention of locally 
generated tax revenues), education, culture, environmental issues…etc, enumerated by 
their respective special statutes. The case of South Tyrol is peculiar even within the five 
special regions not just because of the international entrenchment but also because South 
Tyrol, as a province within Trentino-Alto Adige region, exercises competencies that in 
the other four cases are allocated to the regional level. Thus, there is a complex 8 level 
system of power sharing: Exclusive legislative powers of the State 261 ; Concurring 
legislative powers shared by the State and its Regions 262 ; Exclusive legislative 
competencies of Trentino–Alto Adige region 263 ; Exclusive competencies of the 
autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano 264 (a.k.a. primary jurisdiction from the 
autonomous entities point of view);265 Concurring legislative powers shared by the State 
and Trentino–Alto Adige Region;266 Concurring legislative powers shared by the State 
and the Province (secondary jurisdiction);267 Powers to enact the provisions of national 
                                                          
260 See: Peterlini (2013), p. 130 
261 Article 117, Paragraph 2, points a) - s) CI 
262 Id. Article 117, Paragraph 3. 
263 Article 4. of the Special Statute of the Region Trentino - Sudtirol, Law No. 118 from 11. March 1972 
(hereinafter, ASt). 
264 Article 8. ASt and Article 117.  Paragraph 4 CI regarding regional involvement in EU decision-making 
processes. 
265 Scientific literature often approaches the autonomous competencies from the point of view of the 
autonomous entity, and thus differentiates between primary (or exclusive), secondary (or shared), and 
tertiary (or complementary) competencies. See for example: Ferrari, Paolo (ed.) (2009). 
266  Article 5. ASt, which adds some specific competencies (like organization of public welfare and 
charitable institutions, local savings banks and credit institutions) that are not present in the general 
framework as set out by Article 117 CI. 
267 Article 9. ASt. 
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laws (tertiary jurisdiction);268 Competencies delegated from the State to either the region 
or the province.269 
Since Constitutional Law No. 1/1999 entered into force, the autonomy statutes of 
both the special and the ordinary regions must be adopted by the national parliament with 
a constitutional law.270 Thus, the autonomy statute of South-Tyrol lies between ordinary 
laws and the Constitution in the hierarchy of norms meaning that simple majority 
legislation of the Italian Parliament cannot repeal nor amend the statute.  Accordingly, 
Regional Statutes are adopted and amended by the Regional Council with a law approved 
by an absolute majority of its members, with two subsequent deliberations at an interval 
of not less than two months.271 The constitutionality of these statutes can be contested 
before the Constitutional Court by the central government within thirty days of their 
publication. The statute is submitted to popular referendum if one-fiftieth of the electors 
of the Region or one-fifth of the members of the Regional Council so request within three 
months from its publication.  The statute that is submitted to referendum is not 
promulgated if it is not approved by the majority of valid votes.272 
 These provisions provide a firm domestic legal entrenchment of the autonomous 
statutes, but they also make the statutes quite hard to amend. Consequently, in the case of 
regions with special statutes, there is a peculiar institutional machinery enabling a more 
flexible adjustment of the autonomous legal system to eventual new challenges. “All 
special regions can negotiate with the state the concrete developments of their autonomy, 
bilaterally and on an equal footing. For each of the five special regions, a joint body of 
state and regional representatives (in equal number) has been established, with the crucial 
task of drafting the enactment decrees implementing the regional autonomy statues. These 
drafts are submitted to the national government, which approves them in the form of 
governmental decrees. The decrees are by-laws of the autonomy statute and cannot 
therefore be abrogated or amended by the laws of the national parliament.273 This is due 
to the so-called ‘principle of specialty’, according to which special regions have a 
                                                          
268 Id. Article 10. 
269 Id. Article 16, Paragraphs 3. and 4., and article 17. 
270 Article 116, Paragraph. 1 CI. 
271 Id. Article 123. 
272 A similar procedure applies to constitutional laws on the national level under Article 138 CI. 
273 This means that enactment decrees in practice lie between constitutional laws and ordinary legislation 
in the hierarchy of norms. 
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privileged status with particular regard to negotiations with the state,274 which are carried 
out in a way that is similar to international relations: either there is consensus among the 
parties involved or the agreement cannot be reached. In other words, the relations between 
the state and the special regions are not based on hierarchy but, in principle, on parity. 
Put differently, the existence of two categories of regions cannot be abolished even by 
means of a constitutional reform.” 275  In South-Tyrol these enactment decrees 
(Durchführungsbestimmungen) are adopted by the so-called Commission of Six 
(Sechser-Kommission) consisting of three Italian members (appointed by the Italian 
Parliament) and three German speaking members (appointed by the South-Tyrolean 
Landtag). 
The case of Italy shows that the constitution of a unitary state can flexibly 
accommodate a “federalist-like” division of powers (where the state is "only" vested with 
enumerated powers, and all other legislative and administrative competencies are 
transferred to the regions), as well as asymmetrical regionalism (whit different levels of 
competencies even among the special regions) open to further devolution of powers from 
state to regional or provincial levels. While the Romanian constitution safeguards the 
unitary and indivisible, national character of the state to the extent that these features may 
not be the object of a constitutional amendment,276 the Italian Constitution safeguards 
with the same vigour the special status of its autonomous entities, as their competencies 
cannot be unilaterally abrogated or amended by the national parliament, not even by 
means of a constitutional reform. Furthermore, the involvement of the kin-state (Austria) 
and the UN as mediators in the conflict from the late sixties onwards makes the case of 
South Tyrol one of the most salient models to analyse from the Szekler point of view. 
The Constitution of Spain (CS) is unique in the sense that Section 2 recognizes 
and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is 
composed. Under the auspices of this “right to autonomy”, the administrative structure is 
decided by the Self-governing Communities (Comunidades Autónomas),277 who are free 
                                                          
274 This principle is constantly stated in the case law of the Constitutional Court. See, among others, 
Judgments No. 20/1956; 22/1961; 151/1972; 180/1980; 237/1983; 212/1984; and 160/1985. 
275 Woelk et. al (2008), pp. 39-40. 
276 Article 152 (1) CR. 
277  These communities are defined by Art. 143 CS as provinces with common historic, cultural and 
economic characteristics, insular territories and provinces with a historic regional status. Currently there 
are 17 Autonomous Communities: Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Basque Country, Canary 
Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile and León, Catalonia, Extremadura, Galicia, La Rioja, 
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to decide whether or not they would like to form a common province or accede to an 
existing one.278 This so-called dispositive principle (principio dispositivo)279 allows for a 
structure that is permanently open at the "disposal" of the autonomous communities.280 
The scope of the competencies they can assume is equally flexible. Section 149.1 
enumerates the exclusive competencies of the central state, such as international 
relations;281 immigration; defence; administration of justice;282 commercial- criminal- 
civic- or labour legislation, regulations on customs, tariff and foreign trade; or basic 
legislation on the financial system, health- and on social security...etc.283 But matters  not  
expressly  assigned  to  the State by the Constitution may fall under the jurisdiction  of  
the Self-governing Communities by virtue of their  Statutes  of  Autonomy, while  
jurisdiction  on  matters  not  claimed  by  Statutes  of Autonomy shall fall with the 
State. 284  The competencies that the Communities can assume are enumerated under 
section 148 CS and include fields such as: organization of own institutions; urban 
planning, and housing; public transportation; woodlands and forestry; agriculture and 
fisheries in accordance with general economic planning; administration of local cultural 
institutions (schools, museums, libraries). The precise enumeration of competencies is 
particularly important, given that state law and regional legislation enjoy the same legal 
value, meaning that in case provisions of these two forms of legislation clash, the law will 
prevail that was adopted by the legislature, which possesses jurisdiction over the given 
subject. Due to this legal equality, it is the Constitutional Court alone that can decide in 
                                                          
Madrid, Murcia, Navarre, Valencia, and two autonomous cities on the northern coast of Africa: Ceuta and 
Melilla. 
278 Section 143 CS. 
279 For a broader explanation of this principle, see among others Constitutional Court Decision 247/2007 
from December 12. 
280 The constitution also differentiates between a fast-track (Art. 151 CS) and a slow assumption of powers 
(Art. 143 CS). In most cases the latter one was chosen. 
281  Notwithstanding the exclusive competencies over foreign affairs, there is an institution called the 
Conference on Issues Related to the European Union (Conferencia para Asuntos Relacionados con la 
Unión Europea - CARUE), aimed to channel the views and interests of the Autonomous Communities 
regarding EU decision-making before Madrid adopts a position on various EU policy issues. A similar 
parity-based organ was established through organic law 8/1980 called the Council of Fiscal and Financial 
Policy (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera), in order to adapt the coordination between the financial 
activities of the Autonomous Communities of the State Treasury. 
282 While the legislative and executive branches are decentralized, the judicial power remains an exclusive 
power of the State. 
283 The CS also allows the state to lay down the basics of a field to be regulated while leaving it to the 
Communities to enact the detailed regulations or to ensure the regional administrative enforcement of state 
level legislation. 
284 Section 149.3 CS. 
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such cases which law prevails over the other.285 Ordinary judges cannot perform such 
scrutiny. Thus, this system allows for the gradual development of asymmetric regionalism 
providing the Self-governing Communities wish to expand the scope of their jurisdiction. 
However, such expansion of competencies has its own limits some of which came 
particularly well to the fore when the Catalan Parliament adopted a new Statute of 
Autonomy on 30 September 2005, which aimed to widen the powers of the Generalitat 
de Catalunya.286 
In general, the text of the Statutes of autonomy is adopted by the respective 
regional legislatures but is subject to the approval of the Spanish Parliament (Cortes 
Generales),287 which in practice means a political veto, and not just a constitutional one, 
as we saw in Italy (as Arzoz characterises this system: “the autonomy statutes were denied 
a constitutional role in the process of developing the decentralisation model”).288 The text 
then has to be approved on a referendum after which the Constitutional Court can still 
exercises scrutiny over the statutes’ compliance with the Constitution and can overrule 
provisions or define the interpretation thereof. However, once enacted, the autonomy 
statute cannot be unilaterally amended by the central government.289 
It was against this backdrop that the mentioned amendment of the 1979 statute of 
autonomy of Catalonia took place. After the overwhelming majority of the Catalan 
Parliament voted in favour of the text (125 in favour, 15 against out of a total 135 
representatives), the statute was submitted to the Spanish legislature where about half of 
the provisions were already repealed as part of a deal with the then governing socialist 
party (PSOE) in January 2006. The Congress and the Senate both approved the new 
Statute on 10 May 2006 when the amended text passed through its final reading with the 
support of all parties except for the Spanish main opposition party, the conservative 
                                                          
285 The Constitutional Court`s scrutiny, however, is a point where there is a difference between national 
and regional legislation, as the CCS can suspend the application of regional laws but not national ones. 
286 The term Generalitat refers to the three main decision-making institutions of, including the Parliament 
of Catalonia, the President of the Generalitat de Catalunya and the Government of Catalonia. 
287 Section 147.3 CS. 
288 Arzoz (2012), p. 187. 
289  In theory the only way for the central government to unilaterally encroach upon autonomous 
competencies is adopt „laws of harmonization”. As Article 150.3 CS stipulates, the State may enact laws 
laying down the necessary principles for harmonizing the rulemaking provisions of the Self-governing 
Communities, if general interest so requires. However, the Constitutional Court has been restrictive in the 
interpretation of this rule, and has annulled the only harmonizing law that has so far been adopted (See 
ruling STC 76/1983). 
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People's Party (PP), and the Catalan separatist party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. 
On 18 June 2006, the new statute was approved in a referendum gaining the support of 
73.9% of the participating electorate. In early 2006, PP members of the Cortes filed an 
appeal against the new Statute with the Constitutional Court of Spain (CCS) arguing that 
126 articles were unconstitutional and that the French model of popular sovereignty 
applies also to Spain: “It can be said, with reason, that the centralism characteristic of 
French constitutionalism is not comparable to the Spanish constitution of 1978. But what 
is without doubt identical to it [in our constitution] is the concept of the people. The 
question is of enormous constitutional relevance because the concept of the people is used 
for nothing less than to attribute to it national sovereignty. National sovereignty is not 
fragmentable and still less, consequently, is the Spanish people. This is not a federative 
concept, formed by grouping the peoples of the different Spanish communities. The 
individual components of this sovereign people ... are the citizens. All of them belong to 
a single category, not to be differentiated territorially”.290 The appeal dragged on for four 
years. In the meantime, the terms of four judges expired in late 2007 (and one place was 
vacant since 2008 due to the death of one judge), but for political reasons they were not 
replaced. Finally, in late June 2010, after 4 years of deliberations, a divided court rendered 
14 articles of the statute unconstitutional and 27 others subject to further legal opinion 
(while also criticizing much of the PP appeal as inaccurate and badly argued).291 For the 
purposes of this study, this latter group of provisions are more interesting given that it 
shows the importance of being “legally open-minded” to decentralization and the will of 
local communities.  
Decision no. 31/2010 of the CCS vividly demonstrates the importance of how one 
interprets statutory provisions. Instead of rendering some of the provisions that were 
deemed by PP critics as unconstitutional, the Court provided an interpretation which 
allows for these provisions to remain in place given that they are interpreted in a specific 
manner (much to the dismay of the Catalan Parliament, these interpretations were 
                                                          
290 Introduction of PP`s appeal to the Constitutional Court as quoted by: Friend (2012), p. 105. 
291 Rejection applied to articles concerning judicial powers of the Council of Justice of Catalonia, some 
financial powers of the Taxation Agency of Catalonia as well as some linguistic competencies. 
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unacceptable for them in many ways).292 For this reason, it is worth mentioning some of 
the findings of this ruling. 
Some of the contested provisions of the New Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 
(NSAC) alluded to symbolic issues. The Preamble stipulated that the Parliament of 
Catalonia defined Catalonia “as a nation by an ample majority” and that “The Spanish 
Constitution, in its second Article, recognizes the national reality of Catalonia as a 
nationality”. Accordingly, Article 8 of the NSAC described the flag, the holiday and the 
anthem of Catalonia as “the national symbols of Catalonia”. These articles have been 
challenged for classifying as “national” the symbols of Catalonia, which were believed to 
contradict the concepts of unity and indivisibility as set out by Section 2 CS. The CCS 
mentions that „it is indeed possible to speak of nation as a cultural, historic, linguistic, 
sociological and even religious reality. But the nation of importance here is solely and 
exclusively the nation in its legal and constitutional sense”.293  This means that, as far as 
constitutional law is concerned, the term „nation” can only be interpreted as a civic bond 
between all citizens of Spain irrespective of their cultural identity. Consequently, the 
interpretation of the references to “Catalonia as a nation” and to “the national reality of 
Catalonia” in the preamble of the NSAC have no legal effect. In other words, while the 
communities of Spain have the right to self –government, the exercise of this right can 
only happen within the indissoluble Spanish nation, where the concept of the “nation” 
connotes the civic understanding of a political community composed of all citizens of the 
Spanish state and can only be used by a sub-state entity for self-identification within these 
constitutional boundaries. Finally, as far as “national symbols of Catalonia” are 
concerned, this wording can allude to a manifestation of the right recognized under 
Section 2 CS with “no intention to challenge the competency or counteract the symbols 
of the Spanish nation”. 
With regard to linguistic issues, the Generalitat attempted to place Catalan on 
equal footing with Castilian by stating under Article 6 (2) NSAC that „all persons have 
the right to use the two official languages and citizens of Catalonia have the right and the 
duty to know them”. These provisions were inspired by Section 3.1 CS, which lays down 
                                                          
292 See Legal Report of experts commissioned by the President of the Generalitat as a response to CC 
Decision 31/2010: http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/docs/2010/07/21/12/11/76d06239-427f-48da-a533-
5cf2492b43ea.pdf, accessed: 2016.07.13. 
293 Paragraph 12 of Decision 31/2010. 
  
105 
 
the duty of all Spaniards to know Castilian. In the CCS’s opinion, these provisions would 
be unconstitutional and null if their intention was to impose a duty to know Catalan, 
equivalent in meaning to the constitutional duty to know Spanish. However, the CCS 
noted that there is a different possible interpretation, according to which the “the duty to 
know Catalan” refers to a mandate of the public powers of Catalonia „to adopt the 
measures necessary to facilitate compliance with this duty”.294 In this context, the duty to 
know Catalan would create liability for Catalan public institutions to build up capacity to 
be able to communicate and teach in Catalan, whereas the duty to know Castilian applies 
to all citizens of the state. Linguistic issues came also to the fore with regard to education. 
Article 35.1 NSAC stipulates that “each individual has the right to receive an education 
in Catalan”, and that “Catalan shall be used as the teaching and learning language for 
university and non-university education”. The CCS notes that even though this article 
does not refer to Spanish as a teaching language, this cannot be understood deliberately 
to order an exclusion. While “it is perfectly legitimate for Catalan to be the centre of 
gravity of this model of bilingualism … both languages must be not just taught, but also 
a means of communication in the educational process as a whole, both co-official 
languages constitutionally must be recognized by the public powers as teaching and 
learning languages and therefore each individual has the right to be taught in either of 
them”.295 
The most instructive part of CCS decision 31/2010 in comparison with the Szekler 
case was probably the one pertaining to the internal administrative borders of Catalonia. 
Articles 83, 90 and 91 NSAC mention Vegueria as the new administrative unit of local 
government in Catalonia (responsible for the territorial organisation of its services),296 
whose executive council should supersede that of the province.297 The challenge to the 
Vegueria system was dismissed by the CCS “because the territorial division of the State 
into provinces, generally speaking, is not affected by it, nor, more particularly, is the 
division of Catalonia into the four provinces currently existing… since the constitutional 
guarantee of the province as a local entity does not exclude the existence of other supra-
                                                          
294 Id. at, paragraph 14. b. 
295 Id. at, paragraph 24. 
296 The vegueria was the feudal administrative territorial division of the Principality of Catalonia between 
the 12th and 18th century. 
297 Catalonia is currently divided into 948 municipalities, which are organized into 42 comarcas, included 
in 4 provinces. 
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municipal government entities”.298 The conclusion of the CCS was that the autonomous 
administration in practice is free to develop whatever local administrative structure it 
deems appropriate for the organizations of services that fall in their competencies (even 
concurring, multi-level structures) as long as they maintain the administrative capacities 
for the fulfilment of state activities. In this sense, the executive branch of Veguerías could 
even replace that of the provinces, but only if “the State legislation determines their 
composition, the form in which its members are elected, as well as the basic state 
standards regulating their competencies in the local arena”;299 and only if their geographic 
borders coincide, given that Section 141.1 CS states that „any alteration of provincial 
boundaries must be approved by the Cortes Generales in an organic act.”.  
As described earlier in Chapter 2.2.2, one of the procedural objections against the 
reestablishment of the traditional Szekler Seats, as internal administrative units of an 
autonomous Szeklerland, was that no such unit is mentioned in the constitution and that 
this would result in a 3 level municipal structure, as opposed to the usual 2 level system 
of any other county of Romania. In this perspective, it is worth mentioning that the CCS 
did not find anything unconstitutional in Chapter VII NSAC, which concerns Aran's own 
institutions.300 Aran is an autonomous entity within an autonomous entity. Addressing 
Aran's cultural specificities, they were granted an autonomous government called the 
Conselh Generau, which is vested with the power to decide the own internal 
administrative division of Aran. Consequently, the Aranese executive established a 
territorial division that exists nowhere else in the whole country, the so-called terçons. 
The terçó was the traditional territorial division of the Aran Valley from 1313 to 1834. 
The Conselh Generau decided to re-establish them in 1990, even though the traditional 
borders of the terçons cross-cut that of the nine municipalities of Aran. Even though 
Section 141.3 CS stipulates that groups of municipalities other than provinces may be 
formed, the lack of a similar provision in the Romanian constitution does not constitute a 
de jure ban on other forms of administrative units.  
The example of Spain shows that even a unitary state is capable of accommodating 
a multi-tier administrative structure, which gives room for the expression of specific 
                                                          
298 Supra note, paragraph 40. 
299 Id. at, paragraph 41. 
300 Aran is the northernmost comarca of Catalonia where the population speaks Aranese, a form of the 
Gascon dialect of Occitan, spoken in Val d'Aran. 
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traditions in the shape of historical local administrative units. Furthermore, the example 
of Decisions 31/2010 of the CCS shows the relevance of how one perceives a provision 
and illustrates that interpretative framework of legal provisions can be constructed in a 
way that fosters the accommodation of autonomy aspirations and promotes 
“reconciliation” between the central state and its constituent regions aiming to achieve 
greater self-rule within existing constitutional boundaries. 
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Chapter 4 
4 Conclusions 
 
History shows that there has always been a certain readiness from the side of Romania to 
adopt western constitutional patterns and legal solutions, the implementation of which 
mostly failed due to deficiencies in political culture. Even so, the adoption of such 
“western” standards were never taken seriously when they pertained to best practices of 
minority protection, decentralization or power-sharing. Romanian political- and 
diplomatic elites preferred investing their creative energies in generating the appearance 
that the country abides by her international commitments regarding minority protection 
to actually abiding by them. This is the reason why public institutions fail on purpose to 
fully implement relevant international documents signed and ratified by Romania, and 
the reason why state policies towards the Hungarian/Szekler community are characterized 
by general mistrust, forced linguistic inequality, persecution of symbols and 
criminalization of autonomy aspirations. The long-term aim has continued to be the 
establishment of an ethnically homogenous nation state. An endeavor which is very much 
detectable in practices of local and national governments, debates carried out in-, and 
laws adopted by the parliament, court judgments, fines and protocols of law enforcement 
agencies or activities of the secret services and other actors of the Romanian deep state. 
All these different public institutions exhibited in their own peculiar way some typical 
traits of nation-state thinking: the majority is dominant and superior to the extent that it 
can impose on the minority separate forms of behavior to follow and dissenting rules to 
abide by; exercising certain rights is contingent on the approval of authorities in the case 
of the ethnic Hungarian minority but not for the ethnic majority (as we saw in the case of 
the DSF); ultimately it is the ethnic majority that is entitled to tell the minority how to 
live, what language to speak, which identity to pledge allegiance to, and what legal status 
to enjoy.   
Despite the preferences of the ethnic majority on what this legal status should 
entail, the arguments of the preceding Chapters prove that territorial autonomy as an 
institutional solution does not contradict the constitutional order of Romania. There are 
no provisions in the Romanian legal system whatsoever, which would constitute a legal 
obstacle to the creation of an autonomous administrative unit. Chapters 1 and 152 of the 
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Constitution of Romania, so frequently referred to in the autonomy discourse, are thus of 
no legal relevance and cannot be understood as an effective constitutional legal barrier. 
On the contrary, the notion of autonomy is not alien to the Romanian constitutional 
system at all, as it recognizes personal, functional, as well as a certain degree of territorial-
administrative autonomy. The only existing obstacle to a Szekler autonomy arrangement 
is a political one. The assumption that autonomy contradicts the constitutional order and 
violates the unitary, indivisible and national character of the state arises from the 
misinterpretation of the connection between state and autonomy. These misconceptions 
can be traced back to the historic resentment that is present in Romanian political culture 
towards Hungarians and the parallel nation-building processes of Hungarians and 
Romanians that have been unfolding for more than a century now. Fears of autonomy are 
also fuelled by weak rule of law traditions and insufficient experiences in democratic 
governance. The tacit agreement on full rejection of autonomy produces conceptual 
restraints, which blind nation-state enthusiasts to alternative and possibly more effective 
ways the state machinery could function. This is how referring to Article 1 of the 
constitution becomes a mental shortcut to avoid a meaningful discussion on territorial 
autonomy. This is also where the inspiration came from to invite readers of this 
dissertation to engage in a mind-game in order to deconstruct the “constitutional myth”. 
What we intended to illustrate is that a “simple” change in the mind-set can remove an 
unnecessary and unjustified, albeit seemingly robust obstacle to a legitimate minority 
claim. 
With this in mind, the most relevant conclusion that can be deducted from the 
numerous different forms of legal entrenchment presented above is that in the presence 
of political will, minority claims can be accommodated even if the resolution requires the 
central state to resort to special means. In the case of the Åland Islands, the autonomy 
statute was provided with a firm general constitutional entrenchment and protection 
against unilateral amendment by the central governments. As an act of exception, this 
statute was unique in its kind and stood alone in the Finnish legal system for over seven 
decades. South Tyrol was equally special within the Italian constitutional system, on the 
one hand, because among the five regions with special statutes, it is the only one to have 
an international legal entrenchment through the Gruber-de Gasperi agreement, and on the 
other hand, because in their case the autonomous competencies were granted on a 
provincial level, while in the other four cases autonomous competencies were granted on 
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the regional level. Both Åland and South Tyrol show the importance of active 
participation of the international community in facilitating a dialogue between a state and 
its constituent parts striving for greater self-rule. These examples also show that kin-states 
can have a pivotal role in assisting the aspirations of their compatriots abroad. The 
devolution of Scotland required the common law system of the UK to change and develop 
including its pivotal doctrine on parliamentary sovereignty, which is now altered by the 
Sewel Convention. In other words, with the devolution process the UK Parliament has 
chosen to exercise its legislative sovereignty in devolved matters through an elected body 
other than the UK Parliament and reinforced this decision in its political conventions.301 
The Faroese case shows the importance of political culture in the establishment and 
functioning of an autonomous arrangement. The relations between Faroe and Denmark 
are developed under the auspices of equality, consensus building and the respect of 
Faroese peculiarities, even though in the absence of a general constitutional entrenchment 
there are no constitutional provisions that would compel successive Danish governments 
to follow suit with this approach. The example of Gagauzia and the Hungarian 
Autonomous Province in Romania shows that territorial autonomy can be achieved within 
central-eastern Europe as well, even though most of the territorial autonomies of the 
continent exist in Western Europe. Parallel with the numerous flexible legal solutions that 
were mentioned, the case of the New Catalan Statute of Autonomy showed the 
importance of a positive attitude from institutions of the central state towards 
decentralization and the aspirations of a nationality. Judgment 31/2010 of the CCS 
showed how easy it is to remove a perceived threat (greater autonomy to sub-state 
entities) by simply presenting an alternative interpretation of a given legal provision. This 
simple observation is particularly relevant in the case of Romania, where the political 
culture and the constitutional traditions are overtly ethnocentric. Even so, the text of the 
Constitution of Romania is not, “all in all, ethnocentric in itself: it allows an opposite, 
pluralistic interpretation. What must be changed, therefore, is not the constitutional text 
but the ethnocentric mentality”.302 
One can draw inspiration from the examples and solutions mentioned in this study 
and apply them to the Szekler case. The Draft Law on the Autonomy of Szeklerland could 
                                                          
301 Some scholars even argue that autonomy in Scotland and Northern Ireland defies a feature of the 
Parliamentary Sovereignty doctrine, namely that all statutes are of the same constitutional value. See: 
Tierney (2014), pp. 159-180. 
302 Selejan-Gutan (2016), p. 43. 
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blend into the Romanian legal system as an organic law based on Article 117 (3) of the 
Constitution. Besides this semi-general constitutional entrenchment, a regional 
entrenchment would also be present as the Draft Law stipulates that any amendment to 
the statute should be approved in a local referendum before it can enter into force. While 
such an arrangement could be flexible enough to follow the changes that inevitably occur 
in group relations over time, it might also make it doubtful whether such an arrangement 
would be sufficient enough to protect the local Szekler community in the long run and to 
ensure the effective participation of the citizens of the autonomous polity in public 
decision making. Due to the weakly embedded nature of democratic political culture, a 
political entrenchment that functions effectively in Denmark or the UK cannot be 
achieved within a reasonable time-frame in Romania.  For this reason, an international 
entrenchment of some kind would be desirable to counterbalance the possible 
shortcomings of the lack of a general constitutional entrenchment. Such a treaty-based 
entrenchment would be possible under the auspices of an international organization or 
can take a bilateral form as concluded between Hungary and Romania. 
As a closing remark, one could refer to the thoughts of Count Esterházy János303 
regarding good minority policy that is also applicable to regional autonomy: “Righteous 
national minority policy is a considerably bigger coefficient than a number of written 
laws, it is more secure than any Maginot line, for nothing makes a state stronger than the 
fact that not only the majority citizens but also the minority citizens feel completely at 
home”.304 
  
                                                          
303 Count János Esterházy was an ethnic Hungarian politician in Czechoslovakia during the inter-war era 
as well as in the First Slovak Republic (a puppet state of Nazi Germany). He was the only parliamentarian 
of the First Slovak Republic who voted against the law on the deportation of Jews in 1942. Based on 
fabricated allegations, he was sentenced to ten years of forced labour in Siberia. Additionally, the Slovak 
National Court sentenced him to death in his absence for contribution to the dissolution of the Czechoslovak 
state. He was not executed due to a presidential pardon but was transferred around instead from prison to 
prison over the next ten years. He died in prison in 1957. 
304 Quoted by Kardos (2015), p. 40. 
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Chapter 5 
5 Policy implications 
 
The preceding chapters of this dissertation already imply some conclusions de lege 
ferenda.305Consequently, I found it important to directly address the possible policy 
implications that can be deducted from this study. The main task of this chapter would be 
to identify the corresponding action various actors (State, Minority Community, Kin-
state, International community) can undertake in order to assist the establishment of the 
territorial autonomy of Szeklerland in Romania.  
There have been many attempts within academia to gauge past events in an 
attempt to assess possible “recipes of success” for the future. Shaykhutdinov, for 
example, conducted a correlation and regression analysis on the self-determination 
movements of 168 ethnic groups in 87 states between 1945 and 2000306 in order to assess 
the impact of violence on the success of those movements.307 The statistical analysis 
showed that the employing peaceful tactics groups employ when seeking greater self-rule 
is the sole strongest predictor of the formation of an autonomy arrangement. Non-violent 
movements were about three times more effective at achieving territorial autonomy than 
ethnic groups that employed violence.308  Even though there were some cases where 
violent tactics played a significant role in an arrangement that introduced autonomy for 
that community, in most cases these tactics were found counterproductive as they 
generate mistrust and antipathy towards members of the movement and alienate 
representatives of the given state as well as actors of the international community. 
Furthermore, the study identifies some additional factors that are relevant to the Szekler 
case. A positive correlation with successful autonomy movements was found in cases 
                                                          
305 Latin expression, meaning "with a view to the future law" as opposed to de legelata, the “current law”.  
306 The analysis only included minority groups that constituted at least 1% of their country’s population or 
had 100,000 members or more, and had expressed a desire for territorial autonomy or independence at least 
once between 1945 and 2000. Additionally, groups included in the study resided in countries with a 
population of at least 500,000. 
307 Shaykhutdinov (2010), pp 179-191. 
308 This viewpoint is shared also by Daftary in her comparative study between Corsica and the Åland-
Islands where she notes that the low level of militarization of the Åland conflict along with the Finnish 
democratic political culture were major factors contributing to the success of the Ålandic autonomy 
movement relative to Corsica. See: Daftary, (2004). 
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where: the autonomy demand came from larger and geographically concentrated 
communities (the latter being the more important factor), there were international 
mediators involved in the autonomy process (state actors were found to have more 
influence in this regard than international organizations), the political system of the host 
country could be characterized as democratic.  
Cunningham examined the internal fragmentation of the primary actors of any 
autonomy process: the central governments of states and organizations representing a 
given minority community.309She argues that the internal structure of both movements 
for self-determination and national governments structures the negation process in these 
disputes and the incentives that both sides have for settlement. The author’s findings 
sophisticated the general topos that autonomy movements led by a sole and unified 
organization are more likely to succeed in winning autonomy than their organizationally 
fragmented counterparts. Unified movements have the competitive advantage that central 
governments are less able to deploy “divide and conquer” tactics against them. Thus, the 
negotiated agreement is more likely to echo the opinion of the whole group, which also 
makes this option more “costly” to central governments, insofar as it presupposes the 
fulfilment of all (or at least the majority) of the demands of that group. This scenario 
decreases the government`s manoeuvring space and pushes the dynamics of the autonomy 
process in the direction of a zero-sum game. The situation is not the same with internally 
fragmented movements where the government could use these internal divisions to their 
advantage by pursuing “divide et impera” strategy and offering autonomy deals that a 
subset of factions would agree to in an attempt to divide the moderates from the hard-
liners. This scenario would entail governments satisfying moderate factions with lesser 
concessions resulting in autonomy arrangements with a more limited scope of powers that 
are only accepted by a fraction of the group. This in turn could generate discontent among 
the minority group and make the arrangement more fragile and unstable.310 From the 
government’s point of view, this option is more favourable and easier to communicate as 
it does not jeopardize its own internal structure, which usually is not homogenous but is 
composed of parties with discrepant preferences. Cunningham states that relatively higher 
                                                          
309 Cunningham (2007), pp. 6-12. 
310 Salat and Constantine further point out that autonomy arrangements that are not accepted by the wider 
majority of the affected communities can produce severe legitimacy deficit. It was the case with Macedonia 
and the Ohrid Framework Agreement or the Jewish Autonomous Oblast in Russia. See: Salat et al. (2014), 
pp. 465-466. 
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levels of internal fragmentation of minority and majority actors constitute a hurdle for 
policy change, given that it increases the number of veto players on both sides, makes it 
more difficult for parties to assess each other’s relative bargaining strength and decreases 
the chances of elaborating an autonomy arrangement that would satisfy the majority of 
both sides. In summary, Cunningham notes that the chances of reaching an autonomy 
arrangement are the highest in cases where you have a government with a moderate 
number of internal veto players311 complemented by a minority group, which is either 
unified or fragmented in a way that allows governments to buy off moderates with lesser 
autonomy concessions.312 In this latter case, the minority group can increase its chances 
for a deal with establishing a coordinating or deliberative body for the various 
stakeholders, which decreases the potential of hard-liners to block the acceptance of an 
autonomy proposal of the government. 
Ghai and Woodman indicated on a 5-point scale how strong the correlation was 
between specific factors and their contribution to the establishment of an autonomy 
arrangement in 13 different regions. 313 They found that the most salient factor that 
facilitated the granting of an autonomous status was general regime change in the host 
country. Ghai notes that times when the architecture of the state is under review present 
an opportunity to minorities to assert a variety of claims to the future order including 
claims on autonomous status (this assertion was true to eleven of the thirteen autonomies 
covered by the book, which shows the presence of a strong correlation).314The second 
strongest correlation was found in cases where the international community actively 
contributed to the establishment of that autonomy. Chances for autonomy were further 
increased in cases where the territory inhabited by the given national community was 
relatively small in size and economic significance. Lastly, the presence of a democratic 
political system and traditions of rule law were found to have helped facilitate autonomy 
(given that most of the autonomies can be found in liberal democracies). Other authors, 
however, contested the relevance of democratic political structures in autonomy 
arrangements and would allude to examples where the host country could not be 
                                                          
311 As an example, she mentions the Corsican autonomy process whose outcome was very much shaped by 
the excessive number of veto players on the governmental level in 1982, 1991 and 2001. 
312 This type of favourable fragmentation was present in the North-east Indian movements of Naga, Mizo 
and Bodo. 
313 Ghai et al. (2013), pp. 449-486. 
314 Ghai et al. (2013), pp. 452. 
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characterized as a liberal democracy315 such as: Gagauzia in Moldova, Hong Kong in 
China, Aceh Darussalam in Indonesia, Bougainville in Papua New-Guinea, Muslim 
Mindanao in the Philippines or Tatarstan in Russia.  
Lapidoth highlights 16 points, which can contribute to a successful autonomy 
arrangement. Among these, we will find some I have already alluded to above (like the 
positive, mediating role of the international community) as well as new factors such as 
the importance of the consent of the minority community that is supposed to be the subject 
of the newly established autonomy. Moreover, if there is a kinstate to which the given 
minority of a host country is attached to culturally, than that kinstate should be involved 
in the autonomy negotiation process (and be able to give its tacit or explicit consent to it); 
and the arrangement should be mutually beneficial for both the state and the population 
of the given region.316 
 
5.1 Romanian state 
 
Earlier I have already alluded to some traits of the Romanian political culture that 
represent difficulties to be reckoned with, such as: informal mechanisms of decision-
making that often prevail over formal ones; selective law enforcement; weakness of rule-
of-law traditions; high levels of corruption-proneness resulting in the criminalisation of 
the political-elite and the reproduction of neo-patrimonial political practices; poorly 
phrased laws generating cacophony in interpretations of legislation; or the general lack 
of willingness to implement laws regarding minority rights. Nonetheless, from a legal 
doctrinal point of view, the following general categorization contains options that are 
theoretically available if state authorities wanted to accommodate minority autonomy 
claims: 
I) Options involving the amendment of the constitution or the adoption of a new one:  
a) Federalization: The imaginary line that separates the western civilization from the 
orthodox world runs right through the middle of Romania.317 The line of the Carpathians 
                                                          
315 See e.g.: Schulte (2015), pp. 75-84. 
316 Lapidoth (1997), pp 199-201. 
317 See Huntington (1996), 258. 
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separate regions and communities with historically divergent views on shared 
motivations, social values, beliefs, identities and interpretation of common 
experiences.318 These differences also have an economic spill-over effect in so far as they 
are reflected in different working morals, differences in financial literacy and economic 
discipline, traditions and religious beliefs affecting economic performance as well as 
consumer preferences or disparities in the inclination towards corruption.319 In multi-
ethnic polities shaped by such vast regional, historical, cultural and linguistic differences, 
a federalized state can be considered as an appropriate constitutional structure. This 
option, however, would most likely come into the fore only if Romania was to unify with 
the Republic of Moldova, which is not a plausible scenario in the foreseeable future.320 
b) Transformation into a regionalized state, characterised by asymmetric regionalism, like 
Spain or Italy: As Asbjørn Eide noted, a process of decentralization is often a “reaction 
to over-centralization, found unacceptable both because of bureaucratic overload, and for 
linguistic, cultural or other reasons. In Europe, recent cases are those of Belgium, Italy 
and Spain.” 321  In terms of Romania, both aspects are relevant. On the one hand, 
asymmetric regionalism could contribute to tackling governmental bureaucracy and the 
forms of corruption that can be linked to over-centralization. On the other hand, such 
regionalization would enable the state to avoid unnecessary inter-ethnic conflicts and 
create an administrative machinery that is often characterised as one of the most effective 
ways to ensure the effective participation of national communities in public affairs.322 As 
the Explanatory note of the Lund Recommendations reminds, “experience  shows  that  
powers  can  be  divided  even  with  respect  to fields of public authority traditionally 
                                                          
318 For a detailed description about the cultural differences in Romania see the findings of Bakacsi et al. 
(2006). 
319 For more information on culture`s impact on economy in both Romania, as well as in the whole EU see: 
Dabis (2015), pp.111-132. 
320 Such a unification would first require the settlement of the Transnistrian question between Moldova, 
Russia and the population of Transnistria. Secondly, the Gagauzian autonomy statute foresees the region’s 
secession from Moldova provided the country’s independent status ceases to exist. Gagauzia even 
organized a consultative referendum on the issue in 2014, where the overwhelming majority opted against 
the unification with Romania as well against EU membership, and favoured independence and membership 
in the Russian customs union instead. A third obstacle would be the reluctance of Moldovans to become a 
part of Romania. 
321 Paragraph 257 of Report no. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34/Add.4 of the Commission on Human Rights of the 
UN on the Protection of Minorities, available: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3b00f4344.pdf, accessed: 
2017.02.22. 
322 See e.g. Section III/B of the OSCE’s Lund recommendations on the Effective Participation of National 
Minorities in Public Life. 
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exercised by central government, including devolved powers of justice (both substantive 
and procedural) and  powers  over  traditional  economies.”323 
 
II) Options not necessarily requiring constitutional amendments. The main responsibility 
lies with the host country to protect its citizens belonging to a minority. The opportunity 
to engage in a dialogue with minorities is always open, and the administrative reform that 
has been on the agenda of Romanian politics for years now is a suitable framework for 
such a dialogue. The central government could at any time engage in a discussion with 
the representatives of the Hungarian community in order to elaborate an arrangement that 
would accommodate their aspirations but left the constitutional framework unchanged. 
Such a process could contain questions on the distribution of power and further 
decentralization through organic- or ordinary laws, but it should at least pertain to 
acknowledging cultural circumstances and aspects of minority protection when drawing 
the borders of future administrative units in accordance with the international and 
domestic legal obligations of the country. Pursuant to the provisions of Law 215/2001, 
and Article 5 of the European Charter of Local Self Government, a local referendum 
should be conducted to establish the will of the local communities in this regard. It would 
be perceived as a major step forward if Szeklerland were able to form one unified 
administrative unit even if it was without special law-making competencies. The 
historical seats, which are so deeply embedded in Szekler culture, could also be 
administratively re-established. This option would be short of what is written in the draft 
statute of autonomy, still it would represent a meaningful step towards recognizing the 
existence and distinctiveness of Szeklerland; contribute to building mutual trust between 
Hungarians and Romanians and foster the desecuritization of autonomy aspirations, all 
of which are key components for establishing a sustainable autonomy arrangement. As 
outlined in Chapter 4, such an autonomy does not contradict the constitutional order of 
the country and can be established without having to amend the Constitution. 
 
 
                                                          
323  See paragraph 20 of the Explanatory note, available at: 
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/32240?download=true, accessed: 2017.02.23. 
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5.2 Minority community 
 
While past events show that external (accession to international organizations) and 
internal (coalition forming with Hungarian parties) developments can trigger fluctuations 
in majority rhetoric on minority rights in Romania, this is not the case regarding attitudes 
towards autonomy.324 As we saw in Chapter 2.3, the majority political parties - regardless 
of their ideological affiliation - remain adamantly opposed to granting either cultural or 
territorial autonomy. Representative organizations of the Hungarian community are, thus, 
left without political allies among the majority parties in this regard.  Hungarian parties 
can reach certain concessions if their presence is needed to produce a governing majority 
in the national parliament. Still, as long as the general opinion of the political elite remains 
so rejecting, major public demonstrations need to be organized to raise both international 
and domestic public awareness. Given that the Romanian political elite refuses to engage 
in a dialogue about autonomy within domestic institutions, proactive presence in 
international fora is pivotal, which can provide external motivation for Romanian 
authorities to engage in a dialogue in order to accommodate minority claims.  
An aspect, which continuously comes to the fore when mentioning the minority 
actors of the autonomy struggle is the extent to which they are internally fragmented. 
Cunnigham mentioned that while unified autonomy movements do not have to face 
“divide and conquer” tactics of the central government, certain degrees of organizational 
fragmentation can foster an autonomy deal. As far as Hungarian political parties are 
concerned, the Dominant party was always DAHR which has gained around 80% of the 
valid Hungarian votes since the political transition even when they had smaller contenders 
(like the Hungarian Civic Party or the Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania, both of 
which are pro-autonomy parties).325 Outside the party-political arena, the most relevant 
actor is the Szekler National Council, which, unlike DAHR, does not participate in 
elections and is rather involved in paradiplomacy and the organization of pro-autonomy 
mass demonstrations.326 If we accept Cunningham’s findings, we can conclude that this 
type of fragmentation can potentially foster a moderate form of autonomy arrangement. 
                                                          
324 See finding of Andriescu (2007). 
325 Source: Kiss (et. al) (2013), p. 7-8. 
326 A partner organization of SzNC is the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania which has a 
Transylvanian wide scope of activity and is not narrowed down to Szeklerland. 
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However, critics of DAHR point out that the party has switched tactics step by step and 
shifted from the community building- and mobilizing tactics of the nineties to putting an 
emphasis on the absorption of state resources instead. This in turn allows for a 
phenomenon called control-cooptation, whereby the central state is able to mitigate 
minority claims while not giving any concessions in return. 327  While DAHR was a 
member of various governments for over 16 years from 1996 onwards, the privileges they 
managed to obtain (like state investments in Hungarian regions) were due to ad hoc 
political deals, the cost of which was to abandon claims on institutionalization of ethnic 
power sharing or the use of international advocacy strategies.328 Given that this model 
reproduces the dominance of the titular nation and the marginalization of the Hungarian 
community, political parties that profess to represent an autonomist agenda, should sever 
ties with control cooptation, which allows the central state to transforms a minority 
representative organization into a channel that mediates and reproduces power 
asymmetry.329 Instead, minority organizations and DAHR in particular should resume 
and amplify strategies of community-building, international advocacy as well as 
domestic-public pressure and aim to achieve institutional solutions, as opposed to relying 
on haphazard political pacts. Such a strategy shift can be based on, and supported by, the 
overwhelming consensus and unity among Szeklers regarding demands towards 
territorial autonomy. 
 
5.3 Kin-state 
 
According to Kardos, “four types of action can be taken by a kin-state in favour of its kin 
minority: actions in the context of international bodies and mechanisms, actions in co-
operation with the home state, actions vis-à-vis other states, and domestic legislation on 
                                                          
327 Control-cooptation referrers to the process of neutralizing or overcoming the influence potential of a 
certain group (in this case a party representing a minority community) through assimilation into existing 
power-structures. 
328 In 2013 PM Victor Ponta made specific references to control-cooptation when he emphasized the 
importance of preventing the “radicalization” of Hungarian self-government claims by allowing DAHR 
into the government. See: Kiss (2015), p. 55. 
329 It is worth mentioning that the shear existence of control cooptation within the Romanian model calls 
into question the rationale of having a unified organizational system for minority protection. 
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the relationship with its kin minority”.330  In this context, there are two most salient forms 
of Hungarian kin-state activity. Firstly, it is important to have good neighbourly relations 
built on mutual trust between the kin-state and the host country. It is hard to imagine that 
Romania would grant autonomy to a minority whose kin-state they are suspicious of. 
Good relations and trust between Romania and Hungary can therefore be seen as a 
prerequisite for Szekler autonomy. Secondly, while some of the support that Hungary has 
so far granted for its kinspeople abroad stirred some controversy in the host countries 
(like the Status Law in the late nineties), financial and cultural support was much less 
contentious and has meant an important form of support that assisted minority 
communities in reproducing their societies. The maintenance of minority identity is a 
crucial question due to the rapid demographic decline Hungarian minorities have been 
suffering for many decades.331Such kin-state aid policies are not illegitimate or illegal 
given that Hungary concluded a series of bilateral treaties on good neighbourly relations 
and cooperation with surrounding states. Among others, these treaties contain reciprocal 
obligations for parties to protect and promote the existence and identity of minorities and 
obliges parties to settle all their disputes concerning the interpretation or implementation 
of this Treaty through direct consultations and negotiations or based on an international 
multilateral treaty on peaceful settlement of disputes both countries are parties to. Due to 
these, Hungary has a treaty-based, mutually agreed-upon opportunity to be involved in 
the management of minority affairs of neighbouring countries including Romania. Given 
the general reluctance of the international community as a whole to address the yet 
unresolved issues of traditional minorities, the kinstate activity of Hungary will continue 
to be an important factor in helping minority Hungarians to maintain and reproduce their 
societies, let their voices be heard by the international public opinion, initiate a dialogue 
with the host countries on their problems and aspirations and to negotiate beneficial 
economic deals and promote cross-border development programs. 
 
 
                                                          
330 Kardos (2006), p. 130 
331 Csángó Hungarian, for example, is already listed by UNESCO as one of the severely endangered 
languages of Europe. 
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5.4 International community 
 
The limited willingness of the main human rights/minority rights forum of Europe (the 
CoE) to interfere with minority affairs became obvious by 1993 at the latest. Had the 
Committee of Ministers of the CoE adopted Recommendation 1201 (1993), Europe 
would have an additional protocol on the rights of minorities to the European Convention 
on Human Rights which would be enforceable before the European Court of Human 
Rights. Not even an armed conflict, as violent as the Yugoslav wars, proved to be enough 
of an incentive for European states to create a general legal framework through which an 
external actor would have been entitled to make legally binding decisions regarding 
minority protection. Even so, Article 1 of FCPNM stipulates that the protection of 
national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to those 
minorities forms an integral part of the international protection of human rights, and as 
such falls within the scope of international co-operation. Consequently, while the 
responsibility to implement measures of minority protection lies primarily with the 
respective states, the question itself is not merely an issue of any state’s internal affairs. 
With this in mind, the importance of international organizations is mainly to provide 
platforms to develop the global or regional legal regimes of minority protection and to 
motivate states and within the given possibilities hold them accountable for the 
implementation of at least those international documents that were ratified by them. I 
have already mentioned the importance of the active involvement of other states and 
international institutions in autonomy arrangements.332 What can be added is that the 
international community can also foster the durability of autonomy arrangements as seen 
in the case of both South-Tyrol and the Åland Islands. Moreover, drawing on the 
experiences of this latter region, Hannikainen even asked the question why not authorize 
an international organ to work for the creation of regional autonomies in States?333 In the 
case of the Åland Island, the League of Nations actively participated in the formulation 
of the regional autonomy in close cooperation with both the minority community and its 
host country, who were both able to communicate their viewpoints to the League Council, 
and if these pertained to legal questions, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
could have been consulted. More importantly, the Ålanders had the opportunity to turn to 
                                                          
332 Ghai et al (2013), p. 452 
333 Hannikainen (1998),  p. 95 
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the League of Nations, as the external guarantor agency, in the event of Finland breeching 
its commitments. 
As we saw earlier, Romanian constitutional culture was heavily influenced by 
foreign models. Constitutional transplants following mostly the French and the Belgian 
constitutions were present in many cases. After the political transition of 1989, the Euro-
Atlantic integration provided for a set of different external requirements from both 
Strasbourg and Brussels, some of which even entailed the amendment of the constitution. 
International influence proved to be a strong factor in shaping both the norms and the 
mentalities specific to the Romanian legal system and constitutional culture. In fact, the 
historical overview presented in chapter 1.5 showed that the active involvement of 
external forces, especially state powers, was always needed in some form to develop the 
domestic circumstances of minority protection in Romania. Even though there appears to 
be a sufficiently diminishing readiness from the side of the international community to 
actively engage in resolving issues of traditional national communities of Europe, 
especially since the migration/refugee crisis started to unfold as of 2015, the mechanisms 
of the Council of Europe and the European Union, along with the involvement of foreign 
states could still play a salient role in fostering to improve autonomy related practices and 
legislation in Romania. 
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Annexes 
 
Table 1 - Demographic trends of Hungarian minority communities living in countries 
adjacent to Hungary (1989-2011)  
Country 1989-1992 2001-2002 % 2011 % 
Austria 33.459 40.583 21.3 ̴ 60.000 47.8 
Croatia 22.355 16.595 -25.8 14.048 -15.3 
Romania 1.624.959 1.434.377 -11.7 1.268.444 -11.6 
Serbia 344.147 293.299 -14.8 251.136 -14.4 
Slovakia 567.296 520.528 -8.2 458.467 -11.9 
Slovenia 8.503 6.243 -26.6 ̴ 5000 -19.9 
Ukraine 155.711 151.516 -2.7 ̴ 141.000 -6.9 
Total 2.756.430 2.463.141 -10.61 2.198.095 -10.76 
Source: Répás (ed.) (2013), p. 24. 
 
Figure 1 - Administrative borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
 
Source: Bereznay (2011), p. 173. 
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Figure 2 - Territorial changes due to the 1st, and 2nd Vienna Arbitrations in 1938, and 
1940 
 
Source: Bereznay (2011), p. 195. 
 
Figure 3 - Changing borders of the Hungarian Autonomous Province in communist 
Romania 
 
Source: Bereznay (2011), p. 205. 
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Figure 4 – Ethnic distribution of Transylvania (1910-1977) 
 
Source: Bárdi et al. (2008), p. 504. 
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Figure 5 – Ethnic distribution of Transylvania (2002)
 
Source: Bárdi et al. (2008), p. 505.  
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